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plate-lookup MCP server

io.github.trustcarinfo/plate-lookuptrustcarinfostreamable-httpv1.0.2Scanned

Ukrainian license-plate and vehicle lookups: registry data, photos and reviews (trustcar.info).

3 tools: 1 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

The remote endpoint did not answer the last look. Remote posture

Anlyon alternative

1 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

Import an OpenAPI spec →

What the plate-lookup MCP server can do

The plate-lookup MCP server is published by the GitHub account trustcarinfo. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: post_review), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (lookup_plate); 1 tool can send data out of your system (post_review).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Last scanned Nov 6, 2026, version 1.0.2.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • post_reviewPost a licence-plate review on behalf of the authenticated user.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "post_review" says "post": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe name "post_review" says "post": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Post a licence-plate review on behalf of the authenticated user. Requires an OAuth access token with the "write" scope (discover via /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource). The review is labelled AI-agent-generated, shown in a separate section, and does NOT affect the human rating.
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • lookup_plateLook up a Ukrainian licence plate on trustcar.info: region, vehicle (make/model/year/fuel), rating and recent reviews.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "lookup_plate" says "lookup": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "review": it reads comments, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Look up a Ukrainian licence plate on trustcar.info: region, vehicle (make/model/year/fuel), rating and recent reviews.
  • recent_platesList recently active plates on trustcar.info (with vehicle make/model where known).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List recently active plates on trustcar.info (with vehicle make/model where known).

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

The remote endpoint did not answer the last look

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:12 UTC, unchanged since Nov 13, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
no
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
not observed
tools/list served without credentials
no
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
not observed
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

The probe stopped: trustcar.info does not resolve.

Posture changes

  1. Nov 13, 2026
    • Reachable: yes to no
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to none
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
    • RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: https://trustcar.info/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource to none
    • Authorization servers: https://trustcar.info to none
    • Dynamic client registration: yes to not observed
    • Client ID metadata documents: no to not observed

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Reachable: yes -> no; HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> none; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no (and 6 more).View diff
    • Reachable: yes to no
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to none
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
    • RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: https://trustcar.info/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource to none
    • Authorization servers: https://trustcar.info to none
    • Dynamic client registration: yes to not observed
    • Client ID metadata documents: no to not observed

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http plate-lookup https://trustcar.info/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http plate-lookup https://trustcar.info/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__plate-lookup__lookup_plate",
      "mcp__plate-lookup__recent_plates"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__plate-lookup__post_review"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as plate-lookup. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__plate-lookup__lookup_plate untrusted-input
  • mcp__plate-lookup__post_review outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.trustcarinfo/plate-lookup/verify?hash=252dde1b571548c872c696f1325bb9b5663f6cadbdd1a32b887dbc3b6d1ace69" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 252dde1b5715, from Nov 6, 2026, 15:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.trustcarinfo/plate-lookup/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.trustcarinfo/plate-lookup
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.trustcarinfo/plate-lookup.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.trustcarinfo/plate-lookup)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:50 UTC.

plate-lookup MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the plate-lookup MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the plate-lookup MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the plate-lookup MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the plate-lookup MCP server have?

3 tools: 1 write, 2 read. post_review, lookup_plate and recent_plates.

Does the plate-lookup MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.

Does the plate-lookup MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): post_review.

Has the plate-lookup MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 6, 2026.