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Manto — 馒头新闻 MCP server

io.github.tans/mantotansstreamable-httpv1.1.0Scanned

Publish, search, and promote time-sensitive news and messages through a public remote MCP server.

10 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 1 do something that can't be undone, 3 change things and 5 only read.

Tools: 1 delete, 1 irreversible, 3 write, 5 read.
  • Reads private data · 2
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here can delete or cancel things and 1 does something that can't be undone. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Manto — 馒头新闻 MCP server can do

The Manto — 馒头新闻 MCP server is published by the GitHub account tans. It has 10 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: remove_content), do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (publish) and create or change data (3 tools: create_account, create_recharge and set_promotion). 5 tools only read.

2 tools read private data (lookup_account and search); 2 tools bring in text other people can write (lookup_account and search); 1 tool can send data out of your system (publish). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

10 tools

Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
  • remove_contentRemove content owned by the authenticated accountNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "remove_content" says "remove": a word for removing or ending something.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Remove content owned by the authenticated account
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • publishCreate or idempotently update contentCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "publish" says "publish": a word for a change that another call does not undo.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe name "publish" says "publish": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Create or idempotently update content
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • create_accountCreate a passwordless Manto account and receive an API key onceNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "create_account" says "create": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Create a passwordless Manto account and receive an API key once
  • create_rechargeCreate a recharge order for an existing account emailNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "create_recharge" says "create": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Create a recharge order for an existing account email
  • set_promotionSet a daily promotion budget in cents; zero pauses promotionNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "set_promotion" says "set": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Set a daily promotion budget in cents; zero pauses promotion
Only reads 5Show 5 read-only tools
  • get_accountGet account quota, balance, account score and recent contentNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_account" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get account quota, balance, account score and recent content
  • get_rechargeGet recharge statusNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_recharge" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get recharge status
  • list_account_articlesList an account's published articles; no API key requiredNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_account_articles" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List an account's published articles; no API key required
  • lookup_accountLook up a public account by email; no API key requiredReads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "lookup_account" says "lookup": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "email": it reads mail.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "email": it reads inbound email, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Look up a public account by email; no API key required

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

4 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data2
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__manto__publish"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:11 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
5
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (1 destructive, 1 irreversible, 3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://manto.xin/mcp: tools/list returned 10 tools to an anonymous client, including remove_content (destructive), publish (irreversible), create_account (write), create_recharge (write), set_promotion (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http manto https://manto.xin/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http manto https://manto.xin/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__manto__lookup_account",
      "mcp__manto__list_account_articles",
      "mcp__manto__search",
      "mcp__manto__get_recharge",
      "mcp__manto__get_account"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__manto__create_account",
      "mcp__manto__create_recharge",
      "mcp__manto__publish",
      "mcp__manto__set_promotion"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__manto__remove_content"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as manto. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__manto__lookup_account private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__manto__search private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__manto__publish outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.tans/manto/verify?hash=824e92766c3dea030ada67de6f078a15767a142879efb1df7d8cf02acb7e556c" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 824e92766c3d, from Nov 20, 2026, 14:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.tans/manto/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.tans/manto
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.tans/manto.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.tans/manto)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:50 UTC.

Manto — 馒头新闻 MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Manto — 馒头新闻 MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 10 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Manto — 馒头新闻 MCP server delete data?

Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: remove_content.

Can the Manto — 馒头新闻 MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: publish.

What tools does the Manto — 馒头新闻 MCP server have?

10 tools: 1 destructive, 1 irreversible, 3 write, 5 read. remove_content, publish, create_account, create_recharge, set_promotion, lookup_account, list_account_articles, search and 2 more.

Does the Manto — 馒头新闻 MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Manto — 馒头新闻 MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): publish.

Has the Manto — 馒头新闻 MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.