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GuardLayer MCP server

io.github.solvionholdings/guardlayersolvionholdingsstreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned

Security checks for Next.js + Supabase apps: code scan, read-only live DB check, fix confirmation.

3 tools: 1 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 2
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 1 finding, 1 high

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the GuardLayer MCP server can do

The GuardLayer MCP server is published by the GitHub account solvionholdings. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: scan_files), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

2 tools read private data (get_supabase_snapshot_sql and check_supabase_snapshot).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding, 1 of them high severity (sensitive-path). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 1.0.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • scan_filesStatic security scan of a Next.js + Supabase codebase: secrets in code or public env vars (NEXT_PUBLIC_, VITE_), service role keys in client code, RLS off or open policies in supab…1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • High

      The description refers to ".env*".

      Matched text

      description: "...nd source files (ts, tsx, js, jsx, sql, .env*, config files) with paths relative to t..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Static security scan of a Next.js + Supabase codebase: secrets in code or public env vars (NEXT_PUBLIC_, VITE_), service role keys in client code, RLS off or open policies in supabase/migrations, unauthenticated API routes, Server Actions and Edge Functions, unsafe redirects and more. Send source files (ts, tsx, js, jsx, sql, .env*, config files) with paths relative to the project root; skip node_modules, build output and lockfiles. Up to 300 files and 4 MB per call; split bigger projects. Files are scanned in memory and discarded.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • check_supabase_snapshotChecks the JSON from get_supabase_snapshot_sql: tables anyone can read, RLS off, policies that only check for a signed-in user (public in practice when sign-ups are open), users wh…Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "check_supabase_snapshot" says "snapshot": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "sql": it reads databases.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Checks the JSON from get_supabase_snapshot_sql: tables anyone can read, RLS off, policies that only check for a signed-in user (public in practice when sign-ups are open), users who can update their own role or plan columns, exposed SECURITY DEFINER functions, public buckets. Pass auth_config (the project's Auth settings) when you can: it decides whether 'any signed-in user' means anyone. Pass previous_issue_keys from an earlier result to see what is closed, still open or new. Returns each issue with its SQL fix and a fix prompt.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_supabase_snapshot_sqlReturns the read-only SQL for the live Supabase check and how to run it.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_supabase_snapshot_sql" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "get_supabase_snapshot_sql" says "get" and "sql": it reads databases.
    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "return" and "sql": it reads databases.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns the read-only SQL for the live Supabase check and how to run it. It reads only catalog metadata (table and column names, RLS flags, policies, grants, triggers, SECURITY DEFINER functions, bucket settings), never table rows, and returns one JSON value.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data2
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 18, 2026, 16:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 11, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://www.guardlayer.io/api/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including scan_files (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 high
  • The description refers to ".env*".

    Matched text

    description: "...nd source files (ts, tsx, js, jsx, sql, .env*, config files) with paths relative to t..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http guardlayer https://www.guardlayer.io/api/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http guardlayer https://www.guardlayer.io/api/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__guardlayer__get_supabase_snapshot_sql",
      "mcp__guardlayer__check_supabase_snapshot"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__guardlayer__scan_files"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as guardlayer. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__guardlayer__get_supabase_snapshot_sql private-data
  • mcp__guardlayer__check_supabase_snapshot private-data

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.solvionholdings/guardlayer/verify?hash=58c7255e6a8473b0e572b3055b79fc3da16f74772fe3ee9f165a0951a28f9ba8" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 58c7255e6a84, from Nov 10, 2026, 21:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.solvionholdings/guardlayer/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.solvionholdings/guardlayer
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.solvionholdings/guardlayer.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.solvionholdings/guardlayer)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 10, 2026, 21:18 UTC.

GuardLayer MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the GuardLayer MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding (1 high) from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the GuardLayer MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the GuardLayer MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the GuardLayer MCP server have?

3 tools: 1 write, 2 read. scan_files, get_supabase_snapshot_sql and check_supabase_snapshot.

Does the GuardLayer MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the GuardLayer MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the GuardLayer MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 10, 2026.