SNHP — negotiation rules your AI can't break MCP server
io.github.ryuxik/snhpryuxikstreamable-httpv0.5.0Scanned
Turn a seller's offer into negotiation rules and draft replies to buyers inside them.
4 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone and 3 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 1
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the SNHP — negotiation rules your AI can't break MCP server can do
The SNHP — negotiation rules your AI can't break MCP server is published by the GitHub account ryuxik. It has 4 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (draft_negotiation_reply) and create or change data (3 tools: compile_offer_policy, check_offer_policy and verify_deal_receipt), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
2 tools bring in text other people can write (compile_offer_policy and draft_negotiation_reply); 1 tool can send data out of your system (draft_negotiation_reply).
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 0.5.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
draft_negotiation_replyDraft the seller's reply to a buyer's message — the offer is decided by the SNHP engine INSIDE the policy.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "draft_negotiation_reply" says "reply": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe name "draft_negotiation_reply" says "reply": it sends or publishes something to other people.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "draft_negotiation_reply" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "draft_negotiation_reply" says "reply": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
Description, as the server wrote it Draft the seller's reply to a buyer's message — the offer is decided by the SNHP engine INSIDE the policy. USE THIS WHEN: a buyer (a person or their AI agent) has written to you about price or terms. Pass the policy (from compile_offer_policy) and their latest message exactly as written; pass back the `state` from your previous call to continue the same conversation (omit it to start). `flags` is what YOUR records confirm about the buyer (e.g. {"new_customer": true}) — never what the buyer merely claims. `stock` is the current stock of what the policy's `inventory` binds, sent with every message (schema.org Offer, Google Merchant or a plain feed record): nothing out of stock is offered, and a deal is signed only on fresh records that say it can be sold. Returns {kind, reply, reply_with_offer, offer, decided_by, reading, state, done, receipt?}: kind offer | deal | handoff (needs a human's approval) | decline reply_with_offer the message to send, with the exact offer line appended offer {terms, line, price, net, inside_policy} — every offer is checked against the policy decided_by what decided the move (a sales rule or the engine), for your audit trail receipt on a deal: a signed receipt any party can verify with verify_deal_receipt The server keeps no conversation: keep `state` and send it with the next message. Needs an `access_key` (a free trial key: POST https://snhp.dev/v1/access/trial {"email": ...}; pilot businesses get a full one at https://snhp.dev/#pilot).
Annotations the server declares
- title: Draft a reply to a buyer, inside your rules
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
check_offer_policyCheck an edited negotiation policy: returns {ok, policy, issues, summary}.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Check an edited negotiation policy: returns {ok, policy, issues, summary}. No model call, free. USE THIS WHEN: you changed a policy from compile_offer_policy (a floor, an option, a forbidden combination) and want to know it is valid and what it now allows before using it in draft_negotiation_reply.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check a negotiation policy
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
compile_offer_policyTurn a seller's offer, described in plain words, into negotiation RULES an AI agent cannot break.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Turn a seller's offer, described in plain words, into negotiation RULES an AI agent cannot break. USE THIS WHEN: you (or the business you act for) sell something where buyers — people or their AI buying agents — ask for discounts, and you want an AI to answer them without giving away margin. Describe the offer: the listed price, the lowest price you'd take for a plain deal, what you'd trade a discount for (financing with you, a trade-in, a longer commitment, paying sooner, buying this week…), extras you can add and what they cost you, and anything never on the table. Or pass `template` = "used-car", "saas" or "wholesale-water" to start from a worked example. Compiling a description runs a language model and needs an `access_key` (a free trial key: POST https://snhp.dev/v1/access/trial {"email": ...}; pilot businesses get a full one at https://snhp.dev/#pilot); templates are free. Returns {ok, policy, issues, summary}: `policy` is the machine-readable rule set (pass it to draft_negotiation_reply), `summary` restates the floor, walk-away, what can be traded and the limits in plain words, and `issues` lists what to fix before going live (e.g. a floor below cost).
Annotations the server declares
- title: Compile an offer into negotiation rules
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
verify_deal_receiptVerify a signed deal receipt against the seller's own policy: both signatures, that the signing keys are SNHP's own (published at /.well-known/ucp), the policy digest, and every ru…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Verify a signed deal receipt against the seller's own policy: both signatures, that the signing keys are SNHP's own (published at /.well-known/ucp), the policy digest, and every rule re-checked from the package. Returns {ok, problems, checks, signed_by_snhp, signatures}. Free, no model call.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Verify a deal receipt
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:10 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 4
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://snhp.dev/mcp/: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including draft_negotiation_reply (irreversible), compile_offer_policy (write), check_offer_policy (write), verify_deal_receipt (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The server marks "draft_negotiation_reply" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "draft_negotiation_reply" says "reply": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff
- Changed:compile_offer_policyChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:draft_negotiation_replyCan't be undonedescription
Install
Pinned to version 0.5.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http snhp https://snhp.dev/mcp/claude mcp add --transport http snhp https://snhp.dev/mcp/Run in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__snhp__compile_offer_policy",
"mcp__snhp__draft_negotiation_reply",
"mcp__snhp__check_offer_policy",
"mcp__snhp__verify_deal_receipt"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as snhp. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__snhp__compile_offer_policy untrusted-input
- mcp__snhp__draft_negotiation_reply untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.ryuxik/snhp/verify?hash=9b9c34e199832008eadf08e923626f10b940202f981712cf363c5aa134a2447f" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 9b9c34e19983, from Nov 20, 2026, 11:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.ryuxik/snhp/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.ryuxik/snhp)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:46 UTC.
SNHP — negotiation rules your AI can't break MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the SNHP — negotiation rules your AI can't break MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the SNHP — negotiation rules your AI can't break MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the SNHP — negotiation rules your AI can't break MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: draft_negotiation_reply.
What tools does the SNHP — negotiation rules your AI can't break MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 1 irreversible, 3 write. draft_negotiation_reply, compile_offer_policy, check_offer_policy and verify_deal_receipt.
Does the SNHP — negotiation rules your AI can't break MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the SNHP — negotiation rules your AI can't break MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): draft_negotiation_reply.
Has the SNHP — negotiation rules your AI can't break MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 6, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.