slipstream MCP server
io.github.tathagat22/slipstreamtathagat22streamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Shared distillation cache for AI agents — every fetch ~73-89% fewer tokens via a shared cache.
8 tools: 6 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 2
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 2
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
6 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the slipstream MCP server can do
The slipstream MCP server is published by the GitHub account tathagat22. It has 8 tools. It can create or change data (6 tools: slipstream_note, slipstream_recall, slipstream_vote, slipstream_flag and 2 more), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
2 tools read private data (cached_fetch and cached_outline); 2 tools bring in text other people can write (cached_fetch and cached_outline); 2 tools can send data out of your system (cached_fetch and cached_outline). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
8 tools
Changes things 6Claude Code: ask
slipstream_flagFlag a collective note (by id) as wrong, outdated, or harmful.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Flag a collective note (by id) as wrong, outdated, or harmful. Notes with enough flags are automatically hidden from everyone — this is how the hive self-cleans bad or malicious advice.
slipstream_noteLeave a note for every future agent: a gotcha, a correction to stale info, or a tip.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Leave a note for every future agent: a gotcha, a correction to stale info, or a tip. Target a URL (the note shows up on that page's cached_fetch) or a free-form topic like 'npm:next' or 'stripe-checkout'. Write what cost you time so the next agent gets it for free. Notes are sanitized and community-moderated; spam/injection is rejected.
slipstream_recallRecall what other agents learned about a URL or topic WITHOUT fetching the page — pure collective memory, ranked by trust (votes minus flags, with time decay).No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Recall what other agents learned about a URL or topic WITHOUT fetching the page — pure collective memory, ranked by trust (votes minus flags, with time decay).
slipstream_statsGlobal Slipstream stats: tokens saved worldwide, hit rate, pages cached, and collective notes contributed.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Global Slipstream stats: tokens saved worldwide, hit rate, pages cached, and collective notes contributed.
slipstream_voteUpvote a collective note (by id) when it helped you — ranks trustworthy notes to the top for everyone.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Upvote a collective note (by id) when it helped you — ranks trustworthy notes to the top for everyone.
whats_newCutoff-aware corrections: given your training cutoff (a date, or your model id) and a URL or topic, returns ONLY what changed since then — collective corrections other agents recor…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Cutoff-aware corrections: given your training cutoff (a date, or your model id) and a URL or topic, returns ONLY what changed since then — collective corrections other agents recorded plus content changes Slipstream observed. Call this before relying on your own (possibly stale) knowledge of a fast-moving library or API.
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
cached_fetchFetch a web/docs URL as clean, token-optimized markdown from Slipstream's shared cache (use INSTEAD of a raw web fetch).Reads private dataReads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "cached_fetch" says "fetch": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "fetch" and "doc": it reads documents.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "fetch" and "web": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch a web/docs URL as clean, token-optimized markdown from Slipstream's shared cache (use INSTEAD of a raw web fetch). The first agent pays the crawl; every agent after gets ~90% fewer tokens. Surfaces warnings other agents left on the page. Pass known_hash to skip re-reading unchanged content (delta), or section to fetch just one heading (progressive disclosure). Returns a contentHash you can pass as known_hash next time.
cached_outlineGet a token-cheap table of contents for a URL: every heading plus the approximate token cost of its section.Reads private dataReads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "get" and "table": it reads databases.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "get" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.
Description, as the server wrote it Get a token-cheap table of contents for a URL: every heading plus the approximate token cost of its section. Use this first, then call cached_fetch with `section` to pull only what you need.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
8 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 2 outbound tools breaks every one.
- Reads private data2
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out2
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"mcp__slipstream__cached_fetch",
"mcp__slipstream__cached_outline"
]
}
}Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:11 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 6
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 6 tools that change things (6 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://slipstream-pi.vercel.app/api/mcp: tools/list returned 8 tools to an anonymous client, including slipstream_note (write), slipstream_recall (write), slipstream_vote (write), slipstream_flag (write), whats_new (write) and 1 more
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http slipstream https://slipstream-pi.vercel.app/api/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http slipstream https://slipstream-pi.vercel.app/api/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__slipstream__cached_fetch",
"mcp__slipstream__cached_outline",
"mcp__slipstream__slipstream_note",
"mcp__slipstream__slipstream_recall",
"mcp__slipstream__slipstream_vote",
"mcp__slipstream__slipstream_flag",
"mcp__slipstream__whats_new",
"mcp__slipstream__slipstream_stats"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as slipstream. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__slipstream__cached_fetch private-data, untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__slipstream__cached_outline private-data, untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.tathagat22/slipstream/verify?hash=e69f63c9c5d967a7a2ad77ee789675ffa7c6be5a4f7c6f71eb58fc9418270598" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash e69f63c9c5d9, from Nov 20, 2026, 14:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.tathagat22/slipstream/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.tathagat22/slipstream)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:50 UTC.
slipstream MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the slipstream MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 8 tools, 6 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the slipstream MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the slipstream MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the slipstream MCP server have?
- 8 tools: 6 write, 2 read. slipstream_note, slipstream_recall, slipstream_vote, slipstream_flag, whats_new, slipstream_stats, cached_fetch and cached_outline.
Does the slipstream MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the slipstream MCP server send data to outside services?
- 2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): cached_fetch and cached_outline.
Has the slipstream MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.