File Relay MCP server
io.github.yjq001/file-relayyjq001streamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Temporary file relay for AI agents: upload a generated file, get an expiring download link.
5 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 2 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 2
- Reads text others write · 3
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here can delete or cancel things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the File Relay MCP server can do
The File Relay MCP server is published by the GitHub account yjq001. It has 5 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: delete_file) and create or change data (2 tools: create_upload_link and relay_attached_file). 2 tools only read.
2 tools read private data (get_file_info and read_file); 3 tools bring in text other people can write (create_upload_link, relay_attached_file and get_file_info).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 9, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
delete_fileDelete a relayed file before it expires.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "delete_file" says "delete": a word for removing or ending something.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
Description, as the server wrote it Delete a relayed file before it expires. Requires the delete_token returned at upload.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: false
- title: Delete file
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
create_upload_linkRelay a file of any size up to 100 MB.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "create_upload_link" says "create": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Relay a file of any size up to 100 MB. Save the file to local disk first, call this with its path, then run the returned curl command in your shell to upload it. The download link works as soon as the upload finishes. Requires outbound network access to code.easyllms.com; if curl is blocked, ask the user to allow that domain in their sandbox network settings (on claude.ai: Settings > Capabilities > Code execution).
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
- title: Create upload link
relay_attached_fileChatGPT only: relay a file from the conversation (the host passes it as a file reference) and get a temporary download link.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it ChatGPT only: relay a file from the conversation (the host passes it as a file reference) and get a temporary download link.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
- title: Relay attached file
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
get_file_infoLook up a relayed file by id or download URL: name, size, type, expiry and download link.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_file_info" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "get_file_info" says "get" and "file": it reads files.
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "file": it reads files.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Look up a relayed file by id or download URL: name, size, type, expiry and download link.
Annotations the server declares
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
- title: Get file info
read_fileRead a relayed file's content (up to 1 MB) so an agent can pick up a file someone else relayed.Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "read_file" says "read": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "read_file" says "read" and "file": it reads files.
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "read" and "file": it reads files.
Description, as the server wrote it Read a relayed file's content (up to 1 MB) so an agent can pick up a file someone else relayed. Text comes back as text, images as images, other files as base64.
Annotations the server declares
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
- title: Read file
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.
- Reads private data2
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write3
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 16, 2026, 14:23 UTC, unchanged since Oct 25, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (1 destructive, 2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://code.easyllms.com/relay/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including delete_file (destructive), create_upload_link (write), relay_attached_file (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http file-relay https://code.easyllms.com/relay/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http file-relay https://code.easyllms.com/relay/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__file-relay__get_file_info",
"mcp__file-relay__read_file"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__file-relay__create_upload_link",
"mcp__file-relay__relay_attached_file"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__file-relay__delete_file"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as file-relay. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 4 rules
- mcp__file-relay__create_upload_link untrusted-input
- mcp__file-relay__relay_attached_file untrusted-input
- mcp__file-relay__get_file_info private-data, untrusted-input
- mcp__file-relay__read_file private-data
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.yjq001/file-relay/verify?hash=eb6402c000eb1c7e2ca2a1568ce2f797d3dbceb084e9f3807057179821131162" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash eb6402c000eb, from Nov 9, 2026, 03:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.yjq001/file-relay/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.yjq001/file-relay)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 25, 2026, 03:17 UTC.
File Relay MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the File Relay MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the File Relay MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: delete_file.
Can the File Relay MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the File Relay MCP server have?
- 5 tools: 1 destructive, 2 write, 2 read. delete_file, create_upload_link, relay_attached_file, get_file_info and read_file.
Does the File Relay MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the File Relay MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the File Relay MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 9, 2026.