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CausalLayer MCP server

io.github.smq9sn5jck-coder/causallayersmq9sn5jck-coderstreamable-httpv0.4.0Scanned

Deterministic AI liability attribution with Bitcoin-anchored proof certificates.

10 tools: 7 change things and 3 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 7 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

7 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the CausalLayer MCP server can do

The CausalLayer MCP server is published by the GitHub account smq9sn5jck-coder. It has 10 tools. It can create or change data (7 tools: submit_incident, verify_certificate, verify_certificate_recompute, submit_otel_trace and 3 more), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 0.4.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

10 tools

Changes things 7Claude Code: ask
  • evaluate_prospective_responseDeterministic prospective-evaluation gate (FK-METHOD-2026-006).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "evaluate_prospective_response" says "evaluate": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Deterministic prospective-evaluation gate (FK-METHOD-2026-006). Pass a ProposedAction BEFORE the agent delivers a response; receive one of three verdicts: 'allow', 'require_revision' (with specific factor-keyed directives), or 'block'. Uses the same four-factor engine that issues post-hoc certificates, so a single incident chains: prospective_pre_image -> response -> certificate -> anchor. This is a policy gate on structured action metadata, NOT a content safety classifier on raw prose. Thresholds are per-jurisdiction (EU strictest, US most permissive); read via GET /api/v2/gate/thresholds. Overrides are allowed but REQUIRE a governance rationale so the audit trail is complete. Cost: 1 credit. Pure deterministic.
  • extract_incidentClaude-powered structured extractor.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Claude-powered structured extractor. Parses unstructured text (news articles, court filings, emails, PDFs, incident reports, logs) into the typed JSON schema required by submit_incident. Returns a ready-to-submit incident object with extracted agents, events, severity, jurisdiction, and financial impact. NOTE: This is a pre-processing convenience tool — the deterministic scoring engine itself remains LLM-free. Cost: 10 credits.
  • simulate_remediationCounterfactual remediation simulator.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Counterfactual remediation simulator. Given a certificate's verdict + fourFactorScoring + agents and a list of remediation IDs from the FK-METHOD-2026-003 catalog, return the apportioned shares each remediation would have produced (in isolation) and the composite shares if they all stack. Every remediation cites a specific statute or standard. GET /api/v2/remediation/catalog for the list of IDs. Cost: 1 credit (same price as verify_certificate). Pure deterministic; same inputs produce a byte-identical result.
  • submit_incidentSubmit an AI incident for deterministic causal liability attribution.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "submit_incident" says "submit": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Submit an AI incident for deterministic causal liability attribution. Returns a signed CausalCertificate, per-agent liability allocation, evidence-chain completeness, regulatory mapping, and (where keys are configured) a Bitcoin-anchored proof. Cost: 50 credits. Three guardrails apply: PII scan, deterministic-only acknowledgement, and minimum evidence.
  • submit_otel_traceConvert an OpenTelemetry OTLP JSON trace into a FaultKey incident and return the same deterministic CausalCertificate as submit_incident.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "submit_otel_trace" says "submit": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Convert an OpenTelemetry OTLP JSON trace into a FaultKey incident and return the same deterministic CausalCertificate as submit_incident. Each span becomes an event; service.name groups spans into agents; W3C trace_id and span_id propagate as evidence pointers on the causal graph edges. Cost: 50 credits (same as submit_incident). Three guardrails apply: PII scan, deterministic-only acknowledgement, and minimum evidence (auto-satisfied when the trace has at least 1 span).
  • verify_certificateIndependently verify a CausalCertificate end-to-end (signature, Merkle integrity, issuer status against the registry).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Independently verify a CausalCertificate end-to-end (signature, Merkle integrity, issuer status against the registry). Cost: 1 credit. In production env, certificates from non-active issuers are rejected.
  • verify_certificate_recomputeIndependently re-derive a CausalCertificate from its canonical input and compare byte-for-byte against the claimed certificate.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Independently re-derive a CausalCertificate from its canonical input and compare byte-for-byte against the claimed certificate. This is the strongest verification path: it requires no trust in the issuer or signing key. Cost: 1 credit (same price as verify_certificate). Returns PASS only if every checked field (certificateId, request_hash, merkleRoot, verdict, causalGraph, fourFactorScoring, deviationTaxonomy, euRuleOverlay, cascadeAttenuation, damages, underwriting) matches identically.
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • get_anchor_statusReturn the index of all CausalLayer Tessera anchor batches, or one batch's full JSON (signed Merkle root, leaves, OpenTimestamps proof reference).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_anchor_status" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return the index of all CausalLayer Tessera anchor batches, or one batch's full JSON (signed Merkle root, leaves, OpenTimestamps proof reference). FREE.
  • query_issuer_registryReturn the CausalLayer issuer registry, or one issuer record.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "query_issuer_registry" says "query": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return the CausalLayer issuer registry, or one issuer record. The registry lists all trusted public-key fingerprints, key algorithms, validity windows, and the anchor-log repo for each active issuer. FREE — no API key required.
  • query_jurisdiction_overlayMulti-jurisdiction overlay (FK-METHOD-2026-004).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "query_jurisdiction_overlay" says "query": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Multi-jurisdiction overlay (FK-METHOD-2026-004). Given a canonical attributable apportionment (party-id -> share), the union of all jurisdiction role tags on each actor, and the union of jurisdiction-specific flags, return side-by-side post-overlay shares for AU, EU, US, UK, CA (or a chosen subset) with the specific rules that fired in each, citation URLs, and a parties × jurisdictions matrix. v1 ships full implementations for AU and EU; US/UK/CA are research stubs marked `is_stub: true`. Use GET /api/v2/jurisdiction/catalog to discover support and stub status. Cost: 1 credit. Pure deterministic.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:11 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
7
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 7 tools that change things (7 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.faultkey.com/mcp: tools/list returned 10 tools to an anonymous client, including submit_incident (write), verify_certificate (write), verify_certificate_recompute (write), submit_otel_trace (write), simulate_remediation (write) and 2 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.4.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http causallayer https://mcp.faultkey.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http causallayer https://mcp.faultkey.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__causallayer__query_jurisdiction_overlay",
      "mcp__causallayer__get_anchor_status",
      "mcp__causallayer__query_issuer_registry"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__causallayer__submit_incident",
      "mcp__causallayer__verify_certificate",
      "mcp__causallayer__verify_certificate_recompute",
      "mcp__causallayer__submit_otel_trace",
      "mcp__causallayer__simulate_remediation",
      "mcp__causallayer__evaluate_prospective_response",
      "mcp__causallayer__extract_incident"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as causallayer. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.smq9sn5jck-coder/causallayer/verify?hash=77ee3d89b01608f815253ec407ff022e8014fac65acbaef4ea1b151b6f347200" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 77ee3d89b016, from Nov 20, 2026, 13:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.smq9sn5jck-coder/causallayer/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.smq9sn5jck-coder/causallayer
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.smq9sn5jck-coder/causallayer.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.smq9sn5jck-coder/causallayer)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:49 UTC.

CausalLayer MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the CausalLayer MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 10 tools, 7 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the CausalLayer MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the CausalLayer MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the CausalLayer MCP server have?

10 tools: 7 write, 3 read. submit_incident, verify_certificate, verify_certificate_recompute, submit_otel_trace, simulate_remediation, evaluate_prospective_response, extract_incident, query_jurisdiction_overlay and 2 more.

Does the CausalLayer MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the CausalLayer MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the CausalLayer MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.