Veilfile MCP server
io.github.veilfile/veilfileveilfilestreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned
Private, expiring artifact hosting for AI agents. Upload via API or MCP; links die on their own.
4 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 2 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here can delete or cancel things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Veilfile MCP server can do
The Veilfile MCP server is published by the GitHub account veilfile. It has 4 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: revoke_artifact) and create or change data (2 tools: upload_artifact and create_upload_url). 1 tool only reads.
1 tool reads private data (list_artifacts).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 1.0.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
revoke_artifactRevoke a file by its id.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "revoke_artifact" says "revoke": a word for removing or ending something.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
Description, as the server wrote it Revoke a file by its id. Its link stops working at once and the file is deleted. The result is revoked: true, or revoked: false when this workspace has no file with that id. If storage could not be reached, the result adds storage_deleted: false and a later sweep finishes the deletion. Repeating the call is harmless.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Revoke a file
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
create_upload_urlCreate a one-time upload URL for a file too large to send as base64 through upload_artifact.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "create_upload_url" says "create": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Create a one-time upload URL for a file too large to send as base64 through upload_artifact. The result has upload_url, expires_at, max_size_bytes (25 MiB), ttl_days and filename. The URL is valid for 15 minutes and needs no API key. A PUT of the file's raw bytes to it, for example with curl --upload-file, runs the same type check and secret scan as upload_artifact and answers 201 with the same fields that upload_artifact returns. The first successful PUT uses up the URL. A PUT that fails can be retried until the URL expires, except one blocked as content_not_allowed. The URL also stops working if the API key that created it is revoked or the connected app that created it is disconnected.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Create an upload URL
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
upload_artifactUpload a file from base64 content and return its id, its private share link as url, expires_at, size_bytes and secret_flags.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "upload_artifact" says "upload": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Upload a file from base64 content and return its id, its private share link as url, expires_at, size_bytes and secret_flags. The link stops working when the file expires. The decoded file can be up to 25 MiB; for larger files, create_upload_url takes the bytes by PUT instead. The secret scan reads the first 1 MiB of the file, and secret_flags names each kind of secret-shaped content it finds. With on_secret "flag", the default, a flagged file is stored and the result adds a warning and secret_flag_locations. With on_secret "reject", a flagged file is not stored and the call returns the secret_detected error.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Upload a file
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
list_artifactsList the files in this workspace, newest first.Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_artifacts" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "list" and "file": it reads files.
Description, as the server wrote it List the files in this workspace, newest first. Each entry has id, filename, mime_type, size_bytes, url, expires_at, secret_flags and created_at. Expired files that are not yet deleted are included. The tool changes nothing.
Annotations the server declares
- title: List files
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 18, 2026, 16:24 UTC, unchanged since Nov 11, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://veilfile.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
- Authorization servers
- https://veilfile.com
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- yes
- Client ID metadata documents
- no
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (1 destructive, 2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://veilfile.com/mcp/: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including revoke_artifact (destructive), upload_artifact (write), create_upload_url (write)
Posture changes
- Nov 11, 2026
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 401 to 200
- tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 3
- Protocol version: none to 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401: yes to not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate: https://veilfile.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource to none
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: https://veilfile.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource to https://veilfile.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 401 -> 200; tools/list served without credentials: no -> yes; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 -> 3 (and 4 more).View diff
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 401 to 200
- tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 3
- Protocol version: none to 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401: yes to not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate: https://veilfile.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource to none
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: https://veilfile.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource to https://veilfile.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http veilfile https://veilfile.com/mcp/ --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'claude mcp add --transport http veilfile https://veilfile.com/mcp/ --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'Run in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__veilfile__list_artifacts"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__veilfile__upload_artifact",
"mcp__veilfile__create_upload_url"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__veilfile__revoke_artifact"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as veilfile. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__veilfile__list_artifacts private-data
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.veilfile/veilfile/verify?hash=99e1f88651fa6a86f559ee99456f5ac9935e3afcd95ce4b5e018fe5f5ca95075" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 99e1f88651fa, from Nov 10, 2026, 15:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.veilfile/veilfile/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.veilfile/veilfile)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 10, 2026, 15:18 UTC.
Veilfile MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Veilfile MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Veilfile MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: revoke_artifact.
Can the Veilfile MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Veilfile MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 1 destructive, 2 write, 1 read. revoke_artifact, upload_artifact, create_upload_url and list_artifacts.
Does the Veilfile MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Veilfile MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Veilfile MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 10, 2026.