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LMGram MCP server

io.github.saezbaldo/lmgramsaezbaldostreamable-httpv0.1.2Scanned

Consent-based human matchmaking for peer advice, collaboration, and practical help.

17 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 3 do something that can't be undone, 8 change things and 5 only read.

Tools: 1 delete, 3 irreversible, 8 write, 5 read.
  • Reads private data · 3
  • Reads text others write · 14
  • Can send data out · 4
  • 3 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here can delete or cancel things and 3 do something that can't be undone. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the LMGram MCP server can do

The LMGram MCP server is published by the GitHub account saezbaldo. It has 17 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: panel_dismiss_suggestion), do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (send_message, panel_send_message and panel_create_intent) and create or change data (8 tools: request_human_match, start_chat, open_lmgram_panel, panel_register_device and 4 more). 5 tools only read.

3 tools read private data (list_messages, panel_snapshot and panel_chat); 14 tools bring in text other people can write (request_human_match, start_chat, list_messages and 11 more); 4 tools can send data out of your system (send_message, panel_mark_read, panel_sync_device_keys and 1 more). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

The fixed checks matched 3 findings (credentials-mention and annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 21, 2026, version 0.1.2.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

17 tools

Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
  • panel_dismiss_suggestionDecline an unopened match suggestion.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "panel_dismiss_suggestion" says "dismiss": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Decline an unopened match suggestion.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Dismiss suggestion
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
Can't be undone 3Claude Code: ask
  • panel_create_intentPublish only the minimized intent explicitly reviewed and submitted by the user in this conversation panel.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "panel_create_intent" says "create": a word for a change.
    • The description's first verb is "publish": a word for a change that another call does not undo.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Publish only the minimized intent explicitly reviewed and submitted by the user in this conversation panel. Do not include secrets, private transcripts, or dating requests.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Publish approved intent
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
  • panel_send_messageSend a client-encrypted text message after the user presses Send.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "panel_send_message" says "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe name "panel_send_message" says "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.chatId): what the tool writes goes there.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Send a client-encrypted text message after the user presses Send. Retry only the identical payload and clientMessageId.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Send encrypted message
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
  • send_messageSends a message into a LMGram chat.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "send_message" says "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe name "send_message" says "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.chatId): what the tool writes goes there.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Sends a message into a LMGram chat.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Send a chat message
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
Changes things 8Claude Code: ask
  • open_lmgram_panelOpen LMGram chats, groups and suggestions for the current ChatGPT conversation.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "open_lmgram_panel" says "open": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "open_lmgram_panel" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "open_lmgram_panel" says "open": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Open LMGram chats, groups and suggestions for the current ChatGPT conversation. Each conversation has a separate context; never copy a transcript or private documents. This does not publish an intent or send a message.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Open LMGram conversation panel
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
  • panel_join_groupAccept an existing group invitation related to this context.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Accept an existing group invitation related to this context.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Join group
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
  • panel_mark_readMark the displayed chat as read.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "panel_mark_read" says "mark": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.chatId): what the tool writes goes there.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Mark the displayed chat as read.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Mark chat read
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
  • panel_register_deviceRegister only a public encryption key for this user's panel.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Register only a public encryption key for this user's panel.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Register encryption device
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
  • panel_start_chatRequest a chat with a suggestion in this context, without sending a plaintext introduction.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "panel_start_chat" says "start": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Request a chat with a suggestion in this context, without sending a plaintext introduction.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Request conversation
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
  • panel_sync_device_keysShare client-encrypted message keys only with this account's registered devices.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "panel_sync_device_keys" says "sync": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.chatId): what the tool writes goes there.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Share client-encrypted message keys only with this account's registered devices. Does not send messages, plaintext or private keys.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Sync own encryption devices
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
  • request_human_matchCreates an opt-in LMGram human match request only after the user explicitly asks to use LMGram to find a collaborator, peer, mentor, or helper.Reads text others write2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "request_human_match" says "request": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      description: "...tic matchmaking. Never include secrets, credentials, API keys, raw transcripts, customer da..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The input schema at properties.summary.description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.summary.description: "...-sensitive summary. Never send secrets, credentials, API keys, raw transcripts, customer da..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Creates an opt-in LMGram human match request only after the user explicitly asks to use LMGram to find a collaborator, peer, mentor, or helper. Never invoke for general advice, dating or romantic matchmaking. Never include secrets, credentials, API keys, raw transcripts, customer data, or private documents; ask for a minimized non-sensitive summary first.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Request a human match
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
  • start_chatStarts a LMGram chat for a match request, or records that this side wants to chat.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "start_chat" says "start": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Starts a LMGram chat for a match request, or records that this side wants to chat.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Start or request a chat
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
Only reads 5Show 5 read-only tools
  • get_current_userReturns the LMGram profile linked to the connected account.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_current_user" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns the LMGram profile linked to the connected account.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get current LMGram profile
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
  • list_match_requestsLists recent match requests for the current LMGram user, optionally filtered by role and status.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_match_requests" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Lists recent match requests for the current LMGram user, optionally filtered by role and status.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: List LMGram match requests
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
  • list_messagesLists messages in a LMGram chat.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_messages" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "list_messages" says "list" and "message": it reads messages.
    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "list" and "message": it reads messages.
    • untrusted-inputThe name "list_messages" says "list" and "message": it reads messages, which other people can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "list" and "message": it reads messages, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Lists messages in a LMGram chat. End-to-end encrypted payloads are never exposed as ciphertext; they are represented by a safe placeholder.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: List chat messages
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
  • panel_chatRetrieve authorized chat data for client-side decryption, not model context.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "retrieve": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "panel_chat" says "chat": it reads messages.
    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "retrieve" and "chat": it reads messages.
    • untrusted-inputThe name "panel_chat" says "chat": it reads messages, which other people can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "retrieve" and "chat": it reads messages, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Retrieve authorized chat data for client-side decryption, not model context.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Read private chat
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
  • panel_snapshotRefresh this conversation's private panel data.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "panel_snapshot" says "snapshot": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "conversation": it reads messages.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "conversation": it reads messages, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Refresh this conversation's private panel data.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Refresh conversation
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

168 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 3 private-data tools breaks every one.

Reads private data3
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Can send data out4
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__lmgram__list_messages",
      "mcp__lmgram__panel_chat",
      "mcp__lmgram__panel_snapshot"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:10 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
12
Protocol version
2025-03-26
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://api.lmgram.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
Authorization servers
https://api.lmgram.com
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
yes
Client ID metadata documents
no
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 12 tools that change things (1 destructive, 3 irreversible, 8 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://api.lmgram.com/mcp: tools/list returned 17 tools to an anonymous client, including panel_dismiss_suggestion (destructive), send_message (irreversible), panel_send_message (irreversible), panel_create_intent (irreversible), request_human_match (write) and 7 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn2 info
  • The server marks "open_lmgram_panel" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "open_lmgram_panel" says "open": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    description: "...tic matchmaking. Never include secrets, credentials, API keys, raw transcripts, customer da..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.summary.description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.summary.description: "...-sensitive summary. Never send secrets, credentials, API keys, raw transcripts, customer da..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http lmgram https://api.lmgram.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http lmgram https://api.lmgram.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__lmgram__get_current_user",
      "mcp__lmgram__list_match_requests",
      "mcp__lmgram__list_messages",
      "mcp__lmgram__panel_snapshot",
      "mcp__lmgram__panel_chat"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__lmgram__request_human_match",
      "mcp__lmgram__start_chat",
      "mcp__lmgram__send_message",
      "mcp__lmgram__open_lmgram_panel",
      "mcp__lmgram__panel_register_device",
      "mcp__lmgram__panel_mark_read",
      "mcp__lmgram__panel_sync_device_keys",
      "mcp__lmgram__panel_send_message",
      "mcp__lmgram__panel_start_chat",
      "mcp__lmgram__panel_join_group",
      "mcp__lmgram__panel_create_intent"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__lmgram__panel_dismiss_suggestion"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as lmgram. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 14 rules
  • mcp__lmgram__request_human_match untrusted-input
  • mcp__lmgram__start_chat untrusted-input
  • mcp__lmgram__list_messages private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__lmgram__send_message untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__lmgram__panel_snapshot private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__lmgram__panel_chat private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__lmgram__panel_register_device untrusted-input
  • mcp__lmgram__panel_mark_read untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__lmgram__panel_sync_device_keys untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__lmgram__panel_send_message untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__lmgram__panel_start_chat untrusted-input
  • mcp__lmgram__panel_dismiss_suggestion untrusted-input
  • mcp__lmgram__panel_join_group untrusted-input
  • mcp__lmgram__panel_create_intent untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.saezbaldo/lmgram/verify?hash=bd577e126fac4d5c66ce01025961c19738612233688bafac08f6117eeaeb82e4" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash bd577e126fac, from Nov 21, 2026, 03:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.saezbaldo/lmgram/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.saezbaldo/lmgram
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.saezbaldo/lmgram.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.saezbaldo/lmgram)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:48 UTC.

LMGram MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the LMGram MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 17 tools, 12 of which can change, send or delete something, and 3 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the LMGram MCP server delete data?

Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: panel_dismiss_suggestion.

Can the LMGram MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 3 tools can send, pay, publish or merge: send_message, panel_send_message and panel_create_intent.

What tools does the LMGram MCP server have?

17 tools: 1 destructive, 3 irreversible, 8 write, 5 read. panel_dismiss_suggestion, send_message, panel_send_message, panel_create_intent, request_human_match, start_chat, open_lmgram_panel, panel_register_device and 9 more.

Does the LMGram MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the LMGram MCP server send data to outside services?

4 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): send_message, panel_mark_read, panel_sync_device_keys and panel_send_message.

Has the LMGram MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 21, 2026.