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Actora Tenant — Hosted Chat, Tasks & Usage MCP server

io.github.sftgroup/actora-tenantsftgroupstreamable-httpv0.2.2Scanned

Actora B-side tools: hosted chat, sessions, tasks, tenant plan and usage.

9 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 4 change things and 4 only read.

Tools: 1 delete, 0 irreversible, 4 write, 4 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here can delete or cancel things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Actora Tenant — Hosted Chat, Tasks & Usage MCP server can do

The Actora Tenant — Hosted Chat, Tasks & Usage MCP server is published by the GitHub account sftgroup. It has 9 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: actora_gateway_cancel_task) and create or change data (4 tools: actora_gateway_chat, actora_gateway_create_session, actora_gateway_create_task and actora_tenant_usage). 4 tools only read.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 8, 2026, version 0.2.2.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

9 tools

Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
  • actora_gateway_cancel_taskCancel a task (queued → cancelled; running → aborted; terminal states are idempotent).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "actora_gateway_cancel_task" says "cancel": a word for removing or ending something.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Cancel a task (queued → cancelled; running → aborted; terminal states are idempotent). Requires access_token (registered-user JWT).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Cancel Task
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
  • actora_gateway_chatSingle-turn conversation with an agent (SSE stream collected into a reply).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Single-turn conversation with an agent (SSE stream collected into a reply). Requires access_token (registered-user JWT).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Chat with Agent
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
  • actora_gateway_create_sessionCreate a conversation session (dialog container; idempotent).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "actora_gateway_create_session" says "create": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Create a conversation session (dialog container; idempotent). Requires access_token (registered-user JWT).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Create Chat Session
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
  • actora_gateway_create_taskCreate a background task in a session (returns immediately with taskId; queued→running→done).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "actora_gateway_create_task" says "create": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Create a background task in a session (returns immediately with taskId; queued→running→done). May return 403 PARALLEL_TASKS_DISABLED. Requires access_token (registered-user JWT).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Create Background Task
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
  • actora_tenant_usageToken/tool-call usage summary and daily timeline for the current tenant.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Token/tool-call usage summary and daily timeline for the current tenant. Requires access_token (registered-user JWT).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get Tenant Usage
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
  • actora_gateway_get_taskGet task detail by id (status, result, error).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "actora_gateway_get_task" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get task detail by id (status, result, error). Requires access_token (registered-user JWT).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get Task
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
  • actora_gateway_list_tasksList all tasks of a session.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "actora_gateway_list_tasks" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List all tasks of a session. Requires access_token (registered-user JWT).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: List Session Tasks
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
  • actora_gateway_tenantGet tenant profile, plan, quota.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get tenant profile, plan, quota. Requires access_token (registered-user JWT); `Authorization: Bearer` is injected automatically.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get Tenant Profile
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
  • actora_tenant_plansList platform plans for B-side tenants (Free / Pro / Enterprise: quota, rate limit, concurrency, BYOK).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List platform plans for B-side tenants (Free / Pro / Enterprise: quota, rate limit, concurrency, BYOK). Requires access_token (registered-user JWT).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: List Tenant Plans
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 19, 2026, 17:25 UTC, unchanged since Nov 12, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
5
Protocol version
2024-11-05
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://actora.codes/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
Authorization servers
https://actora.codes
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
yes
Client ID metadata documents
no
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (1 destructive, 4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://actora.codes/mcp/tenant: tools/list returned 9 tools to an anonymous client, including actora_gateway_cancel_task (destructive), actora_gateway_chat (write), actora_gateway_create_session (write), actora_gateway_create_task (write), actora_tenant_usage (write)

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 12, 2026
    • RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none to https://actora.codes/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
    • Authorization servers: none to https://actora.codes
    • Dynamic client registration: not observed to yes
    • Client ID metadata documents: not observed to no

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none -> https://actora.codes/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource; Authorization servers: none -> https://actora.codes; Dynamic client registration: not observed -> yes (and 1 mo…View diff
    • RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none to https://actora.codes/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
    • Authorization servers: none to https://actora.codes
    • Dynamic client registration: not observed to yes
    • Client ID metadata documents: not observed to no
  2. Tools9 changed.~9 changedView diff
  3. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 0.2.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http actora-tenant https://actora.codes/mcp/tenant
claude mcp add --transport http actora-tenant https://actora.codes/mcp/tenant

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__actora-tenant__actora_gateway_tenant",
      "mcp__actora-tenant__actora_gateway_get_task",
      "mcp__actora-tenant__actora_gateway_list_tasks",
      "mcp__actora-tenant__actora_tenant_plans"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__actora-tenant__actora_gateway_chat",
      "mcp__actora-tenant__actora_gateway_create_session",
      "mcp__actora-tenant__actora_gateway_create_task",
      "mcp__actora-tenant__actora_tenant_usage"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__actora-tenant__actora_gateway_cancel_task"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as actora-tenant. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.sftgroup/actora-tenant/verify?hash=e08f066aea985339be8d4725b0678cfa96e8a18b6c178a6b79166d034f5b6bca" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash e08f066aea98, from Nov 8, 2026, 10:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.sftgroup/actora-tenant/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.sftgroup/actora-tenant
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.sftgroup/actora-tenant.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.sftgroup/actora-tenant)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 8, 2026, 10:18 UTC.

Actora Tenant — Hosted Chat, Tasks & Usage MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Actora Tenant — Hosted Chat, Tasks & Usage MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 9 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Actora Tenant — Hosted Chat, Tasks & Usage MCP server delete data?

Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: actora_gateway_cancel_task.

Can the Actora Tenant — Hosted Chat, Tasks & Usage MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Actora Tenant — Hosted Chat, Tasks & Usage MCP server have?

9 tools: 1 destructive, 4 write, 4 read. actora_gateway_cancel_task, actora_gateway_chat, actora_gateway_create_session, actora_gateway_create_task, actora_tenant_usage, actora_gateway_tenant, actora_gateway_get_task, actora_gateway_list_tasks and 1 more.

Does the Actora Tenant — Hosted Chat, Tasks & Usage MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Actora Tenant — Hosted Chat, Tasks & Usage MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Actora Tenant — Hosted Chat, Tasks & Usage MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 8, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.