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KernelScan MCP server

io.kernelscan/kernelscankernelscan.iostreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Linux kernel CVE analyzer: upload a .config, get a CycloneDX VEX report of affecting CVEs.

11 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 3 change things and 7 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 3 write, 7 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 2 findings, 1 high

The remote endpoint did not answer the last look. Remote posture

Anlyon alternative

4 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

Import an OpenAPI spec →

What the KernelScan MCP server can do

The KernelScan MCP server is published by kernelscan.io, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 11 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (submit_support_report) and create or change data (3 tools: create_product, update_product and request_access), but cannot delete data. 7 tools only read.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

The fixed checks matched 2 findings, 1 of them high severity (long-description and model-directed-text). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Last scanned Nov 18, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

11 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • submit_support_reportSend a support / dispute report to KernelScan staff.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "submit_support_report" says "submit": a word for a change.
    • The description's first verb is "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Send a support / dispute report to KernelScan staff. Use this when an automated CVE or factor assessment looks wrong, or when you need to hand human-needed context back to the team. The caller's API-key user is attached automatically (id, email, plan) so support can look the account up. ``category`` should be one of: - ``cve_assessment`` — wrong AI verdict / CVSS / CWE on a CVE - ``factor_assessment`` — wrong factor verdict for a product - ``bug`` — broken behavior in the API or UI - ``other`` — anything else ``cve_id`` / ``product_id`` / ``assessment_id`` are optional but recommended — they let support jump straight to the relevant row.
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • create_productCreate a new product, run analysis, and return its initial stats.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "create_product" says "create": a word for a change.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description is 3,462 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

      Matched text

      description ends: "...sion, or a ``.config`` without a version header, is not checked."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Create a new product, run analysis, and return its initial stats. ``config_upload_id`` references a previously-staged .config that the caller POSTed to ``/api/configs/uploads`` over plain HTTP — the LLM does NOT emit the config text itself (a real kernel .config is ~100–200 KB and exceeds a single tool-call output budget). Workflow: 1. Caller / wrapper script: ``curl -H "Authorization: Bearer ks_live_..." \ -F "config_file=@.config" \ https://kernelscan.io/api/configs/uploads`` returns ``{config_upload_id, sha256, size_bytes, expires_at}``. 2. Pass that ``config_upload_id`` into this tool. Uploads are per-user, single-use, and expire 30 minutes after upload. Same gates as POST /api/products: free can't create products; paid plans are capped at their resolved product limit — read it (and any per-account override) from ``whoami.product_limit`` rather than assuming a fixed per-tier number. ``factor_ids`` are silently ignored unless the plan allows security factors (``whoami.can_use_factors``). Re-using a product name returns 409. Creating a product RUNS an analysis, so it spends one unit of the team's SHARED monthly analysis allowance (``whoami.monthly_analyses_used`` / ``monthly_analyses_limit``). When the allowance is exhausted the tool fails with "Monthly analysis limit reached (…/month) [429]". This is a durable monthly quota — NOT the transient per-call rate limit that also surfaces as 429: it will not clear until next month, so report it to the user instead of retrying. Check ``whoami`` before a batch of creates. ``kernel_version`` is the kernel's release. For a stable kernel that is its version (``6.6.67``). For a CIP SLTS kernel pass its CIP release or the full ``uname -r``: ``4.19.325-cip136``, ``4.19.325-cip136-rt50``; a trailing local suffix such as ``-yocto-standard`` is accepted and ignored. The ``-cipN`` counter decides which of CIP's own backported fixes apply, so pass it whenever the device runs a CIP kernel — a bare ``4.19.325`` is analysed as the final 4.19 stable release (the ``.config`` never names the ``-cipN``). The known CIP releases of a series are listed by ``GET /api/kernel-releases?flavor=cip&series=4.19`` (add ``&rt=1`` for the RT tree). The returned ``kernel_release`` shows how the string was read (``flavor``, ``base``, ``series``, ``cip``, ``rt``, ``local``; null when the string is no release). Surrounding whitespace is trimmed. A version string the analysis cannot read (e.g. ``4.19.325cip136``, or anything non-ASCII) fails with "Unrecognized kernel version" [400] before anything is created or the upload is consumed. A CIP release must be on the stable base the uploaded ``.config``'s header names (the header shows the exact base; a CIP tag never changes it): ``4.19.300-cip90`` with a ``4.19.325`` config fails with "… is based on 4.19.300, but the .config header says 4.19.325" [400]. This is checked before the upload is consumed, so the same upload can be used again with the right release. A stable version, or a ``.config`` without a version header, is not checked.
  • request_accessExplain how to get a KernelScan account (no API key needed).1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "request_access" says "request": a word for a change.

    Findings

    • High

      The description contains "never tell the user", an instruction to keep something from the user.

      Matched text

      description: "...nts don't break, but they are ignored — never tell the user that a request was submitted on..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Explain how to get a KernelScan account (no API key needed). Self-registration is open — there is no invitation to wait for and no admin in the loop. The user signs up on kernelscan.io themselves (email + password, accepting the terms), confirms the verification mail, and mints a ks_live_ API key on their account page. This tool only hands that path back: it files nothing and sends no mail. ``email`` / ``name`` / ``reason`` are still accepted so older clients don't break, but they are ignored — never tell the user that a request was submitted on their behalf.
  • update_productUpdate a product owned by the caller.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "update_product" says "update": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Update a product owned by the caller. Re-runs analysis if the kernel_version, arch, or referenced .config changed. To change the .config, first POST the new file to ``/api/configs/uploads`` (see ``create_product`` for the curl recipe) and pass the returned ``config_upload_id`` here. Leave ``config_upload_id`` as ``None`` to keep the existing .config. ``factor_ids=None`` leaves factor selections untouched; an empty list clears them. Same tier gates as PUT /api/products/{id}. A change that re-runs analysis (``kernel_version``, ``arch``, or the ``.config``) spends one unit of the team's shared monthly analysis allowance and can fail with the same durable "Monthly analysis limit reached … [429]" quota error as ``create_product`` (distinct from the transient rate-limit 429 — don't retry it). A rename / description / factor-only edit runs no analysis and is free; the product's VEX is re-evaluated against the new factors in the background (not metered), so ``get_product`` / ``get_product_vex`` show the new verdicts a few seconds later. ``kernel_version`` takes the same forms as in ``create_product``: a stable version, or a CIP release / full ``uname -r`` such as ``4.19.325-cip136-rt50``, whose ``-cipN`` counter decides which CIP fixes apply. A changed version string the analysis cannot read fails with 400 and changes nothing; re-sending the stored value is always accepted. A CIP release must stay on the base its ``.config`` header names: whichever of the two the update changes is checked against the other ([400], before the upload is consumed).
Only reads 7Show 7 read-only tools
  • get_cveFetch a single Linux kernel CVE by ID (e.g.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_cve" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fetch a single Linux kernel CVE by ID (e.g. ``CVE-2024-12345``). No API key required: keyless callers get the public representation of a CVE, but only for CVEs in the public set (recent high-severity); any other id returns ``not found``. Free *keyed* callers get a 404 for CVEs published more than 60 days ago. AI risk-summary / analysis fields are included for any keyed user on CVEs in the public set, and for pro / enterprise on every assessed CVE.
  • get_productFetch one product owned by the caller, including the CVE breakdown.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_product" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fetch one product owned by the caller, including the CVE breakdown. Returns 404 (not 403) if the product belongs to another user, so product existence isn't leaked across accounts.
  • get_product_vexReturn the VEX MANIFEST for one of the caller's products — metadata, not the document.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_product_vex" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return the VEX MANIFEST for one of the caller's products — metadata, not the document. Multi-megabyte CycloneDX documents (up to 8,000+ vulnerability entries) are not safe model-context payloads, so this tool returns a bounded manifest: CycloneDX format/spec version, product id, generated/expires timestamps, the VEX hash and the composite ETag identity, the uncompressed size in bytes, total + per-status vulnerability counts, and the authenticated REST download path. Reads from the 24h ProductVexCache; if the cache is empty/expired the next call to ``get_product`` (or the REST endpoint) will regenerate it. The MANIFEST carries the same ``kernelscan.io:exploit_maturity`` / ``kernelscan.io:kev`` overlay identity as the REST download (backend#337), so ETags compare across transports. To inspect the entries themselves, use ``list_product_vex_entries``. To retrieve the COMPLETE CycloneDX document, use the authenticated REST endpoint ``GET /api/products/{product_id}/vex`` (same ks_live_ key) — that is the canonical way to retrieve the full artifact; no MCP tool returns it.
  • list_product_vex_entriesPage through the VEX vulnerability entries of one of the caller's products.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_product_vex_entries" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Page through the VEX vulnerability entries of one of the caller's products. Returns COMPLETE CycloneDX vulnerability objects for one bounded page — never the root document, never all entries — plus ``returned``, ``total_matching``, and a ``next_cursor`` to continue with. Every result is bounded to 256 KiB: the page stops before the byte limit and returns a cursor when necessary. Entries are ordered by CVE id (ascending) and carry the same live ``kernelscan.io:exploit_maturity`` / ``kernelscan.io:kev`` properties as the REST download (backend#337). Filters (all optional, combinable): - ``statuses``: ``affected`` / ``not_affected`` / ``in_triage`` - ``severities``: ``critical`` / ``high`` / ``medium`` / ``low`` / ``none`` - ``kev``: true/false — CISA KEV listing only / non-KEV only - ``exploit_maturity``: ``poc`` / ``weaponized`` - ``cve_ids``: exact-match list of CVE ids ``limit`` defaults to 25, maximum 100. ``cursor`` is the opaque continuation token from a previous page — it is tied to the product, the active filters, AND the current document + threat-overlay revision: changing filters, a regenerated cache, or a KEV/PoC signal that moved since the last page invalidates it (start a fresh page without a cursor — re-using a stale one is rejected, never silently re-applied). Within one revision, concatenating all pages yields each matching CVE exactly once. The COMPLETE multi-megabyte CycloneDX document is served by the authenticated REST endpoint ``GET /api/products/{product_id}/vex`` (same ks_live_ key) — the canonical way to retrieve the full artifact.
  • list_productsList the calling user's products with denormalized analysis stats.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_products" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List the calling user's products with denormalized analysis stats. Paid plans only (basic / pro / enterprise). Free callers get a clear upgrade message.
  • search_cvesSearch Linux kernel CVEs.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_cves" says "search": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search Linux kernel CVEs. No API key required: keyless callers get the free public tier — recent high-severity Linux kernel CVEs (capped at 25 results). Free *keyed* callers see only CVEs published in the last 60 days; basic+ keyed callers get the full corpus. ``query`` matches against CVE id and description (case-insensitive). ``severity`` filters by effective severity (``critical``/``high``/``medium``/``low``). ``cvss_min`` filters by effective CVSS score. ``published_after`` (ISO 8601) returns only CVEs newer than that date. Returns up to ``limit`` (max 100) CVEs, newest first.
  • whoamiReturn the caller's identity, plan, and quota state.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "whoami" says "whoami": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return the caller's identity, plan, and quota state. Works without an API key: keyless callers get a lightweight public-tier payload (no account) describing how to request access.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

The remote endpoint did not answer the last look

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:13 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
no
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
not observed
tools/list served without credentials
no
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
not observed
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

The probe stopped: The operation was aborted due to timeout

Posture changes

  1. Nov 20, 2026
    • Reachable: yes to no
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to none
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
    • RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: https://kernelscan.io/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp to none
    • Authorization servers: https://kernelscan.io to none
    • Dynamic client registration: yes to not observed
    • Client ID metadata documents: yes to not observed

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 high1 info
  • The description contains "never tell the user", an instruction to keep something from the user.

    Matched text

    description: "...nts don't break, but they are ignored — never tell the user that a request was submitted on..."

    What this check looks for
  • The description is 3,462 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

    Matched text

    description ends: "...sion, or a ``.config`` without a version header, is not checked."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Reachable: yes -> no; HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> none; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no (and 6 more).View diff
    • Reachable: yes to no
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to none
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
    • RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: https://kernelscan.io/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp to none
    • Authorization servers: https://kernelscan.io to none
    • Dynamic client registration: yes to not observed
    • Client ID metadata documents: yes to not observed

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http kernelscan https://kernelscan.io/mcp/
claude mcp add --transport http kernelscan https://kernelscan.io/mcp/

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__kernelscan__search_cves",
      "mcp__kernelscan__get_cve",
      "mcp__kernelscan__list_products",
      "mcp__kernelscan__get_product",
      "mcp__kernelscan__get_product_vex",
      "mcp__kernelscan__list_product_vex_entries",
      "mcp__kernelscan__whoami"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__kernelscan__create_product",
      "mcp__kernelscan__update_product",
      "mcp__kernelscan__request_access",
      "mcp__kernelscan__submit_support_report"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as kernelscan. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.kernelscan/kernelscan/verify?hash=c01cd73c1aaa2a87cedf92b54e0a5fd3be81158d10e87dc01b675c0e49ca76e4" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash c01cd73c1aaa, from Nov 18, 2026, 12:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.kernelscan/kernelscan/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.kernelscan/kernelscan
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.kernelscan/kernelscan.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.kernelscan/kernelscan)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:52 UTC.

KernelScan MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the KernelScan MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 11 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings (1 high) from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the KernelScan MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the KernelScan MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: submit_support_report.

What tools does the KernelScan MCP server have?

11 tools: 1 irreversible, 3 write, 7 read. submit_support_report, create_product, update_product, request_access, search_cves, get_cve, list_products, get_product and 3 more.

Does the KernelScan MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.

Does the KernelScan MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the KernelScan MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 18, 2026.