PDF Slim — PDF Compression for AI MCP server
io.github.zhaoyaqi18/pdfslimzhaoyaqi18streamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned
Compress PDFs to exact target sizes (82-93% smaller). Tools: compress_pdf, optimize_pdf, inspect_pdf
3 tools: 2 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the PDF Slim — PDF Compression for AI MCP server can do
The PDF Slim — PDF Compression for AI MCP server is published by the GitHub account zhaoyaqi18. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: compress_pdf and optimize_pdf), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
1 tool reads private data (inspect_pdf).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 21, 2026, version 0.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
compress_pdfCompress a PDF file to reduce its size.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Compress a PDF file to reduce its size. Renders pages and re-encodes as JPEG, iterating quality/resolution to hit a target size. Use this when a user wants to shrink a PDF (e.g. to 500KB, 1MB, or "smaller"). Free anonymous tier: 20 calls/day per IP, files up to 10MB. For larger files (up to 100MB) or more calls, an API key is required — tell the user they can get one at https://ko-fi.com/yugutou/shop, or point them to the free website https://pdfslim.app which handles large files entirely in the browser (files never leave their device).
optimize_pdfLossless PDF optimization: garbage collection, stream re-compression.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Lossless PDF optimization: garbage collection, stream re-compression. No quality loss. Good for PDFs with redundant data; effect is small on already-optimized files. Free anonymous tier: 20 calls/day per IP, files up to 10MB. Larger files / more calls need an API key (https://ko-fi.com/yugutou/shop) or the free website https://pdfslim.app.
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
inspect_pdfInspect a PDF: page count, file size, password protection.Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "inspect_pdf" says "inspect": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "inspect" and "file": it reads files.
- private-dataThe input names a file (input.file_base64), and the tool reads: it reads files.
Description, as the server wrote it Inspect a PDF: page count, file size, password protection. Use before deciding how to process a PDF. Free anonymous tier: 20 calls/day per IP. More calls need an API key (https://ko-fi.com/yugutou/shop).
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:13 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://api.pdfslim.app/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including compress_pdf (write), optimize_pdf (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http pdfslim https://api.pdfslim.app/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http pdfslim https://api.pdfslim.app/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__pdfslim__inspect_pdf"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__pdfslim__compress_pdf",
"mcp__pdfslim__optimize_pdf"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as pdfslim. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__pdfslim__inspect_pdf private-data
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.zhaoyaqi18/pdfslim/verify?hash=eacdf16e7dbef49a27933d079495c3664b6d1bad76483cb2b3b29242ddec042e" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash eacdf16e7dbe, from Nov 21, 2026, 06:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.zhaoyaqi18/pdfslim/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.zhaoyaqi18/pdfslim)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:52 UTC.
PDF Slim — PDF Compression for AI MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the PDF Slim — PDF Compression for AI MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the PDF Slim — PDF Compression for AI MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the PDF Slim — PDF Compression for AI MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the PDF Slim — PDF Compression for AI MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 2 write, 1 read. compress_pdf, optimize_pdf and inspect_pdf.
Does the PDF Slim — PDF Compression for AI MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the PDF Slim — PDF Compression for AI MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the PDF Slim — PDF Compression for AI MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 21, 2026.