Skip to content

Abstraxn Agent Layer MCP server

io.github.sandeep-antier/abstraxnsandeep-antierstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Abstraxn: public Web3 MCP server for read-only chain data and pay-per-call relays.

12 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 2 change things and 9 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 2 write, 9 read.
  • Reads private data · 2
  • Reads text others write · 12
  • Can send data out · 1
  • 2 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Abstraxn Agent Layer MCP server can do

The Abstraxn Agent Layer MCP server is published by the GitHub account sandeep-antier. It has 12 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (network.prepare_transfer) and create or change data (2 tools: weather.forecast and market.crypto), but cannot delete data. 9 tools only read.

2 tools read private data (web3.lookup and travel.search); 12 tools bring in text other people can write (network.blocknumber, network.transaction_status, network.gas_info and 9 more); 1 tool can send data out of your system (network.prepare_transfer). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

The fixed checks matched 2 findings (annotation-conflict and long-description). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

12 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • network.prepare_transferBuild an **unsigned** native or token transfer transaction for a supported chain, from an explicit sender you provide.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "network.prepare_transfer" says "transfer": a word for a change that another call does not undo.
    • The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "network.prepare_transfer" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "network.prepare_transfer" says "transfer": a word for a change that another call does not undo.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Build an **unsigned** native or token transfer transaction for a supported chain, from an explicit sender you provide. Free, read-only against the chain (nonce/gas/fees are read live) — this tool never signs, broadcasts, holds a key, or enforces any allowlist/spend limit. This server never binds a caller wallet, so `from` is always required. Supported chains: solana, solana-devnet, ethereum, sepolia, polygon, amoy, bsc, bsc-testnet, base, base-sepolia, tempo, tempo-testnet, arbitrum-one, monad, skale-base-sepolia. Token (`token` field): - Solana: 'SOL' (native, default) or 'USDC'. - EVM: native symbol (default), 'USDC', 'USDC.e' where configured for the chain, or a raw 0x contract address (decimals are read live from the contract; `token_decimals` is only a fallback if that read fails). Gas: the sender pays gas in the chain's native token once they sign — this server never sponsors it. Raw calldata (EVM only): pass `data` (hex, 0x-prefixed) with `to` as the contract call target and `amount` as the native value to send (use "0" for a pure call). Privacy (`private`, EVM only): requests SKALE BITE encryption, only supported on skale-base-sepolia, where it defaults to true — pass `private: false` there for a plaintext transfer. Rejected on every other chain.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Prepare an unsigned transfer transaction
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • market.cryptoCrypto market-data lookups (CoinGecko-sourced pricing and market data), paid per call in USDC/USDm directly from the caller's own wallet via the x402 protocol — no Abstraxn account…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Crypto market-data lookups (CoinGecko-sourced pricing and market data), paid per call in USDC/USDm directly from the caller's own wallet via the x402 protocol — no Abstraxn account needed. Pick one `action`: - search ($0.001): fuzzy-search coins by name/symbol. Requires `q`. Call this first to resolve a coin id before using price_feed or historical_data, both of which need an id (e.g. "bitcoin"), not a ticker. - price_feed ($0.001): current price (and optionally 24h change / market cap) for one or more coins. Requires `ids` (comma-separated coin ids). Optional `currencies` (comma-separated fiat codes, default "usd"), `include_24h` (default true), `include_mcap` (default false). - market_data ($0.002): coins ranked by market cap (or another order) — use for "top N coins" / market overview questions. Optional `currency` (default "usd"), `category`, `order` (default "market_cap_desc"), `limit` (1-250, default 100), `page` (default 1). - historical_data ($0.003): historical price/market cap/volume series for one coin. Requires `id`. Optional `currency` (default "usd"), `days` (lookback window or "max", default 30), `interval` (e.g. "daily"). - trending ($0.001): currently trending coins by search interest. No extra parameters. - token_prices ($0.005): DEX-derived prices for up to 200 tokens in one call. Requires `tokens`, an array of `{chain, token_address}` objects. Prices above are indicative — the exact charge for a given call is always whatever the live payment challenge specifies for that request. The first call (no `paymentPayload`) returns `paymentRequired`; retry with the same arguments plus `paymentPayload` to complete payment and get the real result.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Crypto market data (pay-per-call)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • weather.forecastWeather data from a global weather data provider — current conditions, short-range forecast, astronomy, historical, marine, and location search.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Weather data from a global weather data provider — current conditions, short-range forecast, astronomy, historical, marine, and location search. Free, read-only, no wallet needed. Every action requires `q`, a location: a city name (e.g. "Paris"), "lat,lon" (e.g. "48.85,2.35"), a US/UK/Canadian postal code, or an IATA airport code. Pick one `action`: - current: current conditions for `q`. Optional `aqi` (default false) adds basic air quality data. - forecast: forecast for `q`. Optional `days` — this deployment runs on a data plan capped at 3 days, so only 1-3 is accepted; omit for the provider default. Optional `aqi`, `alerts` (default false, adds active weather alerts for the location where available). - astronomy: sunrise/sunset/moonrise/moonset/moon phase for `q` on `date` (required, YYYY-MM-DD). - search: resolve a fuzzy `q` into matching locations (name, region, country, lat/lon) — use this first if you only have an approximate place name and need to disambiguate. - history: past weather for `q` on `date` (required, YYYY-MM-DD, must be yesterday). This deployment enforces a free-tier data plan that only allows yesterday's date — any other date is rejected before a provider call is made. - marine: marine/sailing conditions for `q`. This deployment runs on a data plan limited to 1 day of data with no tide information. Results are for general informational purposes only — do not use them as the sole basis for decisions involving personal safety, aviation, marine navigation, or emergency planning.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Weather forecast and current conditions
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 9Show 9 read-only tools
  • network.blocknumberRead the current chain head — EVM block number or Solana slot — for a supported network.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read the current chain head — EVM block number or Solana slot — for a supported network. Free, read-only, no wallet needed. Use this to confirm a network is progressing before submitting a transaction, correlate off-chain events with on-chain height, or choose a safe starting point when scanning logs. Pass `chain` as one of: solana, solana-devnet, ethereum, sepolia, polygon, amoy, bsc, bsc-testnet, base, base-sepolia, tempo, tempo-testnet, arbitrum-one, monad, skale-base-sepolia. Omit `chain` (or pass `all`) to query every resolvable chain in one call.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get current block number / slot
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • network.gas_infoGet the current gas price and EIP-1559 fee hints for an EVM chain.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get the current gas price and EIP-1559 fee hints for an EVM chain. Free, read-only, no wallet needed. Use this to estimate transaction cost or explain fees to a user before they send a transaction. `chain` is required. Supported chains: ethereum, sepolia, polygon, amoy, bsc, bsc-testnet, base, base-sepolia, tempo, tempo-testnet, arbitrum-one, monad, skale-base-sepolia.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get gas price info
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • network.token_infoRead ERC-20 token metadata — name, symbol, decimals, total supply — for a token contract on an EVM chain.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read ERC-20 token metadata — name, symbol, decimals, total supply — for a token contract on an EVM chain. Free, read-only. Pass `token` as a contract address (0x…) or symbol `USDC` / `USDC.e` on chains where a lookup is configured. This server never holds a caller wallet, so no balance is ever returned — only public token metadata. Both `chain` and `token` are required. Supported chains: ethereum, sepolia, polygon, amoy, bsc, bsc-testnet, base, base-sepolia, tempo, tempo-testnet, arbitrum-one, monad, skale-base-sepolia.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get ERC-20 token info
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • network.token_priceGet a spot token price from a public market API (CoinGecko).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get a spot token price from a public market API (CoinGecko). Free — no payment or wallet needed. Defaults to ETH/USD.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get token spot price
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • network.transaction_statusCheck the status of a transaction.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "network.transaction_status" says "status": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check the status of a transaction. Supports both EVM (transaction hash) and Solana (signature). Free, read-only. Use this to confirm a transfer landed, debug a failed transaction, or report status to a user. Both `chain` and `transaction_hash` are required. Available chains: solana, solana-devnet, ethereum, sepolia, polygon, amoy, bsc, bsc-testnet, base, base-sepolia, tempo, tempo-testnet, arbitrum-one, monad, skale-base-sepolia.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get transaction status
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • places.lookupPlaces, solar, and aerial-view lookups, paid per call directly from the caller's own wallet via the x402 protocol — no Abstraxn account needed.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "places.lookup" says "lookup": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description is 4,001 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

      Matched text

      description ends: "...same arguments plus `paymentPayload` to complete payment and get the real result."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Places, solar, and aerial-view lookups, paid per call directly from the caller's own wallet via the x402 protocol — no Abstraxn account needed. Pick one `action`: - text_search_full ($0.08): full-detail place text search. Requires `textQuery`. Optional `maxResultCount` (1-5, default 5), `excludeFields` (default ["photos"]), `pageToken`, `locationBias` ({circle:{center:{latitude,longitude},radius}}), `includedType`, `languageCode` (default "en"), `openNow`, `minRating` (0-5), `priceLevels`. - text_search_partial ($0.02): same as text_search_full but returns fewer fields per place — cheaper for quick lookups. Same parameters. - nearby_search_full ($0.08): full-detail search for places within a radius. Requires `locationRestriction` ({circle:{center:{latitude,longitude},radius (0-50000)}}) — do NOT send a bare top-level latitude/longitude/radius. Optional `includedTypes`/`excludedTypes` (max 50 each), `maxResultCount` (1-5, default 5), `excludeFields` (default ["photos"]), `languageCode` (default "en"), `rankPreference` (POPULARITY default, or DISTANCE). - nearby_search_partial ($0.02): same as nearby_search_full, fewer fields, cheaper. Same parameters. - place_details_full ($0.05): full details for one place. Requires `placeId` — the exact place id returned by an earlier text_search/nearby_search result; do not invent or guess it. Optional `excludeFields` (default ["photos"]), `languageCode` (default "en"). - place_details_partial ($0.02): same as place_details_full, fewer fields, cheaper. Same parameters. - solar_building_insights ($0.02): rooftop solar potential for one location. Requires `latitude` (-90..90) and `longitude` (-180..180). Optional `requiredQuality` (LOW/MEDIUM/HIGH, default HIGH). - solar_data_layers ($0.08): raw solar data layers for an area. Requires `latitude`, `longitude`. Optional `radiusMeters` (0.1-175, default 50), `view` (default "FULL_LAYERS"), `requiredQuality` (default HIGH), `pixelSizeMeters` (default 0.25, documented as one of 0.1/0.25/0.5/1.0 but not schema-enforced), `exactQualityRequired` (default false). - solar_rgb_image ($0.05): renders one of the solar_data_layers assets as a viewable image. Either `id` (the exact asset id already returned by an earlier solar_data_layers call — "Mode A"; do not invent or guess it) OR both `latitude` and `longitude` ("Mode B") is required — provide exactly one mode, not both. Optional `radiusMeters` (0.1-100, default 30, Mode B only), `layer` (default "rgb"), `month` (1-12), `hour` (0-23), `format` (png/jpeg, default png), `scale` (1-2, default 1), `crop` (default false), `quality` (1-100, default 85). - aerial_view_lookup_video ($0.01): check whether a rendered aerial-view video already exists / poll its render status. Exactly one of `address` or `videoId` is required — `videoId` must be the exact value returned by an earlier aerial_view_render_video call; do not invent or guess it. - aerial_view_render_video ($0.01): kick off rendering a new aerial-view video for an address. Requires `address`. Poll aerial_view_lookup_video with the returned videoId until ready. Pagination: text_search_full/partial and nearby_search_full/partial return `nextPageToken` when more results exist — repeat the ORIGINAL call (same textQuery / locationRestriction / etc.) with `pageToken` set to page further. `pageToken` must be the exact `nextPageToken` value from that earlier response — do not invent or guess it. excludeFields: colon-separated nested-path syntax trims nested response fields, e.g. "organization:technologies" excludes just that sub-field. All place-search/details actions default-exclude `photos` if `excludeFields` is omitted — pass `excludeFields: []` to include photos. Prices above are indicative — the exact charge for a given call is always whatever the live payment challenge specifies for that request. The first call (no `paymentPayload`) returns `paymentRequired`; retry with the same arguments plus `paymentPayload` to complete payment and get the real result.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Places / solar / aerial-view lookups (pay-per-call)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • social.profile_lookupResolve person / social-profile identity for a batch of records, paid per call directly from the caller's own wallet via the x402 protocol — no Abstraxn account needed.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "social.profile_lookup" says "lookup": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Resolve person / social-profile identity for a batch of records, paid per call directly from the caller's own wallet via the x402 protocol — no Abstraxn account needed. Supports two modes per record: - Fuzzy match: supply `first_name` and/or `last_name` plus `emails` and/or `phones`. - Reverse lookup: supply only `emails` and/or `phones`, no name required. Every record needs a caller-chosen `record_id` (any string) to correlate it with its match in the response, plus at least one non-empty first_name/last_name, or at least one non-empty entry in emails, or at least one non-empty entry in phones — an empty array counts as not provided. Optional top-level `match_condition_fields` (e.g. `["linkedin_url"]`) restricts results to matches that include ALL of the named fields. The exact response shape (field names/nesting per match) is passed through unchanged from the upstream provider — read whatever comes back rather than assuming a fixed shape. Charges ~$0.02 per call — the exact charge for a given call is always whatever the live payment challenge specifies for that request. The first call (no `paymentPayload`) returns `paymentRequired`; retry with the same arguments plus `paymentPayload` to complete payment and get the real result.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Social / person profile lookup (pay-per-call)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • travel.searchFlight and hotel search, paid per call in USDC/USDm directly from the caller's own wallet via the x402 protocol — no Abstraxn account needed.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "travel.search" says "search": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "dm": it reads messages.
    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "dm": it reads messages, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Flight and hotel search, paid per call in USDC/USDm directly from the caller's own wallet via the x402 protocol — no Abstraxn account needed. Pick one `action`: - flight_search ($0.02): live flight fares via Google Flights. Requires `origin`, `destination`, `departureDate`. Optional `returnDate`, `adults`, `children`, `travelClass`, `stops`, `maxPrice`, `currency`. - hotel_search ($0.02): live hotel prices/ratings via Google Hotels. Requires `q` (city or hotel name), `checkInDate`, `checkOutDate`. Optional `adults`, `children`, `sortBy`, `minPrice`, `maxPrice`, `hotelClass`, `currency`. Prices above are indicative — the exact charge for a given call is always whatever the live payment challenge specifies for that request. The first call (no `paymentPayload`) returns `paymentRequired`; retry with the same arguments plus `paymentPayload` to complete payment and get the real result.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Flight / hotel search (pay-per-call)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • web3.lookupMulti-chain wallet, token, ENS, and transaction-simulation lookups, paid per call in USDC/USDm directly from the caller's own wallet via the x402 protocol — no Abstraxn account nee…Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "web3.lookup" says "lookup": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "dm": it reads messages.
    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "dm": it reads messages, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Multi-chain wallet, token, ENS, and transaction-simulation lookups, paid per call in USDC/USDm directly from the caller's own wallet via the x402 protocol — no Abstraxn account needed. Pick one `action`: - wallet_balances ($0.005): token balances for a wallet across 20+ chains. Requires `chain` and `address`. - wallet_transactions ($0.005): transaction history with asset transfers for a wallet. Requires `address`. Optional `chain`, `limit`. - wallet_pnl ($0.01): realized and unrealized profit/loss per token for a wallet. Requires `chain` and `address`. - token_metadata ($0.002): name/symbol/decimals for a token contract. Requires `chain` and `address`. - ens_resolve ($0.001): resolve an ENS name to an Ethereum address. Requires `name`. - ens_reverse ($0.001): resolve an Ethereum address to its ENS name. Requires `address`. - tx_simulate ($0.01): simulate an EVM transaction before sending — gas estimate, execution trace, revert reason. Requires `network_id`, `from`, `to`. Optional `value`, `data`, `gas`. Prices above are indicative — the exact charge for a given call is always whatever the live payment challenge specifies for that request. The first call (no `paymentPayload`) returns `paymentRequired`; retry with the same arguments plus `paymentPayload` to complete payment and get the real result.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Wallet / token / ENS / tx-simulation lookups (pay-per-call)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

24 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data2
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__abstraxn__network_prepare_transfer"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:10 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.abstraxn.com/mcp: tools/list returned 12 tools to an anonymous client, including network.prepare_transfer (irreversible), weather.forecast (write), market.crypto (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn1 info
  • The server marks "network.prepare_transfer" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "network.prepare_transfer" says "transfer": a word for a change that another call does not undo.

    What this check looks for
  • The description is 4,001 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

    Matched text

    description ends: "...same arguments plus `paymentPayload` to complete payment and get the real result."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http abstraxn https://mcp.abstraxn.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http abstraxn https://mcp.abstraxn.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__abstraxn__network_blocknumber",
      "mcp__abstraxn__network_transaction_status",
      "mcp__abstraxn__network_gas_info",
      "mcp__abstraxn__network_token_info",
      "mcp__abstraxn__network_token_price",
      "mcp__abstraxn__web3_lookup",
      "mcp__abstraxn__travel_search",
      "mcp__abstraxn__places_lookup",
      "mcp__abstraxn__social_profile_lookup"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__abstraxn__network_prepare_transfer",
      "mcp__abstraxn__weather_forecast",
      "mcp__abstraxn__market_crypto"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as abstraxn. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 12 rules
  • mcp__abstraxn__network_blocknumber untrusted-input
  • mcp__abstraxn__network_transaction_status untrusted-input
  • mcp__abstraxn__network_gas_info untrusted-input
  • mcp__abstraxn__network_token_info untrusted-input
  • mcp__abstraxn__network_token_price untrusted-input
  • mcp__abstraxn__network_prepare_transfer untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__abstraxn__weather_forecast untrusted-input
  • mcp__abstraxn__market_crypto untrusted-input
  • mcp__abstraxn__web3_lookup private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__abstraxn__travel_search private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__abstraxn__places_lookup untrusted-input
  • mcp__abstraxn__social_profile_lookup untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.sandeep-antier/abstraxn/verify?hash=a16934fa3365db58bed04766d2db6919b423ddf09e990c27401354bf89695500" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash a16934fa3365, from Nov 20, 2026, 11:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.sandeep-antier/abstraxn/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.sandeep-antier/abstraxn
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.sandeep-antier/abstraxn.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.sandeep-antier/abstraxn)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:48 UTC.

Abstraxn Agent Layer MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Abstraxn Agent Layer MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 12 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Abstraxn Agent Layer MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Abstraxn Agent Layer MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: network.prepare_transfer.

What tools does the Abstraxn Agent Layer MCP server have?

12 tools: 1 irreversible, 2 write, 9 read. network.prepare_transfer, weather.forecast, market.crypto, network.blocknumber, network.transaction_status, network.gas_info, network.token_info, network.token_price and 4 more.

Does the Abstraxn Agent Layer MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Abstraxn Agent Layer MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): network.prepare_transfer.

Has the Abstraxn Agent Layer MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.