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FabTally Safe MCP server

io.github.zvmzaretsky/crypto-safetyzvmzaretskystreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Read-only crypto safety: token honeypot checks, EIP-712 signature decode, approval scans.

8 tools: 2 do something that can't be undone and 6 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 2 irreversible, 6 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 2
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here do something that can't be undone. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the FabTally Safe MCP server can do

The FabTally Safe MCP server is published by the GitHub account zvmzaretsky. It has 8 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (simulate and simulate_free) and create or change data (6 tools: token_safety, token_safety_free, decode_signature, decode_signature_free and 2 more), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

2 tools can send data out of your system (simulate and simulate_free).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

8 tools

Can't be undone 2Claude Code: ask
  • simulatePAID $0.02 (x402, USDC on Base).Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    PAID $0.02 (x402, USDC on Base). Keyless pre-sign analysis of {chain, from?, to, data, value?}: public-RPC eth_call revert check + static calldata decode predicting approval/transfer deltas + risk flags (unlimited approval, approval-for-all, reverts). Honest keyless limitation stated in the response (no full fork trace). Without payment returns the x402 challenge; pass x_payment. Free teaser: simulate_free.
  • simulate_freeFREE.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    FREE. Method + revert flag + risk level + predicted effect types for a transaction. Real result, no wallet. Upgrade to simulate for the full predicted deltas + all risk flags.
Changes things 6Claude Code: ask
  • approvalsPAID $0.01 (x402, USDC on Base).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    PAID $0.01 (x402, USDC on Base). Scan a wallet's ERC-20/721 approvals ranked by exposure; flags unlimited amounts, unverified/known-malicious spenders, and address-poisoning 'fake-approval revoke bait'; returns the exact revoke calldata you execute YOURSELF (never executed/broadcast by us). Without payment returns the x402 challenge; pass x_payment. Free teaser: approvals_free.
  • approvals_freeFREE.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    FREE. Approval counts + top-3 riskiest spenders for {address, chain}. Real result, no wallet. Upgrade to approvals for EVERY approval ranked + revoke calldata.
  • decode_signaturePAID $0.01 (x402, USDC on Base).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    PAID $0.01 (x402, USDC on Base). Decode an off-chain EIP-712 typed-data signature (Permit / Permit2 / Seaport / generic) into plain English with risk flags: unlimited approval, unknown/known-malicious spender, never-expiring or already-expired deadlines, zero-consideration NFT-drain orders. Off-chain signatures are the top wallet-drainer vector. Pure offline decode — never signs/broadcasts. Without payment returns the x402 challenge; pass x_payment. Free teaser: decode_signature_free.
  • decode_signature_freeFREE.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    FREE. Type + plain-English summary + risk level for an EIP-712 `typed_data`. Real result, no wallet. Upgrade to decode_signature for the full field-by-field decode + all risk flags + malicious-spender screening.
  • token_safetyPAID $0.02 (x402, USDC on Base).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    PAID $0.02 (x402, USDC on Base). Multi-chain token honeypot/rug check aggregating GoPlus token-security + honeypot.is buy/sell-tax simulation into a normalized 0-100 risk score with explainable reasons: honeypot/can't-sell, buy/sell tax, mint/blacklist/pausable/ownership privileges, top-holder concentration, LP-lock, contract verified/bytecode. Descriptive facts only — NOT a buy/sell signal. Without payment returns the x402 challenge; pass x_payment to settle. Free teaser: token_safety_free.
  • token_safety_freeFREE.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    FREE. Score band + top-line honeypot/tax/privilege flags for a token {address, chain}. Real result, no wallet. Upgrade to token_safety for the full numeric breakdown.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out2
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:13 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
8
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 8 tools that change things (2 irreversible, 6 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://safe.fabtally.com/mcp: tools/list returned 8 tools to an anonymous client, including simulate (irreversible), simulate_free (irreversible), token_safety (write), token_safety_free (write), decode_signature (write) and 3 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http crypto-safety https://safe.fabtally.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http crypto-safety https://safe.fabtally.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__crypto-safety__token_safety",
      "mcp__crypto-safety__token_safety_free",
      "mcp__crypto-safety__decode_signature",
      "mcp__crypto-safety__decode_signature_free",
      "mcp__crypto-safety__approvals",
      "mcp__crypto-safety__approvals_free",
      "mcp__crypto-safety__simulate",
      "mcp__crypto-safety__simulate_free"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as crypto-safety. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__crypto-safety__simulate outbound
  • mcp__crypto-safety__simulate_free outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.zvmzaretsky/crypto-safety/verify?hash=9d62f033b1604d5bb00357a3499b5e93320f2b0f85d3b8c46ff588be3ffa7017" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 9d62f033b160, from Nov 20, 2026, 20:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.zvmzaretsky/crypto-safety/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.zvmzaretsky/crypto-safety
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.zvmzaretsky/crypto-safety.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.zvmzaretsky/crypto-safety)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:52 UTC.

FabTally Safe MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the FabTally Safe MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 8 tools, 8 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the FabTally Safe MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the FabTally Safe MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 2 tools can send, pay, publish or merge: simulate and simulate_free.

What tools does the FabTally Safe MCP server have?

8 tools: 2 irreversible, 6 write. simulate, simulate_free, token_safety, token_safety_free, decode_signature, decode_signature_free, approvals and approvals_free.

Does the FabTally Safe MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the FabTally Safe MCP server send data to outside services?

2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): simulate and simulate_free.

Has the FabTally Safe MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.