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Feed Audit (Product Feed Hygiene) MCP server

io.github.theharrisontruong-web/feed-audittheharrisontruong-webstreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned

Audits a product feed (XML/CSV/JSON) for Google Shopping disapproval errors. $1.00/call via x402.

2 tools: 2 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 2 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 2
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Feed Audit (Product Feed Hygiene) MCP server can do

The Feed Audit (Product Feed Hygiene) MCP server is published by the GitHub account theharrisontruong-web. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: audit_feed and audit_feed_lite), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

2 tools bring in text other people can write (audit_feed and audit_feed_lite); 2 tools can send data out of your system (audit_feed and audit_feed_lite).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 1.0.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

2 tools

Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • audit_feedFull product feed hygiene scan of a product feed URL (Google Shopping-style XML, CSV, or JSON — format auto-detected).Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Full product feed hygiene scan of a product feed URL (Google Shopping-style XML, CSV, or JSON — format auto-detected). Fetches the feed server-side and runs 20 weighted checks: parse validity and encoding, required attributes (id, title, link, price, availability values, image_link), GTIN/MPN and brand coverage, identifier_exists misuse, title/description quality, image-link spot-checks, price format and sale_price logic, taxonomy and shipping/tax presence, duplicate ids and variant grouping. These are the errors behind Google Merchant Center disapprovals — a disapproved feed means the products do not serve on Google Shopping at all, and agent-commerce surfaces referencing Merchant Center IDs inherit the same dirt. Returns machine-readable JSON: 0-100 score, A-F grade, a disapproval-risk level (Low/Moderate/Elevated/High) with the failing disapproval-class checks named, per-check pass/partial/fail/unknown with evidence, the worst-offending items sampled with concrete fixes, and the top 3 prioritized fixes. HONEST LIMITS: the scan validates the feed document (capped at 8 MB, first 20,000 items, 8 image spot-checks); it does not crawl landing pages, so feed-vs-page price/availability mismatches are out of scope. Cost: $1.00 USDC on Base per call, paid via x402 — the caller's agent pays from its owner's approved wallet; no API key needed. Use this after every catalog change, before a Shopping campaign launch, or to triage a disapproval wave.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • audit_feed_liteFREE lite product feed hygiene scan of a product feed URL (XML, CSV, or JSON — auto-detected).Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    FREE lite product feed hygiene scan of a product feed URL (XML, CSV, or JSON — auto-detected). Runs the same 20 checks as audit_feed but returns top-line results only: 0-100 score, A-F grade, disapproval-risk level, detected format, item count, check counts, and the titles of the top gaps — item-level detail is capped (no per-check evidence, no offending items, no detailed fixes). Use this to triage whether a feed needs the full audit_feed report, or call audit_feed directly for the complete evidence-backed scan.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out2
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 13, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://feed-al6bxcngia-ue.a.run.app/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including audit_feed (write), audit_feed_lite (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http feed-audit https://feed-al6bxcngia-ue.a.run.app/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http feed-audit https://feed-al6bxcngia-ue.a.run.app/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__feed-audit__audit_feed",
      "mcp__feed-audit__audit_feed_lite"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as feed-audit. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__feed-audit__audit_feed untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__feed-audit__audit_feed_lite untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.theharrisontruong-web/feed-audit/verify?hash=8f4ae9df828c2088956877c750e0d9a7679325b62334e80b554a4bbd256497d0" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 8f4ae9df828c, from Nov 17, 2026, 02:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.theharrisontruong-web/feed-audit/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.theharrisontruong-web/feed-audit
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.theharrisontruong-web/feed-audit.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.theharrisontruong-web/feed-audit)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 17, 2026, 02:18 UTC.

Feed Audit (Product Feed Hygiene) MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Feed Audit (Product Feed Hygiene) MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Feed Audit (Product Feed Hygiene) MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Feed Audit (Product Feed Hygiene) MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Feed Audit (Product Feed Hygiene) MCP server have?

2 tools: 2 write. audit_feed and audit_feed_lite.

Does the Feed Audit (Product Feed Hygiene) MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Feed Audit (Product Feed Hygiene) MCP server send data to outside services?

2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): audit_feed and audit_feed_lite.

Has the Feed Audit (Product Feed Hygiene) MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 17, 2026.