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Woo Revenue Incident Graph MCP server

io.github.tytutueh13-sudo/woo-revenue-incident-graphtytutueh13-sudostreamable-httpv0.2.2Scanned

Check WooCommerce checkout-change risk using public evidence and privacy-safe store signals.

4 tools: 3 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 4
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

3 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Woo Revenue Incident Graph MCP server can do

The Woo Revenue Incident Graph MCP server is published by the GitHub account tytutueh13-sudo. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: diagnose_revenue_incident, check_checkout_change_risk and verify_revenue_recovery), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

4 tools bring in text other people can write (get_checkout_health_snapshot, diagnose_revenue_incident, check_checkout_change_risk and 1 more).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 21, 2026, version 0.2.2.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • check_checkout_change_riskAnswers: is a change to this store's checkout or payment path known to have broken revenue elsewhere — before it is applied, or when explaining a change that was already made?Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "check_checkout_change_risk" says "checkout": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "check_checkout_change_risk" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "check_checkout_change_risk" says "checkout": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Answers: is a change to this store's checkout or payment path known to have broken revenue elsewhere — before it is applied, or when explaining a change that was already made? Checks a component and version against public release and issue evidence scoped to the money path (payment capture, order status transitions, gateway webhooks, wallet checkout), not to general plugin update safety. With no component named, checks every commerce change this store has made recently. Says `unknown` when nothing independent is on record — an absence of reports is not a safety record, and is reported as the absence it is. Free.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • diagnose_revenue_incidentAnswers: what most likely broke this store's checkout or payment path, what argues against each explanation, and how to tell whether a fix actually held.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Answers: what most likely broke this store's checkout or payment path, what argues against each explanation, and how to tell whether a fix actually held. Joins the store's own privacy-safe signals — order status over time, order-status transitions, order-note reason codes, gateway and webhook health, scheduler backlog, checkout page health, recent plugin/theme/core changes — against public release and issue evidence, on one timeline. Every answer reports which signal families this store could and could not report, because a family that cannot be collected is not a family that is fine. Returns up to three ranked hypotheses, each with the observations behind it, independent public sources where they exist, counterevidence, what remains unknown, safe next steps, and a verification plan. Returns `abstained` and charges nothing when the snapshot is stale, coverage is thin, or the signals do not support any cause — an unsupported guess during an outage is worse than no answer. Free while in beta. Call get_checkout_health_snapshot first.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • verify_revenue_recoveryAnswers: after a change was made, did this store's revenue signals actually recover?Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Answers: after a change was made, did this store's revenue signals actually recover? Compares the window before a stated change against the window since: paid vs pending vs failed order mix, webhook failure counts, and gateway availability. Returns `resolved`, `improving`, `still_failing`, or `unknown` — and `unknown` when too little new data has arrived to tell, which is free. A quiet ten minutes is not a recovery. Free while in beta.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • get_checkout_health_snapshotAnswers: is anything wrong with this connected WooCommerce store's checkout and payment path right now, and is a full diagnosis worth running?Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_checkout_health_snapshot" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Answers: is anything wrong with this connected WooCommerce store's checkout and payment path right now, and is a full diagnosis worth running? Free, always. Returns order counts by status with the change across the window, gateway/webhook/scheduler health, checkout page health, how many recent commerce changes there were, which signal families this store can and cannot report, and how fresh the underlying data is. Call this FIRST — it is cheap, and `diagnosis_recommended` tells you whether the expensive call would have anything to work with. It returns no customer, order, or payment identifier because the store never sends any.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write4
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:12 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://revenue-graph.utilityhouse.xyz/mcp/registry: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including diagnose_revenue_incident (write), check_checkout_change_risk (write), verify_revenue_recovery (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • The server marks "check_checkout_change_risk" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "check_checkout_change_risk" says "checkout": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.2.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http woo-revenue-incident-graph https://revenue-graph.utilityhouse.xyz/mcp/registry
claude mcp add --transport http woo-revenue-incident-graph https://revenue-graph.utilityhouse.xyz/mcp/registry

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__woo-revenue-incident-graph__get_checkout_health_snapshot"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__woo-revenue-incident-graph__diagnose_revenue_incident",
      "mcp__woo-revenue-incident-graph__check_checkout_change_risk",
      "mcp__woo-revenue-incident-graph__verify_revenue_recovery"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as woo-revenue-incident-graph. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 4 rules
  • mcp__woo-revenue-incident-graph__get_checkout_health_snapshot untrusted-input
  • mcp__woo-revenue-incident-graph__diagnose_revenue_incident untrusted-input
  • mcp__woo-revenue-incident-graph__check_checkout_change_risk untrusted-input
  • mcp__woo-revenue-incident-graph__verify_revenue_recovery untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.tytutueh13-sudo/woo-revenue-incident-graph/verify?hash=385ded8f16926231cfa43de5a1896e81979e3d1938c69674d777947c4d8824f9" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 385ded8f1692, from Nov 21, 2026, 10:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.tytutueh13-sudo/woo-revenue-incident-graph/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.tytutueh13-sudo/woo-revenue-incident-graph
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.tytutueh13-sudo/woo-revenue-incident-graph.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.tytutueh13-sudo/woo-revenue-incident-graph)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:51 UTC.

Woo Revenue Incident Graph MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Woo Revenue Incident Graph MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Woo Revenue Incident Graph MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Woo Revenue Incident Graph MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Woo Revenue Incident Graph MCP server have?

4 tools: 3 write, 1 read. diagnose_revenue_incident, check_checkout_change_risk, verify_revenue_recovery and get_checkout_health_snapshot.

Does the Woo Revenue Incident Graph MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Woo Revenue Incident Graph MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Woo Revenue Incident Graph MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 21, 2026.