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tclp-mcp server

io.github.thechancerylaneproject/tclp-mcpthechancerylaneprojectstreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned

MCP server for The Chancery Lane Project's climate-aligned contract clause knowledge graph.

6 tools: 6 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 0 write, 6 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 6
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

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  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
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A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the tclp-mcp server can do

The tclp-mcp server is published by the GitHub account thechancerylaneproject. It has 6 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.

6 tools bring in text other people can write (search, entity_lookup, find_legal_resources and 3 more).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 0.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Only reads 6Show 6 read-only tools
  • entity_lookupFind TCLP content (clauses, glossary terms, guides) associated with a named concept.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "entity_lookup" says "lookup": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Find TCLP content (clauses, glossary terms, guides) associated with a named concept. Unlike `search`, this performs a deterministic name match against Entity nodes in the knowledge graph rather than a relevance-ranked semantic search. Use it when you have a specific term or concept (e.g. "scope 3 emissions", "net zero") and want to retrieve every clause or glossary entry that explicitly references it. Args: name: The entity or concept name to look up (exact match, case-insensitive). limit: Maximum number of results to return (1–50). include_full_text: Include each hit's full body text (Markdown). Off by default — bodies are large; request only when you need the content, and prefer a small `limit` when you do. Returns: JSON with "meta" and "results" where each hit includes the source content node, its plain-text `summary` (null when it has none), its `child_name` (a clause's child name, null otherwise) and the entity names that matched. Each hit's "references" lists the instruments it cites: pass a reference's `work_id` to `get_legal_resource` for details. A reference's `edge` (governs, references, describes) says how the content relates to the instrument; it is not a statement of the instrument's legal effect. An empty list means the hit cites no instruments. null with "lrsf" in meta.degraded means references could not be loaded: do not conclude that the hit cites no instruments.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • taxonomy_contentList TCLP content (clauses, guides) or legal resources filtered by taxonomy facet=value.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List TCLP content (clauses, guides) or legal resources filtered by taxonomy facet=value. Multi-facet filters are combined with AND. Call `taxonomy_facets` first to learn which facet names and slugs exist; using a name not in that list returns a 400. Args: filters: Mapping of facet name to value slug, e.g. `{"sector": "real-estate", "practice_area": "commercial"}`. Each facet may appear at most once. scope: `clause` (ClauseName only), `guide` (Guide only), `legal_resource` (laws, regulations, standards and frameworks; facets `jurisdiction` and `sector` only), or `all` (clauses and guides, the default). limit: Maximum results to return (1–100, default 25). offset: Result offset for paging (default 0). sort: `title`, `date_published_desc`, or `date_modified_desc`. Returns: JSON with "meta" (totals, scope, filters echoed back) and "results" (each hit has `id`, `url`, `title`, `content_type`, dates, `summary` (the clause summary or guide excerpt as plain text, null for legal resources), `child_name` (a clause's child name, e.g. "Odhran's Clause", null otherwise), and a `facets` map of all taxonomy arrays on the node). `content_type` is `clause`, `guide` or `legal_resource`, the same values that `search` returns.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • taxonomy_facetsList taxonomy facets and their value slugs across TCLP content.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List taxonomy facets and their value slugs across TCLP content. Facets are taxonomy categories like `sector`, `practice_area`, `application`, and `jurisdiction`. Each facet returns the list of slugs that actually appear on the graph, with counts. Use this to discover the vocabulary, then call `taxonomy_content` with chosen slugs. Args: scope: Which labels to include — `clause` (ClauseName only), `guide` (Guide only), `legal_resource` (laws, regulations, standards and frameworks; facets `jurisdiction` and `sector` only), or `all` (clauses and guides, the default). Returns: JSON with "meta" and "facets". Each facet has `name`, `applies_to` (list of Neo4j labels carrying it), and `values` (list of `{slug, count}`, sorted by count desc).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write6
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:11 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools4 changed.~4 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http tclp https://mcp.chancerylaneproject.org/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http tclp https://mcp.chancerylaneproject.org/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__tclp__search",
      "mcp__tclp__entity_lookup",
      "mcp__tclp__find_legal_resources",
      "mcp__tclp__get_legal_resource",
      "mcp__tclp__taxonomy_facets",
      "mcp__tclp__taxonomy_content"
    ],
    "ask": [],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as tclp. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 6 rules
  • mcp__tclp__search untrusted-input
  • mcp__tclp__entity_lookup untrusted-input
  • mcp__tclp__find_legal_resources untrusted-input
  • mcp__tclp__get_legal_resource untrusted-input
  • mcp__tclp__taxonomy_facets untrusted-input
  • mcp__tclp__taxonomy_content untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.thechancerylaneproject/tclp-mcp/verify?hash=39057e48eec8a48fcab16477da179943b92e36613ee89c5ffdf057a75b498414" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 39057e48eec8, from Nov 20, 2026, 15:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.thechancerylaneproject/tclp-mcp/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.thechancerylaneproject/tclp-mcp
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.thechancerylaneproject/tclp-mcp.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.thechancerylaneproject/tclp-mcp)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:50 UTC.

tclp-mcp server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the tclp-mcp server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.

Can the tclp-mcp server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the tclp-mcp server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the tclp-mcp server have?

6 tools: 6 read. search, entity_lookup, find_legal_resources, get_legal_resource, taxonomy_facets and taxonomy_content.

Does the tclp-mcp server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the tclp-mcp server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the tclp-mcp server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 6, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.