dokimo-mcp server
io.github.ypratap11/dokimo-mcpypratap11streamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned
Verify AI-agent revenue: recompute a Merkle proof and check it against an on-chain anchor.
3 tools: 2 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the dokimo-mcp server can do
The dokimo-mcp server is published by the GitHub account ypratap11. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: recompute_merkle_root and verify_evidence_package), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
1 tool reads private data (dokimo_agent_card); 2 tools bring in text other people can write (verify_evidence_package and dokimo_agent_card).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 0.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
recompute_merkle_rootRecompute a dokimo-merkle-v1 root locally — no network call, no anchor check.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Recompute a dokimo-merkle-v1 root locally — no network call, no anchor check. Hash ``leaf`` in the leaf domain (H(0x00 ‖ leaf)) and replay ``proof_path`` — a list of ``[sibling_hash, side]`` where side is "L" or "R" — hashing internal nodes as H(0x01 ‖ left ‖ right). Compare the returned root to the ``root`` in an evidence package yourself; if it differs, the package was tampered with. Returns ``{recomputed_root, merkle_scheme, steps}``.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Recompute Merkle root (local)
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
verify_evidence_packageAsk Dokimo to check one record of an evidence package against the on-chain anchor.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Ask Dokimo to check one record of an evidence package against the on-chain anchor. Sends the package to Dokimo's public A2A endpoint, which recomputes the Merkle proof AND checks the anchored commitment (root + rule version, plus the close summary for v2) against the anchor on Base. The verdict is Dokimo's answer and is not signed. ``package`` must contain: ``leaf`` (str), ``root`` (str), ``proof_path`` (list of [sibling_hash, "L"|"R"]), and ``rule_version_commitment`` (str); for a v2 close also ``summary`` and ``binding``; ``close_id`` is optional/echoed. Returns the verdict: ``{verified, checks:{recompute, onchain_anchor, rule_version_bound}, ...}``. ``verified`` is true only if the proof recomputes AND the commitment is anchored on-chain. It covers this one record only.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Verify evidence package (on-chain)
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
dokimo_agent_cardFetch Dokimo's public A2A agent card — the discovery document describing what it can verify (skills, endpoints, supported A2A versions).Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "fetch": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "fetch" and "document": it reads documents.
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch Dokimo's public A2A agent card — the discovery document describing what it can verify (skills, endpoints, supported A2A versions).
Annotations the server declares
- title: Fetch Dokimo agent card
- readOnlyHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:13 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://dokimo.augaster.com/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including recompute_merkle_root (write), verify_evidence_package (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff
- Changed:recompute_merkle_rootChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:verify_evidence_packageChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
Install
Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http dokimo https://dokimo.augaster.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http dokimo https://dokimo.augaster.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__dokimo__dokimo_agent_card"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__dokimo__recompute_merkle_root",
"mcp__dokimo__verify_evidence_package"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as dokimo. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__dokimo__verify_evidence_package untrusted-input
- mcp__dokimo__dokimo_agent_card private-data, untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.ypratap11/dokimo-mcp/verify?hash=cbeb558164aeae4fe5023033b3af50405d72e6356d326d1e660bd8a8423d1921" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash cbeb558164ae, from Nov 20, 2026, 19:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.ypratap11/dokimo-mcp/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.ypratap11/dokimo-mcp)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:52 UTC.
dokimo-mcp server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the dokimo-mcp server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the dokimo-mcp server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the dokimo-mcp server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the dokimo-mcp server have?
- 3 tools: 2 write, 1 read. recompute_merkle_root, verify_evidence_package and dokimo_agent_card.
Does the dokimo-mcp server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the dokimo-mcp server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the dokimo-mcp server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 6, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.