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DepScout MCP server

io.github.yc-droid/depscoutyc-droidstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Scan packages and lockfiles (npm, PyPI, Go, Maven, Cargo, NuGet) for vulnerabilities and malware.

4 tools: 3 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 4
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

3 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the DepScout MCP server can do

The DepScout MCP server is published by the GitHub account yc-droid. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: check_package, check_dependencies and check_lockfile), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

4 tools bring in text other people can write (check_package, check_dependencies, check_lockfile and 1 more).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 21, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • check_dependenciesCheck up to 50 packages at exact versions (for example from package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.mod, pom.xml, Cargo.toml or a .csproj) against OSV.dev in one batc…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check up to 50 packages at exact versions (for example from package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, go.mod, pom.xml, Cargo.toml or a .csproj) against OSV.dev in one batch. Returns a summary count and only the packages with problems: malicious-package flags first, then vulnerabilities by severity with the version that fixes each and the minimum upgrade target. Use when the user pastes a dependency file or list, or asks to "audit my dependencies" or "check my package.json / requirements.txt", or which dependencies are vulnerable or outdated. Entries without an exact version are skipped and listed; transitive dependencies are only checked if included in the list.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • title: Check a dependency list
  • check_lockfileAudit a whole lockfile or dependency file in one call, including transitive dependencies where the file records them.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Audit a whole lockfile or dependency file in one call, including transitive dependencies where the file records them. Paste the file content as-is: package-lock.json, npm-shrinkwrap.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt (== pins), poetry.lock, uv.lock, Pipfile.lock, Cargo.lock, go.sum, go.mod, packages.lock.json (NuGet) or gradle.lockfile. Up to 3,000 packages are checked against OSV.dev. Returns a summary and only the packages with problems: malicious-package flags first, then vulnerabilities by severity with the minimum upgrade target. Use when the user pastes or attaches a lockfile, asks for a full or transitive dependency audit, or asks "is my project vulnerable?". Prefer this over check_dependencies when the user has the file itself.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • title: Audit a lockfile
  • check_packageCheck one open-source package (npm, PyPI, Go, Maven, crates.io or NuGet) for safety and freshness.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check one open-source package (npm, PyPI, Go, Maven, crates.io or NuGet) for safety and freshness. Returns a malicious-package flag (from OSV MAL- and malware advisories), known vulnerabilities with severity and the version that fixes each, the minimum version that clears all of them, the latest stable version, whether the given version is outdated or deprecated, licences, last release date, and the linked repository's OpenSSF Scorecard. If no version is given, the latest version is checked. Use when the user asks "is <package> safe?", "is it malware?", "which version should I use?", "should I upgrade?", or about a package's known CVEs, and before recommending any package or version to install (npm install, pip install, go get, cargo add, etc.). Data comes from OSV.dev and deps.dev; newly published malware may not be listed yet.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • title: Check a package
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • get_vulnerabilityLook up one vulnerability or malicious-package advisory by ID (CVE, GHSA, PYSEC, GO, RUSTSEC, MAL and other OSV IDs) and return its summary, severity, CVSS vector, aliases, publish…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_vulnerability" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Look up one vulnerability or malicious-package advisory by ID (CVE, GHSA, PYSEC, GO, RUSTSEC, MAL and other OSV IDs) and return its summary, severity, CVSS vector, aliases, publish date, the affected packages with their affected and fixed version ranges, and key references. Use when the user mentions a specific advisory or CVE ID ("what is CVE-2021-44228?", "am I affected by this GHSA?") and wants to know what it is, what is affected or which version fixes it. Only covers advisories in OSV.dev.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • title: Get vulnerability details

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write4
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:13 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://depscout.salesup.workers.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including check_package (write), check_dependencies (write), check_lockfile (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http depscout https://depscout.salesup.workers.dev/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http depscout https://depscout.salesup.workers.dev/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__depscout__get_vulnerability"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__depscout__check_package",
      "mcp__depscout__check_dependencies",
      "mcp__depscout__check_lockfile"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as depscout. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 4 rules
  • mcp__depscout__check_package untrusted-input
  • mcp__depscout__check_dependencies untrusted-input
  • mcp__depscout__check_lockfile untrusted-input
  • mcp__depscout__get_vulnerability untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.yc-droid/depscout/verify?hash=4e6614c139c3f849882bfcf89d1dd0e820799a3d200d8814ec7839231604161c" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 4e6614c139c3, from Nov 21, 2026, 05:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.yc-droid/depscout/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.yc-droid/depscout
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.yc-droid/depscout.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.yc-droid/depscout)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:52 UTC.

DepScout MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the DepScout MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the DepScout MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the DepScout MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the DepScout MCP server have?

4 tools: 3 write, 1 read. check_package, check_dependencies, check_lockfile and get_vulnerability.

Does the DepScout MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the DepScout MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the DepScout MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 21, 2026.