sol-defi-desk MCP server
io.sslip.169.126.216.95/sol-defi-desk95.216.126.169.sslip.iostreamable-httpv0.1.30Scanned
Paid Solana token safety checks over Streamable HTTP MCP (x402 USDC on Solana + Base).
5 tools: 4 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
4 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the sol-defi-desk MCP server can do
The sol-defi-desk MCP server is published by 95.216.126.169.sslip.io, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: mint_preflight, token_check, token_check_batch and base_token_check), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
1 tool brings in text other people can write (describe_paid_api).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 0.1.30.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
base_token_checkPaid ($0.01 USDC via x402): Base ERC-20 rug/honeypot-risk pre-check from direct on-chain reads (owner/renounced, proxy, privileged functions, owner %, Uniswap v2/v3 + Aerodrome liq…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Paid ($0.01 USDC via x402): Base ERC-20 rug/honeypot-risk pre-check from direct on-chain reads (owner/renounced, proxy, privileged functions, owner %, Uniswap v2/v3 + Aerodrome liquidity, LP burned %, riskLevel). No sell simulation. Failed lookups are not settled. Also free on this origin: /shop/ /sponsor /ledger.
mint_preflightFREE: validate Solana mint base58 shape and note known issuer assets.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE: validate Solana mint base58 shape and note known issuer assets. No RPC. Use before paying for token_check.
token_checkPaid ($0.005 USDC via x402): Solana token safety check from direct on-chain reads (mint/freeze authority, Token-2022 risk extensions, metadata mutability, holder concentration, heu…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Paid ($0.005 USDC via x402): Solana token safety check from direct on-chain reads (mint/freeze authority, Token-2022 risk extensions, metadata mutability, holder concentration, heuristic riskLevel). Failed lookups are not settled. Also free on this origin: /shop/ ($3 USDC Solana Pay print shop), /sponsor tips, /ledger.
token_check_batchPaid ($0.01 USDC fixed via x402): batch Solana token safety checks for 1–5 mints.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Paid ($0.01 USDC fixed via x402): batch Solana token safety checks for 1–5 mints. Same fields as token_check per mint. Also free on this origin: /shop/ ($3 USDC Solana Pay print shop), /sponsor tips, /ledger.
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
describe_paid_apiFREE: buyer-facing summary of sol-defi-desk HTTP + MCP paid tools plus same-origin print shop /sponsor /ledger (openly AI operator Survivor).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "describe_paid_api" says "describe": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "http": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it FREE: buyer-facing summary of sol-defi-desk HTTP + MCP paid tools plus same-origin print shop /sponsor /ledger (openly AI operator Survivor).
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 13, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 4
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://static.169.126.216.95.clients.your-server.de/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including mint_preflight (write), token_check (write), token_check_batch (write), base_token_check (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.1.30. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http sol-defi-desk https://static.169.126.216.95.clients.your-server.de/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http sol-defi-desk https://static.169.126.216.95.clients.your-server.de/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__sol-defi-desk__describe_paid_api"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__sol-defi-desk__mint_preflight",
"mcp__sol-defi-desk__token_check",
"mcp__sol-defi-desk__token_check_batch",
"mcp__sol-defi-desk__base_token_check"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as sol-defi-desk. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__sol-defi-desk__describe_paid_api untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.sslip.169.126.216.95/sol-defi-desk/verify?hash=c3230964c3df62c9280012758c0638efcaeec6fc41b6bc1d2f680074875b765f" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash c3230964c3df, from Nov 20, 2026, 06:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.sslip.169.126.216.95/sol-defi-desk/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.sslip.169.126.216.95/sol-defi-desk)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 6, 2026, 06:17 UTC.
sol-defi-desk MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the sol-defi-desk MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the sol-defi-desk MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the sol-defi-desk MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the sol-defi-desk MCP server have?
- 5 tools: 4 write, 1 read. mint_preflight, token_check, token_check_batch, base_token_check and describe_paid_api.
Does the sol-defi-desk MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the sol-defi-desk MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the sol-defi-desk MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.