Diogenes Agent Guardrails & Sandbox MCP server
io.github.stand-out-of-my-sun/diogenes-agent-guardrails-mcpstand-out-of-my-sunstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Autonomous agent guardrails, bash sandboxing, MCP rugpull diffing & prompt firewalls.
12 tools: 9 change things and 3 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 0
- 5 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
9 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Diogenes Agent Guardrails & Sandbox MCP server can do
The Diogenes Agent Guardrails & Sandbox MCP server is published by the GitHub account stand-out-of-my-sun. It has 12 tools. It can create or change data (9 tools: verify_agent_command_safety, execute_python_sandbox, audit_mcp_server_manifest, detect_mcp_schema_rugpull and 5 more), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.
1 tool brings in text other people can write (sanitize_tool_output_stream).
The fixed checks matched 5 findings (annotation-conflict and credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
12 tools
Changes things 9Claude Code: ask
audit_mcp_server_manifestScans an external MCP server's initial tools/list manifest to detect tool-name shadowing (read_file, bash) and hidden prompt-injection directives in descriptions.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Scans an external MCP server's initial tools/list manifest to detect tool-name shadowing (read_file, bash) and hidden prompt-injection directives in descriptions. Use when vetting a newly discovered third-party MCP server before mounting it into an agent session; for comparing a previously pinned MCP baseline against a live mid-session tools/list response, use detect_mcp_schema_rugpull instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'manifest_json' ('audit_profile' defaults to 'strict'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (25 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid.
Annotations the server declares
- title: External MCP Server Manifest & Tool-Poisoning Security Auditor
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
audit_outbound_egress_urlStatic validation firewall for outbound network destination URIs against cloud metadata IP addresses (169.254.169.254), RFC 1918 private IP blocks, and query-string secret exfiltra…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Static validation firewall for outbound network destination URIs against cloud metadata IP addresses (169.254.169.254), RFC 1918 private IP blocks, and query-string secret exfiltration before agent dispatch. Use when validating a user-supplied or tool-supplied URI destination before network dispatch; for auditing local shell commands or general prompts, use verify_agent_command_safety instead. Read-only edge call (32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'destination_uri' ('egress_policy' defaults to 'block_private_and_metadata'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (15 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Outbound Agent URL SSRF, Metadata & Secret Exfiltration Firewall
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
audit_response_factualityCross-references factual claims, numbers, and citations in a draft agent response against retrieved source passages to flag unsupported hallucinations before delivery.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Cross-references factual claims, numbers, and citations in a draft agent response against retrieved source passages to flag unsupported hallucinations before delivery. Use when verifying that a generated answer is 100% grounded in source evidence before returning it to the user; for scrubbing inbound tool outputs for prompt-injection and invisible Unicode, use sanitize_tool_output_stream instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'claim' ('context' defaults to 'standard'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (25 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Draft Agent Response Groundedness & Hallucination Auditor
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
detect_mcp_schema_rugpullComputes structural diffs between a pinned baseline MCP tools/list snapshot and a live server response to catch mid-session description or schema tampering.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Computes structural diffs between a pinned baseline MCP tools/list snapshot and a live server response to catch mid-session description or schema tampering. Use when verifying that a connected MCP server has not mutated its tool definitions mid-session; for performing a first-time static security audit on a single MCP manifest, use audit_mcp_server_manifest instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'baseline_tools_json' ('current_tools_json' defaults to 'standard'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (20 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Mid-Session MCP tools/list Rug-Pull & Schema Mutation Detector
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
execute_python_sandboxAudits Python source code for forbidden syscalls (os, subprocess, socket, open, eval) inside an AST-governed WebAssembly sandbox with no host filesystem access.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "execute_python_sandbox" says "execute": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "execute_python_sandbox" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "execute_python_sandbox" says "execute": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Audits Python source code for forbidden syscalls (os, subprocess, socket, open, eval) inside an AST-governed WebAssembly sandbox with no host filesystem access. Use when executing LLM-generated Python snippets safely; for checking shell commands without executing code, use verify_agent_command_safety instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'python_script' ('timeout_profile' defaults to 'fast_1s'), supports '?demo=true' or MPP (250 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid.
Annotations the server declares
- title: AST-Audited Ephemeral Python Code Execution Sandbox
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
redact_sensitive_piiRedacts emails, phone numbers, SSNs, credit cards, API keys, and crypto private keys from text before logging or external transmission.3 findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Info
The title mentions "Credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
title: "Zero-PII & Secret Credential Redaction Engine"
- Info
The annotations title mentions "Credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations.title: "Zero-PII & Secret Credential Redaction Engine"
- Info
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...when stripping personal data or secret credentials from prompts, logs, or outbound message..."
Description, as the server wrote it Redacts emails, phone numbers, SSNs, credit cards, API keys, and crypto private keys from text before logging or external transmission. Use when stripping personal data or secret credentials from prompts, logs, or outbound messages; for neutralizing indirect prompt injections and invisible Unicode in inbound tool responses, use sanitize_tool_output_stream instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'text' ('redaction_style' defaults to 'typed_token'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (25 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Zero-PII & Secret Credential Redaction Engine
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
sanitize_tool_output_streamSanitizes untrusted external tool or web-scrape outputs by stripping invisible Unicode Tag characters (U+E0000), neutralizing Markdown tracking image beacons, and defusing indirect…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "scrape": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Sanitizes untrusted external tool or web-scrape outputs by stripping invisible Unicode Tag characters (U+E0000), neutralizing Markdown tracking image beacons, and defusing indirect prompt overrides. Use when cleaning raw third-party tool outputs or scraped web text before inserting it into the LLM context window; for redacting personal identifiable information (emails, SSNs, keys) from outbound text, use redact_sensitive_pii instead. Read-only edge call (32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'raw_tool_output' (with enum defaults), uses '?demo=true' or L402 (15 sats); HTTP 400 if invalid.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Indirect Prompt-Injection, Invisible Unicode & Beacon Output Scrubber
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
verify_a2a_agent_cardVerifies a remote agent's A2A /.well-known/agent.json discovery card, checking JWS/DID signature binding, endpoint HTTPS enforcement, and capability spoofing.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Verifies a remote agent's A2A /.well-known/agent.json discovery card, checking JWS/DID signature binding, endpoint HTTPS enforcement, and capability spoofing. Use when authenticating a peer autonomous agent before delegating subtasks or exchanging payments over A2A; for auditing an MCP tool server's tools/list manifest rather than a peer agent's A2A card, use audit_mcp_server_manifest instead. Read-only edge call (32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'agent_card_json' ('trust_policy' defaults to 'require_https_and_did'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (15 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid.
Annotations the server declares
- title: A2A /.well-known/agent.json Identity & Capability Card Verifier
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
verify_agent_command_safetyEvaluates untrusted agent prompts, bash commands, and tool arguments to block prompt injection, destructive shell commands, and private-key exfiltration.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "evaluate": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "verify_agent_command_safety" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "evaluate": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Evaluates untrusted agent prompts, bash commands, and tool arguments to block prompt injection, destructive shell commands, and private-key exfiltration. Use when screening a general shell command or user prompt before autonomous agent execution; for statically validating SQL database queries at the AST level, use validate_sql_query_ast instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'payload' ('action_type' defaults to 'bash_command'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (20 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Autonomous Agent Pre-Execution Command & Prompt Injection Gate
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
detect_agent_action_loopAnalyzes an agent's recent tool-call trace to detect identical retry spins, A/B state oscillation, and runaway token burn.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "analyze": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Analyzes an agent's recent tool-call trace to detect identical retry spins, A/B state oscillation, and runaway token burn. Use when monitoring autonomous agent execution loops to decide whether to continue or trip a token-burn breaker; for inspecting a single command payload for security threats before execution, use verify_agent_command_safety instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'action_trace_json' ('sensitivity' defaults to 'strict_2_repeats'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (15 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Autonomous Agent Action-Trace Loop & Token-Burn Circuit Breaker
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
validate_mcp_sampling_requestAudits inbound MCP sampling/createMessage callbacks from connected servers to block cross-server context snooping (includeContext='allServers') and token quota hijacking.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "validate_mcp_sampling_request" says "validate": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Audits inbound MCP sampling/createMessage callbacks from connected servers to block cross-server context snooping (includeContext='allServers') and token quota hijacking. Use when filtering a connected MCP server's request to sample the host LLM; for scrubbing text returned from a standard synchronous tools/call response, use sanitize_tool_output_stream instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'sampling_request_json' ('max_tokens_ceiling' defaults to '512'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (20 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Inbound MCP sampling/createMessage Reverse-Injection Firewall
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
validate_sql_query_astPerforms static AST syntax tree parsing on SQL statements to verify strictly read-only SELECT clauses and reject mutations, stacked queries, or comment bypasses.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "validate_sql_query_ast" says "validate": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Performs static AST syntax tree parsing on SQL statements to verify strictly read-only SELECT clauses and reject mutations, stacked queries, or comment bypasses. Use when verifying that an agent-authored SQL statement is strictly read-only before running it on a database; for screening non-SQL bash commands or general agent prompts, use verify_agent_command_safety instead. Stateless read-only edge call (max 32 KB, 60 RPM): accepts 'sql_statement' ('dialect' defaults to 'postgres'), supports '?demo=true' or L402 (15 sats), and returns HTTP 400 if invalid.
Annotations the server declares
- title: AST-Level Read-Only SQL Query & Injection Safety Validator
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:11 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 9
- Protocol version
- 2024-11-05
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 9 tools that change things (9 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev/mcp/agent-guardrails: tools/list returned 12 tools to an anonymous client, including verify_agent_command_safety (write), execute_python_sandbox (write), audit_mcp_server_manifest (write), detect_mcp_schema_rugpull (write), sanitize_tool_output_stream (write) and 4 more
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The server marks "verify_agent_command_safety" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "evaluate": a word for a change.
The server marks "execute_python_sandbox" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "execute_python_sandbox" says "execute": a word for a change.
The title mentions "Credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
title: "Zero-PII & Secret Credential Redaction Engine"
The annotations title mentions "Credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations.title: "Zero-PII & Secret Credential Redaction Engine"
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...when stripping personal data or secret credentials from prompts, logs, or outbound message..."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools12 changed.~12 changedView diff
- Changed:audit_mcp_server_manifestChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:audit_outbound_egress_urlChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:audit_response_factualityChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:detect_agent_action_loopOnly readsdescription
- Changed:detect_mcp_schema_rugpullChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:execute_python_sandboxChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:redact_sensitive_piiChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:sanitize_tool_output_streamChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:validate_mcp_sampling_requestOnly readsdescription
- Changed:validate_sql_query_astOnly readsdescription
- Changed:verify_a2a_agent_cardChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:verify_agent_command_safetyChanges thingsdescription
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http diogenes-agent-guardrails https://diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev/mcp/agent-guardrailsclaude mcp add --transport http diogenes-agent-guardrails https://diogenes-micro-gateway.corinth.workers.dev/mcp/agent-guardrailsRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__diogenes-agent-guardrails__validate_sql_query_ast",
"mcp__diogenes-agent-guardrails__validate_mcp_sampling_request",
"mcp__diogenes-agent-guardrails__detect_agent_action_loop"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__diogenes-agent-guardrails__verify_agent_command_safety",
"mcp__diogenes-agent-guardrails__execute_python_sandbox",
"mcp__diogenes-agent-guardrails__audit_mcp_server_manifest",
"mcp__diogenes-agent-guardrails__detect_mcp_schema_rugpull",
"mcp__diogenes-agent-guardrails__sanitize_tool_output_stream",
"mcp__diogenes-agent-guardrails__redact_sensitive_pii",
"mcp__diogenes-agent-guardrails__verify_a2a_agent_card",
"mcp__diogenes-agent-guardrails__audit_outbound_egress_url",
"mcp__diogenes-agent-guardrails__audit_response_factuality"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as diogenes-agent-guardrails. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__diogenes-agent-guardrails__sanitize_tool_output_stream untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.stand-out-of-my-sun/diogenes-agent-guardrails-mcp/verify?hash=7fbf16eeb8b9e638a74fff858fa89d0bb6e71abe3d0ef6599a736b93661202d7" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 7fbf16eeb8b9, from Nov 20, 2026, 14:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.stand-out-of-my-sun/diogenes-agent-guardrails-mcp/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.stand-out-of-my-sun/diogenes-agent-guardrails-mcp)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:49 UTC.
Diogenes Agent Guardrails & Sandbox MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Diogenes Agent Guardrails & Sandbox MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 12 tools, 9 of which can change, send or delete something, and 5 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Diogenes Agent Guardrails & Sandbox MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Diogenes Agent Guardrails & Sandbox MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Diogenes Agent Guardrails & Sandbox MCP server have?
- 12 tools: 9 write, 3 read. verify_agent_command_safety, execute_python_sandbox, audit_mcp_server_manifest, detect_mcp_schema_rugpull, sanitize_tool_output_stream, redact_sensitive_pii, verify_a2a_agent_card, audit_outbound_egress_url and 4 more.
Does the Diogenes Agent Guardrails & Sandbox MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Diogenes Agent Guardrails & Sandbox MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Diogenes Agent Guardrails & Sandbox MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 6, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.