Token Pressure + Holder Health MCP server
io.github.theharrisontruong-web/pressuretheharrisontruong-webstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Buying-pressure ladder + holder health for Solana memecoins. $0.02/call via x402.
2 tools: 2 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 0
- 2 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Token Pressure + Holder Health MCP server can do
The Token Pressure + Holder Health MCP server is published by the GitHub account theharrisontruong-web. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: token_pressure and token_pressure_lite), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
2 tools bring in text other people can write (token_pressure and token_pressure_lite).
The fixed checks matched 2 findings (base64-blob). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
2 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
token_pressureFull buying-pressure + holder-health report for ONE Solana memecoin (mint address in).Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The input schema at properties.mint.description contains a 44-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.mint.description: "...32-44 chars), e.g. Ce2gx9KGXJ6C9Mp5b5x1sn9Mg87JwEbrQby4Zqo3pump. EVM 0x addresses a..."
Description, as the server wrote it Full buying-pressure + holder-health report for ONE Solana memecoin (mint address in). BUYING PRESSURE: deterministic constant-product math on live pool reserves — the exact net quote inflow that moves the price to 1.5x, 2x, 3x, 5x, 10x, 25x, 50x and 100x, with target prices and target market caps, plus the gross inflow after the venue fee. Works for pump.fun bonding curves (virtual reserves read from the curve account, pre-graduation), PumpSwap and Raydium constant-product pools; concentrated pools (CLMM/DLMM) are reported unavailable with the reason, never approximated. HOLDER HEALTH: cost basis reconstructed from public chain history over a bounded top-holder sample (pool vaults excluded) — total unrealized PnL, percent of sampled wallets in profit, supply-weighted average cost, MVRV, UPNL vs liquidity, per-holder detail, and the sample coverage (% of supply) stated up front. Includes a canonical-contract check for tracked narratives (NEET at launch): clones trading on the name are flagged and the real contract named. Every report carries its methodology (pool type, reserves snapshot slot, fee assumption, holder sample bounds) and names its data gaps — figures that cannot be computed from public state are reported unavailable, never estimated. Cost: $0.02 USDC per call via x402 (Base settlement; Solana settlement when configured) — no API key needed. Use it to answer 'how much money has to arrive for this to 2x / 10x, and are the holders sitting on profit or underwater?' before sizing into any Solana memecoin.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
token_pressure_liteFREE lite buying-pressure + holder-health report for one Solana memecoin.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The input schema at properties.mint.description contains a 44-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.mint.description: "...32-44 chars), e.g. Ce2gx9KGXJ6C9Mp5b5x1sn9Mg87JwEbrQby4Zqo3pump. EVM 0x addresses a..."
Description, as the server wrote it FREE lite buying-pressure + holder-health report for one Solana memecoin. Top-line only: net inflow needed for 2x, 5x and 10x moves, percent of sampled wallets in profit, total unrealized PnL headline, weighted average cost, MVRV and sample coverage. The full ladder (1.5x-100x), gross-of-fee figures, reserves, UPNL vs liquidity and per-holder detail are capped. Use it to triage whether a token deserves the full token_pressure report.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 17, 2026, 15:20 UTC, unchanged since Nov 17, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://pressure-al6bxcngia-ue.a.run.app/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including token_pressure (write), token_pressure_lite (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warntoken_pressure
The input schema at properties.mint.description contains a 44-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.mint.description: "...32-44 chars), e.g. Ce2gx9KGXJ6C9Mp5b5x1sn9Mg87JwEbrQby4Zqo3pump. EVM 0x addresses a..."
The input schema at properties.mint.description contains a 44-character base64 string.
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.mint.description: "...32-44 chars), e.g. Ce2gx9KGXJ6C9Mp5b5x1sn9Mg87JwEbrQby4Zqo3pump. EVM 0x addresses a..."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http pressure https://pressure-al6bxcngia-ue.a.run.app/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http pressure https://pressure-al6bxcngia-ue.a.run.app/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__pressure__token_pressure",
"mcp__pressure__token_pressure_lite"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as pressure. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__pressure__token_pressure untrusted-input
- mcp__pressure__token_pressure_lite untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.theharrisontruong-web/pressure/verify?hash=ebc3e42b77b152845569a7a77d45b5b6a7d56fa38eaf79f013a6993556eb2793" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash ebc3e42b77b1, from Nov 17, 2026, 05:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.theharrisontruong-web/pressure/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.theharrisontruong-web/pressure)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 17, 2026, 06:17 UTC.
Token Pressure + Holder Health MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Token Pressure + Holder Health MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Token Pressure + Holder Health MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Token Pressure + Holder Health MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Token Pressure + Holder Health MCP server have?
- 2 tools: 2 write. token_pressure and token_pressure_lite.
Does the Token Pressure + Holder Health MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Token Pressure + Holder Health MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Token Pressure + Holder Health MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 17, 2026.