DelegAIze Agent Check MCP server
io.github.toasternet/delegaize-agenten-checktoasternetstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Agent check without sign-in: which AI agents would take over your recurring office work.
2 tools: 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
Decide which of this server's tools your agent can use.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the DelegAIze Agent Check MCP server can do
The DelegAIze Agent Check MCP server is published by the GitHub account toasternet. It has 2 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.
1 tool reads private data (agenten_check_mail); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (agenten_check_mail).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 21, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
2 tools
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
agenten_checkReturns the DelegAIze agent catalogue (what each agent does, its tools, minutes saved per item), the clustering rules, the agents that match the input by keyword, and a personal li…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Returns the DelegAIze agent catalogue (what each agent does, its tools, minutes saved per item), the clustering rules, the agents that match the input by keyword, and a personal link (demo or free start) carrying utm and ref/pc. Input: EITHER beschreibung (the user's description of their work or one pasted mail) OR mail_uebersicht (subjects + sender domains, optionally a count per line, that YOUR mail tools collected — no bodies, no full addresses). No sign-in, nothing is stored, no data leaves for third parties. You do the reasoning: cluster with the rules, then present processes, agents and the estimated hours per month.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Agent check
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
agenten_check_mailReturns a link to the DelegAIze page where the user connects Gmail, Microsoft 365 or IMAP READ-ONLY.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "agenten_check_mail" says "mail": it reads mail.
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe name "agenten_check_mail" says "mail": it reads inbound email, which other people can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Returns a link to the DelegAIze page where the user connects Gmail, Microsoft 365 or IMAP READ-ONLY. There the last 100 mails are clustered into recurring processes, 1-3 agents run live on them as drafts, and access is revoked or discarded right after. Use it when the user wants the check on their real mailbox but you have no mail tools, or prefers us to do the analysis. Explain that they must give consent on the page. Nothing happens until they open the link.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Agent check on mailbox
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:25 UTC, unchanged since Nov 21, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://delegaize.innov-ai-tive.de/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/api/sb/functions/v1/agenten-check-mcp
- Authorization servers
- https://callpilotai.cf-innov-ai-tive.de, https://callpilotai.cf-innov-ai-tive.de/api/sb/functions/v1/mcp-auth
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- yes
- Client ID metadata documents
- no
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http delegaize-agenten-check https://delegaize.innov-ai-tive.de/api/sb/functions/v1/agenten-check-mcpclaude mcp add --transport http delegaize-agenten-check https://delegaize.innov-ai-tive.de/api/sb/functions/v1/agenten-check-mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__delegaize-agenten-check__agenten_check",
"mcp__delegaize-agenten-check__agenten_check_mail"
],
"ask": [],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as delegaize-agenten-check. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__delegaize-agenten-check__agenten_check_mail private-data, untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.toasternet/delegaize-agenten-check/verify?hash=09f1bf2b5af93924b37ea299640db6743ae3568f54c58854505880766a203d47" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 09f1bf2b5af9, from Nov 21, 2026, 16:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.toasternet/delegaize-agenten-check/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.toasternet/delegaize-agenten-check)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 21, 2026, 17:18 UTC.
DelegAIze Agent Check MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the DelegAIze Agent Check MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.
Can the DelegAIze Agent Check MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the DelegAIze Agent Check MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the DelegAIze Agent Check MCP server have?
- 2 tools: 2 read. agenten_check and agenten_check_mail.
Does the DelegAIze Agent Check MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the DelegAIze Agent Check MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the DelegAIze Agent Check MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 21, 2026.