dochost MCP server
io.github.zyli5313/dochost-mcpzyli5313streamable-httpv1.1.0Scanned
Publish, list, update and delete shareable Markdown/HTML pages from your AI assistant.
8 tools: 2 can delete or cancel things, 1 do something that can't be undone, 1 change things and 4 only read.
- Reads private data · 2
- Reads text others write · 5
- Can send data out · 1
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here can delete or cancel things and 1 does something that can't be undone. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the dochost MCP server can do
The dochost MCP server is published by the GitHub account zyli5313. It has 8 tools. It can delete or cancel things (2 tools: update_page and delete_page), do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (publish) and create or change data (1 tool: set_page_options). 4 tools only read.
2 tools read private data (get_account and get_page); 5 tools bring in text other people can write (publish, get_page_content, update_page and 2 more); 1 tool can send data out of your system (publish). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
8 tools
Deletes or cancels 2Claude Code: deny
delete_pagePermanently delete one of your pages by slug.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "delete_page" says "delete": a word for removing or ending something.
- The description says "Permanently delete".
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Permanently delete one of your pages by slug. The link stops working immediately and the slug is freed. Deleting an already-deleted page is a safe no-op.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: true
update_pageReplace the content of one of your pages in place.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "update_page" says "update": a word for a change.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Replace the content of one of your pages in place. The URL, view/like counts, and expiry stay the same; only the body, format, and title change. Resending identical content is a no-op. Prefer this over publishing again whenever the user is revising something you already published for them — a second publish creates a second link and strands the one they already shared. This replaces the WHOLE body, so unless you wrote the live content yourself in this conversation, call get_page_content first and pass its version/sha256 back as ifVersion/ifSha — the write is then refused with the current version instead of overwriting an edit you never saw.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: true
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
publishPublish HTML or Markdown as a hosted web page and return a shareable URL.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "publish" says "publish": a word for a change that another call does not undo.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe name "publish" says "publish": it sends or publishes something to other people.
Description, as the server wrote it Publish HTML or Markdown as a hosted web page and return a shareable URL. Use when the user asks to share an HTML quiz, calculator, report or Markdown document as a link. HTML JavaScript runs in a sandbox. Free links expire after seven days, or three days when published with public set to false; paid link lifetime and options follow account entitlements. For revisions of an existing page, use update_page to keep the same link. Results report expiry and any ignored options; relay ignoredOptions/ignoredNote instead of claiming all requested settings were applied. New links use the account primary host; get_account reports it.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
set_page_optionsChange a published page's visibility, search-engine indexing or password WITHOUT republishing it — the URL, view count and content all stay the same.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "set_page_options" says "set": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Change a published page's visibility, search-engine indexing or password WITHOUT republishing it — the URL, view count and content all stay the same. Use this instead of deleting and publishing again, which changes the link the user already shared. Send only the fields you want to change. Turning a paid capability off never needs an entitlement; turning one on is checked against the current plan. A password always forces the page private, so asking for both `public: true` and a password is refused rather than silently resolved. dochost branding is NOT settable here: it is resolved from the account's live plan at render time, so there is nothing per-page to flip — read `brandingHidden` from get_page for the rendered answer.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
get_accountGet your plan, page-quota usage, entitlement flags (size cap, custom slug, password, branding, subdomain, custom domain), and the primary host new links publish on.Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_account" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "get" and "password": it reads secrets.
Description, as the server wrote it Get your plan, page-quota usage, entitlement flags (size cap, custom slug, password, branding, subdomain, custom domain), and the primary host new links publish on. Call when you need plan limits, domain details or paid-option availability; a basic publish can use defaults without this extra call. The primary host is chosen in the dashboard (manageDomainsUrl), not through this API.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
get_pageGet one of your pages by slug: title, format, status, view/like counts, expiry, whether it is password-protected, and its current visibility / indexing / branding state.Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_page" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "get" and "password": it reads secrets.
Description, as the server wrote it Get one of your pages by slug: title, format, status, view/like counts, expiry, whether it is password-protected, and its current visibility / indexing / branding state. Never returns the page body or the password — call get_page_content when you need the source itself, and set_page_options to change any of the settings it reports.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
get_page_contentRead back the CURRENT Markdown or HTML of one of your pages.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_page_content" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "read" and "html": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Read back the CURRENT Markdown or HTML of one of your pages. Call this before update_page whenever you did not write the live content yourself in this same conversation — update_page replaces the body wholesale, so editing from memory silently discards anything you cannot see, including edits the user made in the browser. Returns `version` and `sha256`; pass them to update_page as ifVersion / ifSha so the write is refused instead of overwriting a change you did not read. Expired pages are readable, and updating one republishes it on the same URL.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
list_my_pagesList the pages you have published to dochost, newest first.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_my_pages" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List the pages you have published to dochost, newest first. Paginated; returns compact records (no page bodies).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
10 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.
- Reads private data2
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write5
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"mcp__dochost__publish"
]
}
}Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:13 UTC, unchanged since Nov 6, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 4
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://dochost.io/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/api/mcp
- Authorization servers
- https://dochost.io
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- yes
- Client ID metadata documents
- no
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (2 destructive, 1 irreversible, 1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://dochost.io/api/mcp: tools/list returned 8 tools to an anonymous client, including update_page (destructive), delete_page (destructive), publish (irreversible), set_page_options (write)
Posture changes
- Nov 6, 2026
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none to https://dochost.io/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/api/mcp
- Authorization servers: none to https://dochost.io
- Dynamic client registration: not observed to yes
- Client ID metadata documents: not observed to no
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
- Changed:publishCan't be undonedescription
PostureRemote posture changed. RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none -> https://dochost.io/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/api/mcp; Authorization servers: none -> https://dochost.io; Dynamic client registration: not observed -> yes (and …View diff
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: none to https://dochost.io/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/api/mcp
- Authorization servers: none to https://dochost.io
- Dynamic client registration: not observed to yes
- Client ID metadata documents: not observed to no
Install
Pinned to version 1.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http dochost https://dochost.io/api/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http dochost https://dochost.io/api/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__dochost__list_my_pages",
"mcp__dochost__get_account",
"mcp__dochost__get_page",
"mcp__dochost__get_page_content"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__dochost__publish",
"mcp__dochost__set_page_options"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__dochost__update_page",
"mcp__dochost__delete_page"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as dochost. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 7 rules
- mcp__dochost__publish untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__dochost__get_account private-data
- mcp__dochost__get_page private-data
- mcp__dochost__get_page_content untrusted-input
- mcp__dochost__update_page untrusted-input
- mcp__dochost__set_page_options untrusted-input
- mcp__dochost__delete_page untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.zyli5313/dochost-mcp/verify?hash=6d74458cf2fa966a00c6fba49bae4d7398c44973f66c5ad12ba187e2c0ced38e" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 6d74458cf2fa, from Nov 20, 2026, 20:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.zyli5313/dochost-mcp/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.zyli5313/dochost-mcp)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:52 UTC.
dochost MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the dochost MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 8 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the dochost MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 2 tools can delete, cancel or revoke something: update_page and delete_page.
Can the dochost MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: publish.
What tools does the dochost MCP server have?
- 8 tools: 2 destructive, 1 irreversible, 1 write, 4 read. update_page, delete_page, publish, set_page_options, list_my_pages, get_account, get_page and get_page_content.
Does the dochost MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the dochost MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): publish.
Has the dochost MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 6, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.