AI Storefront Readiness Grader MCP server
io.github.theharrisontruong-web/storefront-gradertheharrisontruong-webstreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned
Grades any storefront URL A-F on 20 weighted conversion checks. $1.00/call via x402.
2 tools: 2 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 2
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the AI Storefront Readiness Grader MCP server can do
The AI Storefront Readiness Grader MCP server is published by the GitHub account theharrisontruong-web. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: grade_storefront and grade_storefront_lite), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
2 tools bring in text other people can write (grade_storefront and grade_storefront_lite); 2 tools can send data out of your system (grade_storefront and grade_storefront_lite).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 13, 2026, version 1.0.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
2 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
grade_storefrontAudit an ecommerce storefront for AI-agent shopping readiness.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Audit an ecommerce storefront for AI-agent shopping readiness. Fetches the store server-side and runs 20 weighted checks across product intelligence (schema.org Product/Offer price, availability, variants, GTIN/MPN), AI discovery (robots.txt, llms.txt, agents.md, sitemap.xml, UCP manifest, MCP endpoint), conversation readiness (contact info, FAQ/returns, site search), transaction readiness (HTTPS, checkout signals, tax/shipping as values), and trust (business identity, policies). Returns a machine-readable JSON report: 0-100 score, A-F grade, per-check pass/partial/fail/unknown with evidence, and the top 3 prioritized fixes. Cost: $1.00 USDC on Base per call, paid via x402 — the caller's agent pays from its owner's approved wallet; no API key needed. Use this to decide whether a store is ready for AI shopping agents, or to generate the audit behind a readiness report for a merchant.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
grade_storefront_liteFREE lite storefront readiness grade of an ecommerce storefront URL.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE lite storefront readiness grade of an ecommerce storefront URL. Runs the same 20 checks as grade_storefront but returns top-line results only: 0-100 score, A-F grade, check counts, and the titles of the top gaps — no per-check evidence, no detailed recommendations. Use this to triage whether a store needs the full grade_storefront report, or call grade_storefront directly for the complete evidence-backed grade.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out2
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:11 UTC, unchanged since Nov 13, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://grader-al6bxcngia-ue.a.run.app/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including grade_storefront (write), grade_storefront_lite (write)
Posture changes
- Nov 13, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 2
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 -> 2.View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 2
Tools1 added, 1 changed.+1 added~1 changedView diff
- Added:grade_storefront_liteChanges things
- Changed:grade_storefrontChanges thingsannotations
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http storefront-grader https://grader-al6bxcngia-ue.a.run.app/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http storefront-grader https://grader-al6bxcngia-ue.a.run.app/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__storefront-grader__grade_storefront",
"mcp__storefront-grader__grade_storefront_lite"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as storefront-grader. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__storefront-grader__grade_storefront untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__storefront-grader__grade_storefront_lite untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.theharrisontruong-web/storefront-grader/verify?hash=974ebdf7d7020a7367fbfb4d52a9b7cceb9f37db2d54352a8f406ba732897133" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 974ebdf7d702, from Nov 13, 2026, 08:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.theharrisontruong-web/storefront-grader/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.theharrisontruong-web/storefront-grader)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 13, 2026, 08:18 UTC.
AI Storefront Readiness Grader MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the AI Storefront Readiness Grader MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the AI Storefront Readiness Grader MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the AI Storefront Readiness Grader MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the AI Storefront Readiness Grader MCP server have?
- 2 tools: 2 write. grade_storefront and grade_storefront_lite.
Does the AI Storefront Readiness Grader MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the AI Storefront Readiness Grader MCP server send data to outside services?
- 2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): grade_storefront and grade_storefront_lite.
Has the AI Storefront Readiness Grader MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 13, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.