Ottom MCP server
io.ottom/ottomottom.iostreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Check how ready an online store is for AI shopping agents, and read public benchmarks.
3 tools: 1 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 1
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here changes things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Ottom MCP server can do
The Ottom MCP server is published by ottom.io, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: check_store_readiness), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
1 tool brings in text other people can write (check_store_readiness); 1 tool can send data out of your system (check_store_readiness).
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 13, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
check_store_readinessRuns a light check of one store page, the way an AI shopping agent reads it: robots.txt, llms.txt, the product feed, the UCP manifest, structured data (product, price, availability…Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "check_store_readiness" says "store": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "check_store_readiness" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "check_store_readiness" says "store": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Runs a light check of one store page, the way an AI shopping agent reads it: robots.txt, llms.txt, the product feed, the UCP manifest, structured data (product, price, availability, GTIN) and whether the price is in text an agent can read. Each finding comes with a plain explanation, a fix and a link to read more. If the store’s owner publishes an Ottom result with the Ottom badge, that result is included too. Pass a product page URL for the most findings; a home page works. Every answer links to a full scan on ottom.io.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check how ready a store is for AI agents
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
get_benchmarkReturns Ottom’s published benchmark for a store category: how far AI agents get at each stage, the stalls that stop them most often, and the score spread.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_benchmark" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Returns Ottom’s published benchmark for a store category: how far AI agents get at each stage, the stalls that stop them most often, and the score spread. Aggregate figures only, never a named store, published under CC BY 4.0. Use "all" for every store. An unknown category answers with the list of published ones.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get the public benchmark for a store category
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
list_checksLists what check_store_readiness reads on a store, what it never does, and what a full scan on ottom.io adds.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_checks" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Lists what check_store_readiness reads on a store, what it never does, and what a full scan on ottom.io adds.
Annotations the server declares
- title: List what the light check looks at
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 14, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://ottom.io/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
- Authorization servers
- https://ottom.io
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- yes
- Client ID metadata documents
- no
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://ottom.io/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including check_store_readiness (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The server marks "check_store_readiness" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "check_store_readiness" says "store": a word for a change.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http ottom https://ottom.io/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'claude mcp add --transport http ottom https://ottom.io/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'Run in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__ottom__get_benchmark",
"mcp__ottom__list_checks"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__ottom__check_store_readiness"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as ottom. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__ottom__check_store_readiness untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.ottom/ottom/verify?hash=38ce24b5d77b443285d2da04da3581ade0e7d273470182e3c329555bca34478c" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 38ce24b5d77b, from Nov 13, 2026, 23:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.ottom/ottom/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.ottom/ottom)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 13, 2026, 23:18 UTC.
Ottom MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Ottom MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Ottom MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Ottom MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Ottom MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 1 write, 2 read. check_store_readiness, get_benchmark and list_checks.
Does the Ottom MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Ottom MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): check_store_readiness.
Has the Ottom MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 13, 2026.