Tolca MCP server
io.github.yayabough/tolcayayaboughstreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned
Know who you are paying before you pay: Québec contractor and company checks, plus web search. x402.
4 tools: 3 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 4
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
3 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Tolca MCP server can do
The Tolca MCP server is published by the GitHub account yayabough. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: qc_contractor_check, qc_licence and sanctions_check), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
1 tool reads private data (company_profile); 4 tools bring in text other people can write (qc_contractor_check, qc_licence, company_profile and 1 more).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.0.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
qc_contractor_checkCheck a Québec construction contractor against four official public data sources in one call: active RBQ licence (status, restrictions, bond, authorized work categories), RENA (bus…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Check a Québec construction contractor against four official public data sources in one call: active RBQ licence (status, restrictions, bond, authorized work categories), RENA (businesses barred from public contracts and public subcontracts), environmental administrative penalties (MELCCFP) and public contracts awarded on SEAO (count, total amount, main public buyers, last 12 months). Returns a verdict ok / review / blocking / not_found with reasons, sources and extraction dates. Use when the user asks whether a Québec contractor, subcontractor or renovation company is licensed, trustworthy or eligible for public contracts. Provide neq, licence or name.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Québec contractor check
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
qc_licenceFast lookup: does this Québec business hold an ACTIVE RBQ (Régie du bâtiment du Québec) construction licence right now?Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Fast lookup: does this Québec business hold an ACTIVE RBQ (Régie du bâtiment du Québec) construction licence right now? Returns active true/false, licence number, legal name, NEQ, municipality, restriction flag and authorized work categories. Good for checking several contractors one after another. For the RENA public-contract ban and environmental penalties, use qc_contractor_check. Provide neq, licence or name.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Québec RBQ licence lookup
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
sanctions_checkScreen a company name against official sanctions lists in one call: US Consolidated Screening List (including OFAC SDN and the Entity List), UK Sanctions List, EU Consolidated Fina…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Screen a company name against official sanctions lists in one call: US Consolidated Screening List (including OFAC SDN and the Entity List), UK Sanctions List, EU Consolidated Financial Sanctions List and Canada's Consolidated Autonomous Sanctions List. Returns an action allow / review / block, a 0-100 risk score, each possible match with its list and official reference, and the date of each list copy. Use when the user asks whether a company, supplier, customer or counterparty is sanctioned before doing business with it. Companies only, not individuals. A review result means a person should confirm the identity. Provide name, optional country (ISO 3166 alpha-2). Free with a shared daily quota.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Sanctions screening of a company
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
company_profileGet a company's profile in one call, read live from its own website plus official registries: what it does, industry, services, service area, address, phones and emails published b…Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "get" and "email": it reads mail.
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "get" and "website": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Get a company's profile in one call, read live from its own website plus official registries: what it does, industry, services, service area, address, phones and emails published by the company (each with the page it came from), social links, and official screening (company registries, contractor licences, US, UK, EU and Canadian sanctions lists). Use when the user asks who a company is, how to contact it, or wants to research a prospect, supplier or partner. Provide domain (preferred) or name, optional city and country. Businesses only, no personal data. Free with a shared daily quota.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Company profile
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write4
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:13 UTC, unchanged since Nov 13, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://tolca.tonbot.ca/mcp/public: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including qc_contractor_check (write), qc_licence (write), sanctions_check (write)
Posture changes
- Nov 13, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 3
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff
- Changed:company_profileOnly readsinputSchema
- Changed:sanctions_checkChanges thingsinputSchema
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 -> 3.View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 3
Tools2 added.+2 addedView diff
- Added:company_profileOnly reads
- Added:sanctions_checkChanges things
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http tolca https://tolca.tonbot.ca/mcp/publicclaude mcp add --transport http tolca https://tolca.tonbot.ca/mcp/publicRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__tolca__company_profile"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__tolca__qc_contractor_check",
"mcp__tolca__qc_licence",
"mcp__tolca__sanctions_check"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as tolca. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 4 rules
- mcp__tolca__qc_contractor_check untrusted-input
- mcp__tolca__qc_licence untrusted-input
- mcp__tolca__company_profile private-data, untrusted-input
- mcp__tolca__sanctions_check untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.yayabough/tolca/verify?hash=5e3174a131e9e9941b594d74544540added700817196a4966e96ca00f09f7734" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 5e3174a131e9, from Nov 20, 2026, 19:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.yayabough/tolca/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.yayabough/tolca)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:52 UTC.
Tolca MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Tolca MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Tolca MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Tolca MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Tolca MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 3 write, 1 read. qc_contractor_check, qc_licence, sanctions_check and company_profile.
Does the Tolca MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Tolca MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Tolca MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 20, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.