tweetsave-mcp server
io.github.zezeron/tweetsave-mcpzezeronssev1.0.3Scanned
Twitter/X analysis without token waste. Fetch tweets, download media. No API key.
5 tools: 2 change things and 3 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 5
- Can send data out · 5
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
Anlyon alternative
2 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →What the tweetsave-mcp server can do
The tweetsave-mcp server is published by the GitHub account zezeron. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: tweetsave_to_blog and tweetsave_extract_media), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.
1 tool reads private data (tweetsave_get_thread); 5 tools bring in text other people can write (tweetsave_get_tweet, tweetsave_get_thread, tweetsave_to_blog and 2 more); 5 tools can send data out of your system (tweetsave_get_tweet, tweetsave_get_thread, tweetsave_to_blog and 2 more). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.0.3.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
tweetsave_extract_mediaExtract direct media URLs (photos, videos, GIFs) from a tweet.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Extract direct media URLs (photos, videos, GIFs) from a tweet. Returns direct URLs that can be downloaded or embedded. Video URLs are the highest quality available. Args: - url (string): Tweet URL or tweet ID - media_type ('all' | 'photos' | 'videos'): Filter by media type (default: 'all') Returns: List of media items with: - type (photo/video/gif) - url (direct download URL) - dimensions (width/height) - duration (for videos) Examples: - "Get all media from this tweet: https://x.com/user/status/123" - "Extract video URLs from tweet 123456"
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
tweetsave_to_blogConvert a tweet into a formatted blog post with title, content, media, and metadata.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "convert": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "tweetsave_to_blog" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "convert": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Convert a tweet into a formatted blog post with title, content, media, and metadata. This tool transforms a tweet into a readable blog post format, perfect for: - Archiving tweets - Creating content from threads - Generating blog posts from viral tweets Args: - url (string): Tweet URL or tweet ID - include_engagement (boolean): Include likes/retweets/etc. (default: true) - response_format ('markdown' | 'json'): Output format (default: 'markdown') Returns: BlogPost with: - Generated title from tweet content - Author info with avatar - Formatted content with media - Tags from hashtags - Read time estimate - Engagement summary - Source link Examples: - "Convert this tweet to a blog post: https://x.com/user/status/123" - "Make a blog from tweet 123456789"
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
tweetsave_batchFetch multiple tweets at once (max 10).Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "fetch": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "fetch" and "tweet": it reads posts, which other people can write.
- untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.urls), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.urls): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch multiple tweets at once (max 10). Useful for: - Collecting tweets from a list - Building a feed from multiple sources - Comparing multiple tweets Args: - urls (string[]): Array of tweet URLs or IDs (max 10) - response_format ('markdown' | 'json'): Output format (default: 'markdown') Returns: Array of tweets or a combined feed in markdown format. Examples: - "Fetch these tweets: [url1, url2, url3]"
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
tweetsave_get_threadFetch a tweet thread (multiple connected tweets by the same author).Reads private dataReads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "tweetsave_get_thread" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "tweetsave_get_thread" says "get" and "thread": it reads messages.
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "fetch" and "thread": it reads messages.
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe name "tweetsave_get_thread" says "get" and "thread": it reads messages, which other people can write.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "fetch" and "tweet": it reads posts, which other people can write.
- untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch a tweet thread (multiple connected tweets by the same author). Note: Current implementation fetches the main tweet. Full thread crawling requires additional API access. Args: - url (string): URL or ID of any tweet in the thread - response_format ('markdown' | 'json'): Output format (default: 'markdown') Returns: Array of tweets in the thread with all content and media. Examples: - "Get the full thread from this tweet: https://x.com/user/status/123"
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
tweetsave_get_tweetFetch a single tweet with all its content including text, media (photos, videos, GIFs), polls, and engagement metrics.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "tweetsave_get_tweet" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- untrusted-inputThe name "tweetsave_get_tweet" says "get" and "tweet": it reads posts, which other people can write.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "fetch" and "tweet": it reads posts, which other people can write.
- untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch a single tweet with all its content including text, media (photos, videos, GIFs), polls, and engagement metrics. This tool retrieves tweet data from Twitter/X using the FxTwitter API. It returns the tweet content, author info, media URLs, and engagement stats. Args: - url (string): Tweet URL or tweet ID - response_format ('markdown' | 'json'): Output format (default: 'markdown') Returns: Tweet data including: - Author info (name, username, avatar) - Tweet text - Media URLs (photos, videos) - Engagement (likes, retweets, replies, views) - Poll data (if applicable) - Quote tweet (if applicable) Examples: - "Get tweet from https://x.com/elonmusk/status/123456" - "Fetch this tweet: 123456789" Note: Does not fetch replies. Use tweetsave_to_blog for a complete blog post with formatting.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
25 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 private-data tool breaks every one.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write5
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out5
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"mcp__tweetsave__tweetsave_get_thread"
]
}
}Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:13 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 202
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://mcp.tweetsave.org/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- yes
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://mcp.tweetsave.org/sse: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including tweetsave_to_blog (write), tweetsave_extract_media (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The server marks "tweetsave_to_blog" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The description's first verb is "convert": a word for a change.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.3. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport sse tweetsave https://mcp.tweetsave.org/sseclaude mcp add --transport sse tweetsave https://mcp.tweetsave.org/sseRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__tweetsave__tweetsave_get_tweet",
"mcp__tweetsave__tweetsave_get_thread",
"mcp__tweetsave__tweetsave_to_blog",
"mcp__tweetsave__tweetsave_batch",
"mcp__tweetsave__tweetsave_extract_media"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as tweetsave. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 5 rules
- mcp__tweetsave__tweetsave_get_tweet untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__tweetsave__tweetsave_get_thread private-data, untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__tweetsave__tweetsave_to_blog untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__tweetsave__tweetsave_batch untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__tweetsave__tweetsave_extract_media untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.zezeron/tweetsave-mcp/verify?hash=ad59d0dfe3684bf5cd693ebaa5399e482c798becf8079e5d9aee80a08e3b5ca8" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash ad59d0dfe368, from Nov 20, 2026, 19:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.zezeron/tweetsave-mcp/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.zezeron/tweetsave-mcp)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:52 UTC.
tweetsave-mcp server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the tweetsave-mcp server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the tweetsave-mcp server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the tweetsave-mcp server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the tweetsave-mcp server have?
- 5 tools: 2 write, 3 read. tweetsave_to_blog, tweetsave_extract_media, tweetsave_get_tweet, tweetsave_get_thread and tweetsave_batch.
Does the tweetsave-mcp server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the tweetsave-mcp server send data to outside services?
- 5 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): tweetsave_get_tweet, tweetsave_get_thread, tweetsave_to_blog, tweetsave_batch and tweetsave_extract_media.
Has the tweetsave-mcp server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.