Tracepay MCP server
io.github.soreniverson/tracesoreniversonstreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned
Read-only payment state for USDC on Base/Solana (Bridge, Circle): completed, failed, or delayed.
3 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 0
- 2 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Tracepay MCP server can do
The Tracepay MCP server is published by the GitHub account soreniverson. It has 3 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (trace_payment), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
1 tool reads private data (list_supported_systems); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (trace_payment).
The fixed checks matched 2 findings (annotation-conflict and credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 21, 2026, version 1.0.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
trace_paymentUse this whenever you need to determine whether a supported stablecoin payment completed, failed, or is delayed — where the money currently is, who owns the next step, and what sho…Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "trace_payment" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "trace_payment" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "trace_payment" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
Description, as the server wrote it Use this whenever you need to determine whether a supported stablecoin payment completed, failed, or is delayed — where the money currently is, who owns the next step, and what should happen next. Typical triggers: 'the recipient says the payment never arrived', 'this payout is stuck', 'did this transaction go through?'. Give it a Base transaction hash, Solana signature, Bridge transfer ID, Circle payment ID, or a Base/Solana wallet address (USDC). Trace correlates blockchain and provider evidence into one deterministic normalized state: completed/terminal flags, health, current stage and owner, an evidence-backed diagnosis code with a machine-readable suggested action and retry timing, and a knowledge model separating observed facts from inferences from what Trace cannot see (e.g. beneficiary bank credit — onchain finality never proves the recipient's bank credited funds; unknown never means failed). Public blockchain data works without authentication; provider-connected state requires an API key. If the user has no identifier, ask for a transaction hash, provider payment ID, or supported wallet address. Read-only: this tool never moves funds, retries payments, signs transactions, or guarantees beneficiary receipt — do not use it to send or swap anything. If a payment's state is unresolved, do NOT send a replacement payment; follow the returned warnings and suggested action instead.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Trace a payment
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
get_traceRetrieve an existing Trace payment trace by its trace_id (tr_...), including the stage timeline.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_trace" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Retrieve an existing Trace payment trace by its trace_id (tr_...), including the stage timeline. Read-only. Same normalized representation as trace_payment.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get an existing trace
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
list_supported_systemsList what Trace supports and can do: assets (USDC), chains with public tracing (Base, Solana), providers requiring connected credentials (Bridge, Circle), and explicit capability f…Reads private data1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_supported_systems" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "list" and "credential": it reads secrets.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...Solana), providers requiring connected credentials (Bridge, Circle), and explicit capabili..."
Description, as the server wrote it List what Trace supports and can do: assets (USDC), chains with public tracing (Base, Solana), providers requiring connected credentials (Bridge, Circle), and explicit capability flags (read-only; cannot send, retry, or sign). Call this when unsure whether a payment is in scope for trace_payment.
Annotations the server declares
- title: List supported payment systems
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:11 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 irreversible). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://tracepay.ai/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including trace_payment (irreversible)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warntrace_payment
The server marks "trace_payment" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "trace_payment" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...Solana), providers requiring connected credentials (Bridge, Circle), and explicit capabili..."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http trace https://tracepay.ai/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http trace https://tracepay.ai/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__trace__get_trace",
"mcp__trace__list_supported_systems"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__trace__trace_payment"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as trace. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__trace__trace_payment untrusted-input
- mcp__trace__list_supported_systems private-data
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.soreniverson/trace/verify?hash=3f2bf0567f3820029b4f3f4e073467f27525f3e49ad8c9fef34b8e8432213c1d" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 3f2bf0567f38, from Nov 21, 2026, 03:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.soreniverson/trace/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.soreniverson/trace)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:49 UTC.
Tracepay MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Tracepay MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Tracepay MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Tracepay MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: trace_payment.
What tools does the Tracepay MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 1 irreversible, 2 read. trace_payment, get_trace and list_supported_systems.
Does the Tracepay MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Tracepay MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Tracepay MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 21, 2026.