Vetto MCP server
io.github.yasaiiko/vettoyasaiikostreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Check signup emails for disposable or dead domains, typos and Gmail aliases; block fake signups.
4 tools: 2 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 4
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Vetto MCP server can do
The Vetto MCP server is published by the GitHub account yasaiiko. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: check_email and check_domains), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
1 tool reads private data (same_inbox); 4 tools bring in text other people can write (check_email, check_domains, same_inbox and 1 more).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 12, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
check_domainsChecks up to 50 email domains (for example the domains of recent signups) and says which are disposable, which cannot receive mail, and which look fine.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Checks up to 50 email domains (for example the domains of recent signups) and says which are disposable, which cannot receive mail, and which look fine. Send only domains, never full addresses.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Audit signup email domains
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
check_emailChecks one email address the way a signup form would: invalid syntax, disposable/throwaway domain, domain that cannot receive mail (no MX), likely typo with a suggested fix (e.g.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Checks one email address the way a signup form would: invalid syntax, disposable/throwaway domain, domain that cannot receive mail (no MX), likely typo with a suggested fix (e.g. gmial.com -> gmail.com), privacy relay (Apple Hide My Email, Firefox Relay: allowed, they reach a real inbox) and role addresses. Returns a verdict (allow, suggest, warn, block) with reasons.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check a signup email
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
how_to_blockReturns setup steps and links for blocking disposable and fake signups on a given stack: next.js, supabase, clerk, better-auth, auth.js, firebase, laravel, django, or html (any for…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "return" and "html": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Returns setup steps and links for blocking disposable and fake signups on a given stack: next.js, supabase, clerk, better-auth, auth.js, firebase, laravel, django, or html (any form: Webflow, Framer, WordPress).
Annotations the server declares
- title: How to block fake signups on a stack
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
same_inboxCompares two addresses after normalising Gmail dots, +tags and googlemail.com.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "compare": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "same_inbox" says "inbox": it reads mail.
- untrusted-inputThe name "same_inbox" says "inbox": it reads inbound email, which other people can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Compares two addresses after normalising Gmail dots, +tags and googlemail.com. Use it to spot one person signing up again for a free trial with an alias (j.ane+2@gmail.com vs jane@gmail.com).
Annotations the server declares
- title: Do two emails reach the same inbox?
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write4
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 13, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://usevetto.com/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including check_email (write), check_domains (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http vetto https://usevetto.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http vetto https://usevetto.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__vetto__same_inbox",
"mcp__vetto__how_to_block"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__vetto__check_email",
"mcp__vetto__check_domains"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as vetto. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 4 rules
- mcp__vetto__check_email untrusted-input
- mcp__vetto__check_domains untrusted-input
- mcp__vetto__same_inbox private-data, untrusted-input
- mcp__vetto__how_to_block untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.yasaiiko/vetto/verify?hash=09bc67907b7ba97c90c2f5d856d2b644206ce9531b5e3442e9188ef8d255a763" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 09bc67907b7b, from Nov 12, 2026, 19:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.yasaiiko/vetto/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.yasaiiko/vetto)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 12, 2026, 20:18 UTC.
Vetto MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Vetto MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Vetto MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Vetto MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Vetto MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 2 write, 2 read. check_email, check_domains, same_inbox and how_to_block.
Does the Vetto MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Vetto MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Vetto MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 12, 2026.