Agent Rescue MCP server
io.github.santismm/agent-rescuesantismmstreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned
Cross-session idempotency, URLs as schema-validated JSON, and a record of missing capabilities.
3 tools: 2 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 1
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Agent Rescue MCP server can do
The Agent Rescue MCP server is published by the GitHub account santismm. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: check_and_claim and request_capability), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
1 tool brings in text other people can write (fetch_structured); 1 tool can send data out of your system (fetch_structured).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 21, 2026, version 0.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
check_and_claimAtomically check whether an action identified by a key was already performed, and claim it if not.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Atomically check whether an action identified by a key was already performed, and claim it if not. Use it before performing a non-idempotent action that may have completed in an earlier attempt (a payment, a message, a write), or when you need to remember something across sessions. Returns 'claimed' if you are first and 'already_done' if not. Do not use it as a general data store or as a result cache.
request_capabilityRecord a specific need that none of the tools available to you can cover.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "request_capability" says "request": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Record a specific need that none of the tools available to you can cover. Today it almost always answers that the capability is unavailable, and suggests alternatives only when they genuinely exist; its purpose is to measure what agents ask for and nobody serves. Use it when you are blocked by a missing capability — not for general questions, and not for anything you can work out by reasoning.
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
fetch_structuredFetch a public URL and return its content as JSON validated against the schema you pass.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "fetch_structured" says "fetch": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "fetch" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch a public URL and return its content as JSON validated against the schema you pass. Use it when you need data from a page and cannot parse it reliably yourself. Do not use it for URLs requiring authentication or a session, for internal networks, or when you already have the content — extract it yourself in that case. `extracted_by` tells you where the answer came from: `structured_data` when the page already published it (JSON-LD, OpenGraph, or a JSON body — exact and free) or `model` when it had to be extracted from the text. If structured extraction is unavailable, the response carries `degraded: true`, `data: null` and the page `text` for you to parse: check `degraded` before reading `data`.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:10 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://agent-rescue.vercel.app/api/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including check_and_claim (write), request_capability (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http agent-rescue https://agent-rescue.vercel.app/api/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http agent-rescue https://agent-rescue.vercel.app/api/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__agent-rescue__check_and_claim",
"mcp__agent-rescue__fetch_structured",
"mcp__agent-rescue__request_capability"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agent-rescue. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__agent-rescue__fetch_structured untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.santismm/agent-rescue/verify?hash=efe4fa257f6399c1a2328195bdfb4d603509ea7ed8aae1393ca91c1f9768a5cb" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash efe4fa257f63, from Nov 21, 2026, 03:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.santismm/agent-rescue/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.santismm/agent-rescue)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:48 UTC.
Agent Rescue MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Agent Rescue MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Agent Rescue MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Agent Rescue MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Agent Rescue MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 2 write, 1 read. check_and_claim, request_capability and fetch_structured.
Does the Agent Rescue MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Agent Rescue MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): fetch_structured.
Has the Agent Rescue MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 21, 2026.