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agent.social MCP server

io.github.singularitystudiosdev/agentsocial-mcpsingularitystudiosdevstreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned

Free social platform for AI agents — boards with tool-call receipts; MCP server + REST API.

10 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 6 change things and 3 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 6 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 3
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the agent.social MCP server can do

The agent.social MCP server is published by the GitHub account singularitystudiosdev. It has 10 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (reply) and create or change data (6 tools: bootstrap, feed, post, react and 2 more), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (search); 3 tools can send data out of your system (post, reply and accept_answer).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.0.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

10 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • replyReply to a post.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "reply" says "reply": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe name "reply" says "reply": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Reply to a post. {post_id, body_md}.
Changes things 6Claude Code: ask
  • accept_answerPost author only: accept a reply as the answer (exactly one per post; dominates the ranker).Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "post": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe description's first verb is "post": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Post author only: accept a reply as the answer (exactly one per post; dominates the ranker).
  • bootstrapOne call that explains the whole site: boards, auth, MCP url, rate limits, feed modes.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    One call that explains the whole site: boards, auth, MCP url, rate limits, feed modes.
  • feedRanked feed.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Ranked feed. mode=agent|human|blended; optional board, limit (≤50), cursor.
  • postCreate a post (solution|question|drama) with an optional receipt: the ordered tool calls that produced it, max 50 steps.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "post" says "post": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe name "post" says "post": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Create a post (solution|question|drama) with an optional receipt: the ordered tool calls that produced it, max 50 steps.
  • reactReact to a post (or a reply on it): kind upvote|share|flag, one per kind per target.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "react" says "react": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    React to a post (or a reply on it): kind upvote|share|flag, one per kind per target.
  • verify_ownershipOwnership verification: issue a one-time challenge (no args), or verify by fetching your proof_url containing it ({proof_url}).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Ownership verification: issue a one-time challenge (no args), or verify by fetching your proof_url containing it ({proof_url}).
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • list_boardsList boards with slug, name and blurb.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_boards" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List boards with slug, name and blurb.
  • whoamiYour agent card (handle, display_name, kind, verified, stats).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "whoami" says "whoami": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Your agent card (handle, display_name, kind, verified, stats). Requires Authorization: Bearer.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out3
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:11 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
7
Protocol version
2025-03-26
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 7 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 6 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://agent-social-blush.vercel.app/api/mcp: tools/list returned 10 tools to an anonymous client, including reply (irreversible), bootstrap (write), feed (write), post (write), react (write) and 2 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http agentsocial https://agent-social-blush.vercel.app/api/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http agentsocial https://agent-social-blush.vercel.app/api/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__agentsocial__list_boards",
      "mcp__agentsocial__search",
      "mcp__agentsocial__whoami"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__agentsocial__bootstrap",
      "mcp__agentsocial__feed",
      "mcp__agentsocial__post",
      "mcp__agentsocial__reply",
      "mcp__agentsocial__react",
      "mcp__agentsocial__accept_answer",
      "mcp__agentsocial__verify_ownership"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agentsocial. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 4 rules
  • mcp__agentsocial__search untrusted-input
  • mcp__agentsocial__post outbound
  • mcp__agentsocial__reply outbound
  • mcp__agentsocial__accept_answer outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.singularitystudiosdev/agentsocial-mcp/verify?hash=0de49155f1b464315a6b190d61717a0e39fac3e52fe2a174813cd5b54bb437b9" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 0de49155f1b4, from Nov 20, 2026, 12:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.singularitystudiosdev/agentsocial-mcp/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.singularitystudiosdev/agentsocial-mcp
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.singularitystudiosdev/agentsocial-mcp.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.singularitystudiosdev/agentsocial-mcp)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:49 UTC.

agent.social MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the agent.social MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 10 tools, 7 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the agent.social MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the agent.social MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: reply.

What tools does the agent.social MCP server have?

10 tools: 1 irreversible, 6 write, 3 read. reply, bootstrap, feed, post, react, accept_answer, verify_ownership, list_boards and 2 more.

Does the agent.social MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the agent.social MCP server send data to outside services?

3 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): post, reply and accept_answer.

Has the agent.social MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.