Routescore MCP server
io.routescore/mcproutescore.iostreamable-httpv0.3.5Scanned
Read-only pre-sign evidence for onchain agents: route quality, MEV exposure, clear/caution verdict.
11 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 7 change things and 3 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 0
- 2 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Routescore MCP server can do
The Routescore MCP server is published by routescore.io, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 11 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (quote_bridge_refund) and create or change data (7 tools: check_swap, record_execution, review_execution, review_public_transaction and 3 more), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.
2 tools bring in text other people can write (check_swap and review_public_transaction).
The fixed checks matched 2 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 0.3.5.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
11 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
quote_bridge_refundModeled premium estimate for cross-chain bridge execution failure against a modeled SLA expectation.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "quote_bridge_refund" says "refund": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "quote_bridge_refund" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "quote_bridge_refund" says "refund": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
Description, as the server wrote it Modeled premium estimate for cross-chain bridge execution failure against a modeled SLA expectation. Returns a modeled premium and conditions — not a live cover, refund, or premium-acceptance offer.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Quote: bridge-failure premium (modeled)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Changes things 7Claude Code: ask
check_swapCALL THIS BEFORE SIGNING AN ONCHAIN SWAP.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it CALL THIS BEFORE SIGNING AN ONCHAIN SWAP. Read-only pre-sign evidence check: given notional, chain, and an optional route and token, it returns a modeled route-quality grade, price-impact / slippage band, modeled MEV/execution exposure where observable, and a token registry read (recognized vs unverified), composed into a clear / caution / unsupported verdict with machine-readable reasons and caveats. Point-in-time decision support: it does not execute, route funds, sign, or promise an outcome — the agent still decides. Recognition is not safety, sellability, redemption, rights, liquidity, or investment-quality verification; unverified tokens, unknown order flow, and uncalibrated sequencer ordering downgrade the verdict rather than reading as safe. Relay the verdict, reasons, and caveats verbatim.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check swap before signing (pre-sign evidence)
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
quote_lrt_slashingModeled premium estimate for slashing risk on a liquid-restaking-token (LRT) position given its AVS exposure.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Modeled premium estimate for slashing risk on a liquid-restaking-token (LRT) position given its AVS exposure. Returns a modeled premium and slashing bounds — not a live cover offer.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Quote: LRT-slashing premium (modeled)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
quote_mev_coverModeled premium estimate for MEV-sandwich exposure on a swap.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Modeled premium estimate for MEV-sandwich exposure on a swap. Returns a modeled premium (bps + USD), expected/CVaR loss, and conditions. Point-in-time decision support before routing a trade — not a live cover, insurance, or premium-acceptance offer.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Quote: MEV-sandwich premium (modeled)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
record_executionPersist 1-100 already-built execution_record.v1 documents as immutable, personal-account post-trade evidence.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Persist 1-100 already-built execution_record.v1 documents as immutable, personal-account post-trade evidence. Requires a stable idempotency_key; an exact replay returns the original result and reuse with different content fails closed. Pro tier, owner-scoped, and bounded by the MCP transport byte limit. This tool never accepts calldata, signing material, routes funds, executes a transaction, applies reviewer overrides, or exposes another tenant. Invalid rows are recorded only as redacted rejection reasons and are never echoed.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Record immutable execution evidence
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
review_executionReview one stored execution_record.v1 by record_id.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Review one stored execution_record.v1 by record_id. Authenticated and personal-account owner-scoped: another account’s id is indistinguishable from a missing id. Returns the deterministic review_execution.v1 evidence coverage, exceptions, unavailable-evidence register, caveats, and canonical hash. Read-only retrospective decision support only: it does not query arbitrary public transactions, accept reviewer overrides, certify best execution or compliance, give advice, or expose admin actions.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Review stored execution evidence
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
review_public_transactionDEV-ONLY CONTRACT DISCOVERY; DISABLED AGAINST PRODUCTION.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it DEV-ONLY CONTRACT DISCOVERY; DISABLED AGAINST PRODUCTION. On an explicitly enabled non-production server, review one arbitrary public Ethereum transaction by transaction hash. This is separate from review_execution: it does not read an owner-scoped stored execution_record.v1 and never exposes tenant, reviewer, override, or administrative fields. Returns the deterministic tenant-free public_transaction_review.v1 coverage register, conclusions, explicit gap register, source provenance, caveats, and canonical hash. Receipt, block, index, and gas facts are measured; gas cost and point-in-time confirmation depth are calculated. Venue is unavailable in this endpoint until a server-owned verified registry adapter exists. Route, amounts, protocol fee, arrival price, feasible-route benchmark, dropped status, and historical reorg remain unavailable unless the public contract can support them. Read-only retrospective decision support only; it does not certify best execution or compliance and does not give advice.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Review public Ethereum transaction
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
simulate_scenarioRun a what-if Monte Carlo: model expected premium vs expected refund/loss over a horizon, given assumptions about sandwich frequency, average loss, and deductible.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "run": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "simulate_scenario" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "run": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Run a what-if Monte Carlo: model expected premium vs expected refund/loss over a horizon, given assumptions about sandwich frequency, average loss, and deductible. Returns a narrative + distribution.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Simulate premium-vs-loss scenario (modeled)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
get_detector_manifestFetch the latest public MEV-detector run manifest: the detector version hash and the eligible pool/token universe it was committed to.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_detector_manifest" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch the latest public MEV-detector run manifest: the detector version hash and the eligible pool/token universe it was committed to. Use to verify what the detector covers.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get MEV-detector manifest
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_preflight_recordRetrieve the durable evidence record a prior check_swap call persisted — the "record" leg of plan → preflight → execute → record.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_preflight_record" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Retrieve the durable evidence record a prior check_swap call persisted — the "record" leg of plan → preflight → execute → record. Fetch one record by the record_id that check_swap returned. Owner-scoped: the configured key only ever sees records belonging to its own account. The record embeds the evaluated check_swap response payload (including its evidence_bundle_id, before the additive record_id / record_output_hash linkage fields) plus a canonical-JSON SHA-256 integrity hash (record_id and recorded_at excluded) so the evidence can be re-verified offline, and includes the stored evidence bundle. Read-only evidence: record creation rejects known execution-material keys (calldata, transaction payloads, signing material) and drops identity-shaped labels from the actor context.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Retrieve pre-sign evidence record
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
whoamiConfirm the configured API key works and report which plan tier it carries.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "whoami" says "whoami": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Confirm the configured API key works and report which plan tier it carries. Returns the owning account email and tier.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Verify API key & tier
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:14 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 8
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 8 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 7 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://www.routescore.io/api/mcp: tools/list returned 11 tools to an anonymous client, including quote_bridge_refund (irreversible), check_swap (write), record_execution (write), review_execution (write), review_public_transaction (write) and 3 more
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The server marks "quote_bridge_refund" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "quote_bridge_refund" says "refund": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
The server marks "simulate_scenario" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "run": a word for a change.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.3.5. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http routescore https://www.routescore.io/api/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'claude mcp add --transport http routescore https://www.routescore.io/api/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'Run in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__routescore__get_preflight_record",
"mcp__routescore__whoami",
"mcp__routescore__get_detector_manifest"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__routescore__check_swap",
"mcp__routescore__record_execution",
"mcp__routescore__review_execution",
"mcp__routescore__review_public_transaction",
"mcp__routescore__quote_mev_cover",
"mcp__routescore__quote_bridge_refund",
"mcp__routescore__quote_lrt_slashing",
"mcp__routescore__simulate_scenario"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as routescore. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__routescore__check_swap untrusted-input
- mcp__routescore__review_public_transaction untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.routescore/mcp/verify?hash=d238c602c2ae544cd3f69e3f6f10f5430785100b90fe79781e4c8ab8af5ef29a" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash d238c602c2ae, from Nov 17, 2026, 19:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.routescore/mcp/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.routescore/mcp)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:52 UTC.
Routescore MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Routescore MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 11 tools, 8 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Routescore MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Routescore MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: quote_bridge_refund.
What tools does the Routescore MCP server have?
- 11 tools: 1 irreversible, 7 write, 3 read. quote_bridge_refund, check_swap, record_execution, review_execution, review_public_transaction, quote_mev_cover, quote_lrt_slashing, simulate_scenario and 3 more.
Does the Routescore MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Routescore MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Routescore MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 17, 2026.