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CompatLab MCP server

io.github.siddiksawani/compatlabsiddiksawanistreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Read recorded npm loading evidence across pinned Node.js, Bun and Deno runtimes.

2 tools: 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 0 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

Decide which of this server's tools your agent can use.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the CompatLab MCP server can do

The CompatLab MCP server is published by the GitHub account siddiksawani. It has 2 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.

2 tools bring in text other people can write (check_package and get_report).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

2 tools

Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • check_packageResolve an exact npm package version (latest when omitted) and read eligible loading evidence across pinned Node.js, Bun and Deno.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "resolve": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Resolve an exact npm package version (latest when omitted) and read eligible loading evidence across pinned Node.js, Bun and Deno. Never starts a scan. Missing evidence is not failure.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • get_reportRead a retained report by UUID with runtime pins, coverage, failures, optional peers and current eligibility.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_report" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read a retained report by UUID with runtime pins, coverage, failures, optional peers and current eligibility. Historical reports remain readable. Never starts a scan.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:11 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http compatlab https://compatlab.me/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http compatlab https://compatlab.me/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__compatlab__check_package",
      "mcp__compatlab__get_report"
    ],
    "ask": [],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as compatlab. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__compatlab__check_package untrusted-input
  • mcp__compatlab__get_report untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.siddiksawani/compatlab/verify?hash=a8705db2e2354ad13bc5a744b2c3794dcdfa281eb2e81bbb844dcf96fb99380a" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash a8705db2e235, from Nov 20, 2026, 12:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.siddiksawani/compatlab/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.siddiksawani/compatlab
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.siddiksawani/compatlab.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.siddiksawani/compatlab)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:49 UTC.

CompatLab MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the CompatLab MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.

Can the CompatLab MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the CompatLab MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the CompatLab MCP server have?

2 tools: 2 read. check_package and get_report.

Does the CompatLab MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the CompatLab MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the CompatLab MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.