bernstein-mcp server
io.github.sipyourdrink-ltd/bernstein-mcpsipyourdrink-ltdstreamable-httpv0.2.0Scanned
Verifies Bernstein run receipts and hash chains; lists the shipped presets and adapters. Read-only.
12 tools: 7 change things and 5 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- 3 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
7 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the bernstein-mcp server can do
The bernstein-mcp server is published by the GitHub account sipyourdrink-ltd. It has 12 tools. It can create or change data (7 tools: server_info, verify_receipt, verify_chain, verify_trace_record and 3 more), but cannot delete data. 5 tools only read.
1 tool reads private data (list_adapters).
The fixed checks matched 3 findings (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 0.2.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
12 tools
Changes things 7Claude Code: ask
server_infoIdentity, version, and request limits for this MCP server.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Identity, version, and request limits for this MCP server.
trace_verify_recordVerify a TRACE v0.2 Ed25519 Trust Record locally with optional caller public key and freshness controls.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Verify a TRACE v0.2 Ed25519 Trust Record locally with optional caller public key and freshness controls. Nothing is fetched. Embedded keys establish internal consistency only; revocation is not affirmed.
verify_agent_manifestAgent Manifest v0.2 conformance checks on one manifest, stateless, no account: schema (vendored agent-manifest.schema.json), profile context, version, canonicalization, COSE envelo…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Agent Manifest v0.2 conformance checks on one manifest, stateless, no account: schema (vendored agent-manifest.schema.json), profile context, version, canonicalization, COSE envelope signature (Ed25519, key identified by kid in the protected header; ML-DSA-65 is reported unverifiable). Optionally checks that a TRACE Trust Record cites this manifest by digest. Nothing is fetched; resolvers are checked as URIs only. The manifest hash is sha256 over the COSE payload bytes (or RFC 8785 canonical JSON for object input).
verify_chainWalk bernstein chain rows and recompute every link: journal rows (event_hash), lineage spine entries (entry_hash) or audit events (prev_hmac linkage).No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Walk bernstein chain rows and recompute every link: journal rows (event_hash), lineage spine entries (entry_hash) or audit events (prev_hmac linkage). The row kind is detected from the fields, or pass `kind` explicitly. Reports the first divergent index. Pass `entries` as the file text (a JSON array or one row per line, as journal.jsonl is written) for byte-exact hashing; a parsed array also works, but then a float spelled 1.0 or -0.0 in the file cannot be told apart from an integer.
verify_delegation_chainTRACE v0.2 delegation-chain conformance, stateless, no account: index every Trust Record by the RFC 8785 digest of its complete form, start at the leaf, follow delegation.parent_re…3 findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...bound, the link's digest algorithm, the credential (registered, issuer = parent subject, h..."
- Info
The input schema at properties.context.properties.now.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.context.properties.now.description: "Carried for completeness; credential windows are judged at each hop's own ia..."
- Info
The input schema at properties.context.properties.credentials.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.context.properties.credentials.description: "...e, not_after}. Default {} → every hop's credential is unknown."
Description, as the server wrote it TRACE v0.2 delegation-chain conformance, stateless, no account: index every Trust Record by the RFC 8785 digest of its complete form, start at the leaf, follow delegation.parent_record_hash to the root, and check each hop's signature, the root key against `trusted_root_keys`, the depth bound, the link's digest algorithm, the credential (registered, issuer = parent subject, holder = record subject, window at the hop's own iat) and data_class narrowing under `data_class_lattice`. Classification: provenance-invalid outranks authorization-invalid; an unread link is unverifiable, not broken. Pass `records` as a JSON array or as file text (one record per line or a JSON array).
verify_receiptRecompute every hash chain a bernstein run receipt embeds (journal, lineage spine, optional audit range), rebuild the signed subject from the recomputed heads, and check the Ed2551…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Recompute every hash chain a bernstein run receipt embeds (journal, lineage spine, optional audit range), rebuild the signed subject from the recomputed heads, and check the Ed25519 signature with the key the receipt carries. Needs no secret and reads nothing but the receipt. Returns the verdict, the first failing check, one line per check, and the same verdict as a DSSE envelope signed by this verifier's Ed25519 key (public key at keys_url) so the outcome can be kept and re-checked offline.
verify_trace_recordTRACE v0.2 conformance checks on one Trust Record, stateless, no account: schema (vendored trace-claim.json), profile, subject URI, software-only runtime rule, policy digest, publi…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it TRACE v0.2 conformance checks on one Trust Record, stateless, no account: schema (vendored trace-claim.json), profile, subject URI, software-only runtime rule, policy digest, public-only confirmation key, the embedded signature (EdDSA, ES256 or ES384 with the key in cnf.jwk), appraisal, delegation link shape and references. Nothing is fetched: resolvers are checked as URIs only. `record_sha256` is the RFC 8785 digest of the complete record, signature included — the value a child hop puts in delegation.parent_record_hash.
Only reads 5Show 5 read-only tools
explain_receiptVerify a run receipt and narrate the result in plain language: what the run recorded, which chains recomputed, where the first divergence is, and what an auditor can and cannot con…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "explain_receipt" says "explain": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Verify a run receipt and narrate the result in plain language: what the run recorded, which chains recomputed, where the first divergence is, and what an auditor can and cannot conclude without the producing install's keys.
explain_trace_mappingHow a bernstein run maps onto a TRACE v0.2 Trust Record: one row per claim with the journal field it is sourced from and the rule that derives it.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "explain_trace_mapping" says "explain": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it How a bernstein run maps onto a TRACE v0.2 Trust Record: one row per claim with the journal field it is sourced from and the rule that derives it. Pass a run receipt to fill in the rows its embedded journal can answer (subject, iat, model, data_class, policy digest, tool transcript) alongside the receipt's own verdict.
get_presetEvery field of one compliance preset as bernstein v3.19.2 resolves it.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_preset" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Every field of one compliance preset as bernstein v3.19.2 resolves it.
list_adaptersThe agent adapters bundled with bernstein v3.19.2: adapter name, the binary it drives, the module that implements it.Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_adapters" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "drive": it reads files.
Description, as the server wrote it The agent adapters bundled with bernstein v3.19.2: adapter name, the binary it drives, the module that implements it.
list_presetsThe compliance presets bernstein v3.19.2 ships, with the switches each one turns on.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_presets" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it The compliance presets bernstein v3.19.2 ships, with the switches each one turns on.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:11 UTC, unchanged since Nov 6, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 7
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 7 tools that change things (7 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://mcp.bernstein.run/mcp: tools/list returned 12 tools to an anonymous client, including server_info (write), verify_receipt (write), verify_chain (write), verify_trace_record (write), trace_verify_record (write) and 2 more
Posture changes
- Nov 6, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 to 7
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...bound, the link's digest algorithm, the credential (registered, issuer = parent subject, h..."
The input schema at properties.context.properties.now.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.context.properties.now.description: "Carried for completeness; credential windows are judged at each hop's own ia..."
The input schema at properties.context.properties.credentials.description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.context.properties.credentials.description: "...e, not_after}. Default {} → every hop's credential is unknown."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools1 added.+1 addedView diff
- Added:trace_verify_recordChanges things
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 -> 7.View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 to 7
Install
Pinned to version 0.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http bernstein https://mcp.bernstein.run/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http bernstein https://mcp.bernstein.run/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__bernstein__explain_receipt",
"mcp__bernstein__explain_trace_mapping",
"mcp__bernstein__list_presets",
"mcp__bernstein__get_preset",
"mcp__bernstein__list_adapters"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__bernstein__server_info",
"mcp__bernstein__verify_receipt",
"mcp__bernstein__verify_chain",
"mcp__bernstein__verify_trace_record",
"mcp__bernstein__trace_verify_record",
"mcp__bernstein__verify_agent_manifest",
"mcp__bernstein__verify_delegation_chain"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as bernstein. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__bernstein__list_adapters private-data
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.sipyourdrink-ltd/bernstein-mcp/verify?hash=4519cca913897bc59c29f5bcaceb5e35b09e2603ee5978153f49b327231b8131" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 4519cca91389, from Nov 20, 2026, 13:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.sipyourdrink-ltd/bernstein-mcp/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.sipyourdrink-ltd/bernstein-mcp)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:49 UTC.
bernstein-mcp server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the bernstein-mcp server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 12 tools, 7 of which can change, send or delete something, and 3 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the bernstein-mcp server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the bernstein-mcp server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the bernstein-mcp server have?
- 12 tools: 7 write, 5 read. server_info, verify_receipt, verify_chain, verify_trace_record, trace_verify_record, verify_agent_manifest, verify_delegation_chain, explain_receipt and 4 more.
Does the bernstein-mcp server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the bernstein-mcp server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the bernstein-mcp server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 6, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.