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cap-shield MCP server

io.github.robinlidberg-dot/cap-shieldrobinlidberg-dotstreamable-httpv0.7.0Scanned

Context selection and compression for AI agents - recall measured, not claimed.

9 tools: 6 change things and 3 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 6 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 2 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

6 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the cap-shield MCP server can do

The cap-shield MCP server is published by the GitHub account robinlidberg-dot. It has 9 tools. It can create or change data (6 tools: measure_traffic, remember, get_account, issue_pass and 2 more), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

The fixed checks matched 2 findings (annotation-conflict and credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 0.7.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

9 tools

Changes things 6Claude Code: ask
  • get_accountGet an account and an API key.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_account" says "get": a word for reading.
    • The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "get_account" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "get_account" says "get": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get an account and an API key. Requires an email address. The key is returned ONCE and cannot be shown again — store it immediately. Beta quotas are low by design; they are hard stops, never overage billing.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Create account and API key
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • issue_passIssue a short-lived (15 minute) signed credential (a JWT) stating who the caller acts for.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "Issue a short-lived (15 minute) signed credential (a JWT) stating who the caller acts for..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Issue a short-lived (15 minute) signed credential (a JWT) stating who the caller acts for. REQUIRES A KEY. Anyone can verify it independently against /.well-known/jwks.json — without calling CAP-Shield again. 'acts_for' and 'scope' are NOT validated against reality: the pass only attests that the key holder claimed this, at this time, and that the claim is recorded in the audit chain. This is identity and claimed authorization, not a payment or access-control mechanism.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Issue a signed agent pass
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • measure_trafficMeasure how much of your own agent traffic could be saved.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Measure how much of your own agent traffic could be saved. NO ACCOUNT OR KEY NEEDED — use this first. Returns byte savings over the wire and, if a query is given, token savings from selective context retrieval. Nothing is stored: the text is compressed in memory and discarded. Rate limited to 20 calls per hour per IP.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Measure possible savings
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • pack_batchPack several messages into ONE compressed packet instead of packing them one at a time.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Pack several messages into ONE compressed packet instead of packing them one at a time. REQUIRES A KEY. Worth it for many small/medium messages (the per-message header cost is paid once per batch, and zstd shares context across them) — for a single message this has no advantage. Returns packet_b64 (hand it to unpack_batch to get the messages back) plus the measured byte savings versus packing each message separately. SECURITY: only batch messages that already share the SAME trust boundary (same tenant/agent — nothing attacker-influenced mixed in with a secret). Batched messages share one compression context, which can leak size-based information between them (a CRIME/BREACH-style side channel). There is no padding mitigation on this endpoint today, so trust-boundary separation is the only protection — don't rely on padding.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Compress a batch of messages
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • rememberStore a memory entry for later retrieval.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "store": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Store a memory entry for later retrieval. REQUIRES A KEY. This does not call any language model — it stores text in an isolated per-tenant archive. Use assemble_context to get relevant entries back.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Store a memory entry
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • unpack_batchUnpack a batch packet made by pack_batch (or by the /api/v1/pack-batch endpoint) back into the exact original list of messages, in order.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Unpack a batch packet made by pack_batch (or by the /api/v1/pack-batch endpoint) back into the exact original list of messages, in order. REQUIRES A KEY. Not for a packet made by the single-message pack endpoint — that is a different format and this will reject it.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Decompress a batch packet
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • assemble_contextRetrieve the memory entries that answer a question, within a token budget.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "retrieve": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Retrieve the memory entries that answer a question, within a token budget. REQUIRES A KEY. Send the returned 'context' to your language model INSTEAD of the whole history. This does not call a model itself — it selects what to send. The budget is a ceiling, not a target: selection stops where relevance runs out, often well below it. The response says how many entries were left behind and why. If the response has a 'budget_warning', the best match did not fit: call again with its suggested_token_budget.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Retrieve relevant memory
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • assemble_escalation_contextRetrieve a WIDE context for a question your model could not answer from assemble_context.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "retrieve": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Retrieve a WIDE context for a question your model could not answer from assemble_context. REQUIRES A KEY. Use it when assemble_context returned escalate_recommended=true, or when the answer depends on dates, counts or several sessions. This does not call a model itself. Returns 'context' (up to token_budget, default 150 000 tokens: lower it if your model's window is smaller), where each stored entry starts with a header '--- Session YYYY/MM/DD (Ddd) HH:MM ---' giving when it was stored, and 'utelamnat_kontext': lower-ranked entries that were left out, in the same format. Read those only if the answer is still missing from 'context'. Python users can pass the whole response to cap_escalate_helper.eskalera_om_behovs_v6().

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Retrieve wide dated memory
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • list_packagesList the available dictionaries with their MEASURED compression, including the ones that perform badly.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_packages" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List the available dictionaries with their MEASURED compression, including the ones that perform badly. Each entry says whether it works one message at a time or only batched, and how many messages came out LARGER. No key needed.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: List compression packages
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 18, 2026, 16:20 UTC, unchanged since Nov 18, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
6
Protocol version
2024-11-05
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 6 tools that change things (6 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://cap-shield-robin.fly.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 9 tools to an anonymous client, including measure_traffic (write), remember (write), get_account (write), issue_pass (write), pack_batch (write) and 1 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn1 info
  • The server marks "get_account" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "get_account" says "get": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "Issue a short-lived (15 minute) signed credential (a JWT) stating who the caller acts for..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.7.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http cap-shield https://cap-shield-robin.fly.dev/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http cap-shield https://cap-shield-robin.fly.dev/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__cap-shield__list_packages",
      "mcp__cap-shield__assemble_context",
      "mcp__cap-shield__assemble_escalation_context"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__cap-shield__measure_traffic",
      "mcp__cap-shield__remember",
      "mcp__cap-shield__get_account",
      "mcp__cap-shield__issue_pass",
      "mcp__cap-shield__pack_batch",
      "mcp__cap-shield__unpack_batch"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as cap-shield. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.robinlidberg-dot/cap-shield/verify?hash=b6f70f5bac13ccf38a81228bf6b7ab9b7c8824aeacaf8b9dbee0f99dec3537c9" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash b6f70f5bac13, from Nov 17, 2026, 22:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.robinlidberg-dot/cap-shield/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.robinlidberg-dot/cap-shield
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.robinlidberg-dot/cap-shield.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.robinlidberg-dot/cap-shield)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 17, 2026, 22:18 UTC.

cap-shield MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the cap-shield MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 9 tools, 6 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the cap-shield MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the cap-shield MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the cap-shield MCP server have?

9 tools: 6 write, 3 read. measure_traffic, remember, get_account, issue_pass, pack_batch, unpack_batch, list_packages, assemble_context and 1 more.

Does the cap-shield MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the cap-shield MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the cap-shield MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 17, 2026.