Actora Tenant — Hosted Chat, Tasks & Usage MCP server
io.github.sftgroup/actora-tenantsftgroupstreamable-httpv0.2.2Scanned
Actora B-side tools: hosted chat, sessions, tasks, tenant plan and usage.
9 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 4 change things and 4 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here can delete or cancel things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Actora Tenant — Hosted Chat, Tasks & Usage MCP server can do
The Actora Tenant — Hosted Chat, Tasks & Usage MCP server is published by the GitHub account sftgroup. It has 9 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: actora_gateway_cancel_task) and create or change data (4 tools: actora_gateway_chat, actora_gateway_create_session, actora_gateway_create_task and actora_tenant_usage). 4 tools only read.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 8, 2026, version 0.2.2.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
9 tools
Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
actora_gateway_cancel_taskCancel a task (queued → cancelled; running → aborted; terminal states are idempotent).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "actora_gateway_cancel_task" says "cancel": a word for removing or ending something.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
Description, as the server wrote it Cancel a task (queued → cancelled; running → aborted; terminal states are idempotent). Requires access_token (registered-user JWT).
Annotations the server declares
- title: Cancel Task
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
actora_gateway_chatSingle-turn conversation with an agent (SSE stream collected into a reply).No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Single-turn conversation with an agent (SSE stream collected into a reply). Requires access_token (registered-user JWT).
Annotations the server declares
- title: Chat with Agent
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
actora_gateway_create_sessionCreate a conversation session (dialog container; idempotent).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "actora_gateway_create_session" says "create": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Create a conversation session (dialog container; idempotent). Requires access_token (registered-user JWT).
Annotations the server declares
- title: Create Chat Session
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
actora_gateway_create_taskCreate a background task in a session (returns immediately with taskId; queued→running→done).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "actora_gateway_create_task" says "create": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Create a background task in a session (returns immediately with taskId; queued→running→done). May return 403 PARALLEL_TASKS_DISABLED. Requires access_token (registered-user JWT).
Annotations the server declares
- title: Create Background Task
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
actora_tenant_usageToken/tool-call usage summary and daily timeline for the current tenant.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Token/tool-call usage summary and daily timeline for the current tenant. Requires access_token (registered-user JWT).
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get Tenant Usage
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
actora_gateway_get_taskGet task detail by id (status, result, error).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "actora_gateway_get_task" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Get task detail by id (status, result, error). Requires access_token (registered-user JWT).
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get Task
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
actora_gateway_list_tasksList all tasks of a session.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "actora_gateway_list_tasks" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List all tasks of a session. Requires access_token (registered-user JWT).
Annotations the server declares
- title: List Session Tasks
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
actora_gateway_tenantGet tenant profile, plan, quota.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Get tenant profile, plan, quota. Requires access_token (registered-user JWT); `Authorization: Bearer` is injected automatically.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get Tenant Profile
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
actora_tenant_plansList platform plans for B-side tenants (Free / Pro / Enterprise: quota, rate limit, concurrency, BYOK).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List platform plans for B-side tenants (Free / Pro / Enterprise: quota, rate limit, concurrency, BYOK). Requires access_token (registered-user JWT).
Annotations the server declares
- title: List Tenant Plans
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 19, 2026, 17:25 UTC, unchanged since Nov 12, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 5
- Protocol version
- 2024-11-05
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://actora.codes/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
- Authorization servers
- https://actora.codes
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- yes
- Client ID metadata documents
- no
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (1 destructive, 4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://actora.codes/mcp/tenant: tools/list returned 9 tools to an anonymous client, including actora_gateway_cancel_task (destructive), actora_gateway_chat (write), actora_gateway_create_session (write), actora_gateway_create_task (write), actora_tenant_usage (write)
Posture changes
- Nov 12, 2026
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none to https://actora.codes/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
- Authorization servers: none to https://actora.codes
- Dynamic client registration: not observed to yes
- Client ID metadata documents: not observed to no
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none -> https://actora.codes/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource; Authorization servers: none -> https://actora.codes; Dynamic client registration: not observed -> yes (and 1 mo…View diff
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none to https://actora.codes/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
- Authorization servers: none to https://actora.codes
- Dynamic client registration: not observed to yes
- Client ID metadata documents: not observed to no
Tools9 changed.~9 changedView diff
- Changed:actora_gateway_cancel_taskDeletes or cancelstitleannotations
- Changed:actora_gateway_chatChanges thingstitleannotations
- Changed:actora_gateway_create_sessionChanges thingstitleannotations
- Changed:actora_gateway_create_taskChanges thingstitleannotations
- Changed:actora_gateway_get_taskOnly readstitleannotations
- Changed:actora_gateway_list_tasksOnly readstitleannotations
- Changed:actora_gateway_tenantOnly readstitleannotations
- Changed:actora_tenant_plansOnly readstitleannotations
- Changed:actora_tenant_usageChanges thingstitleannotations
Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
- Changed:actora_gateway_tenantOnly readsdescriptioninputSchema
Install
Pinned to version 0.2.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http actora-tenant https://actora.codes/mcp/tenantclaude mcp add --transport http actora-tenant https://actora.codes/mcp/tenantRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__actora-tenant__actora_gateway_tenant",
"mcp__actora-tenant__actora_gateway_get_task",
"mcp__actora-tenant__actora_gateway_list_tasks",
"mcp__actora-tenant__actora_tenant_plans"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__actora-tenant__actora_gateway_chat",
"mcp__actora-tenant__actora_gateway_create_session",
"mcp__actora-tenant__actora_gateway_create_task",
"mcp__actora-tenant__actora_tenant_usage"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__actora-tenant__actora_gateway_cancel_task"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as actora-tenant. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.sftgroup/actora-tenant/verify?hash=e08f066aea985339be8d4725b0678cfa96e8a18b6c178a6b79166d034f5b6bca" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash e08f066aea98, from Nov 8, 2026, 10:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.sftgroup/actora-tenant/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.sftgroup/actora-tenant)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 8, 2026, 10:18 UTC.
Actora Tenant — Hosted Chat, Tasks & Usage MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Actora Tenant — Hosted Chat, Tasks & Usage MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 9 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Actora Tenant — Hosted Chat, Tasks & Usage MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: actora_gateway_cancel_task.
Can the Actora Tenant — Hosted Chat, Tasks & Usage MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Actora Tenant — Hosted Chat, Tasks & Usage MCP server have?
- 9 tools: 1 destructive, 4 write, 4 read. actora_gateway_cancel_task, actora_gateway_chat, actora_gateway_create_session, actora_gateway_create_task, actora_tenant_usage, actora_gateway_tenant, actora_gateway_get_task, actora_gateway_list_tasks and 1 more.
Does the Actora Tenant — Hosted Chat, Tasks & Usage MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Actora Tenant — Hosted Chat, Tasks & Usage MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Actora Tenant — Hosted Chat, Tasks & Usage MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 8, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.