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Syl Guardian MCP server

io.sylai/guardiansylai.iostreamable-httpv0.3.1Scanned

Causal check on AI agent claims, from ad-spend/ROAS lift to any decision: pass, caution or hold.

2 tools: 2 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 2 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Syl Guardian MCP server can do

The Syl Guardian MCP server is published by sylai.io, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: guardian_review and guardian_request_upload), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (long-description). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 0.3.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

2 tools

Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • guardian_request_uploadGet a pre-signed URL for uploading a large CSV (more than ~200 rows).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "guardian_request_upload" says "request": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get a pre-signed URL for uploading a large CSV (more than ~200 rows). Use this instead of pasting rows into ``guardian_review``. Returns ``upload_url``, ``dataset_id`` and a ready-to-run ``curl`` command: run it (replace ``data.csv`` with your file; gzip is accepted with ``Content-Encoding: gzip``), then call ``guardian_review`` with ``dataset_id`` (and no ``csv``/``data``). The URL is single-use and expires after 30 minutes; the dataset is only usable by the same API key, and is single-use too: it is deleted when ``guardian_review`` reads it (even if that review fails), so request a new upload to retry. This call does not consume review quota.
  • guardian_reviewSanity-check a causal claim ("cause drove effect") before acting on it.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description is 4,444 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

      Matched text

      description ends: "...ng/discovery/estimator set to "llm" can change a number; summary never does."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Sanity-check a causal claim ("cause drove effect") before acting on it. Provide exactly one of ``csv`` (CSV text), ``data`` (list of row objects) or ``dataset_id`` (a dataset uploaded via ``guardian_request_upload``; use this for more than ~200 rows; single-use, deleted when reviewed) containing columns named by ``cause`` and ``effect``. Returns a verdict -- ``pass`` (act), ``caution`` (act carefully), or ``hold`` (do not act; the effect looks confounded or unsupported) -- with the naive correlational effect versus the confounder-adjusted causal effect and its confidence interval, the confounders adjusted for, a confidence score, a plain-English interpretation, and a recommended action, plus the estimator used and the inferred causal DAG. All numbers are deterministic statistics (never LLM-generated); the LLM may only choose an estimator id from a fixed whitelist and write the interpretation prose. Args: cause: Treatment column the claim says drives the outcome (e.g. "ad_spend"). effect: Outcome column (e.g. "new_customers"). csv: Dataset as CSV text (header row required). data: Dataset as a list of row records (alternative to ``csv``). dataset_id: ID returned by ``guardian_request_upload`` after uploading the CSV (alternative to ``csv``/``data``; for datasets above ~200 rows). Single-use: the dataset is deleted when reviewed, so re-upload to retry. known_confounders: Columns to adjust for; otherwise discovered automatically. context: Free-text business context, e.g. "Q3 promo evaluation". units: Display-only unit hints by column, e.g. {"ad_spend": "USD"}. step: A concrete treatment step (e.g. 1000 for a $1,000 spend increase) to restate the effect in business terms (cost per incremental outcome, ...). time_col: Column to order rows by for time series (autocorrelation-robust standard errors and adstock). adstock: Opt-in geometric-adstock transform for a lagged/carryover treatment. se: Standard-error flavor; "auto" diagnoses autocorrelation when ``time_col`` is given. test_design: ``true`` (or an options object) also returns how many periods a spend-cut test needs to confirm the effect. estimator: Primary-effect estimator. Omit (or "auto") to follow ``config.estimator`` (default "rule": the deterministic choice); "llm" lets the server's LLM pick from a fixed whitelist (falls back to the rule if no LLM is configured); or force "ols_adjusted", "aipw", "ipw", "psm" or "dml_forest" (always wins over ``config``). The response reports the estimator used (`estimator.id`, `.source`, `.rationale`, `.fallback_reason`) and the inferred `dag`. config: Per-step engine config, an object with optional keys ``cleaning``, ``discovery``, ``estimator``, ``summary``, each "rule" (deterministic, no LLM) or "llm". Defaults when omitted or partial: cleaning="llm", discovery="llm", estimator="rule", summary="rule". The LLM never computes a number: cleaning proposes derived columns / null-imputation strategies (pandas computes the values), discovery prunes/orients the discovered DAG (cause/effect are always yours), estimator picks a whitelisted id, summary writes the prose ("rule", the default, is a fixed template that explains the why with no AI). An "llm" step falls back to "rule" when the server has no Gemini key or the call fails; the response's `engine_steps` reports requested vs used per step with a fallback reason. Unknown keys or values are rejected. Use all "rule" for a fully deterministic, reproducible run. seed: Optional base random seed (default 42) for every seeded step; the seeds used are returned in `stamp.seeds`. cate: Opt-in list of dataset columns to stratify by for subgroup effects (returned in `cate`); columns are validated against the dataset. sensitivity: Opt-in; ``true`` also returns sensitivity checks (`sensitivity`). Every response carries `stamp` (core/guardian versions, estimator, resolved config, seeds, data_fingerprint) and `llm_decisions` (audit/replay records): a changed answer with an unchanged `stamp.data_fingerprint` came from a Syl release or config change, not from your data. Only cleaning/discovery/estimator set to "llm" can change a number; summary never does.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:24 UTC, unchanged since Oct 23, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://guardian.sylai.io/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including guardian_review (write), guardian_request_upload (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 info
  • The description is 4,444 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

    Matched text

    description ends: "...ng/discovery/estimator set to "llm" can change a number; summary never does."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff
  2. Tools1 added, 1 changed.+1 added~1 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 0.3.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http guardian https://guardian.sylai.io/mcp --header 'X-API-Key: <your-x-api-key>'
claude mcp add --transport http guardian https://guardian.sylai.io/mcp --header 'X-API-Key: <your-x-api-key>'

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__guardian__guardian_review",
      "mcp__guardian__guardian_request_upload"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as guardian. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.sylai/guardian/verify?hash=63dbdbaeba18f75eb26a5a4f5c358e468126b03670f28ac4c3a2be1fa9959470" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 63dbdbaeba18, from Nov 10, 2026, 03:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.sylai/guardian/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.sylai/guardian
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.sylai/guardian.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.sylai/guardian)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 28, 2026, 20:18 UTC.

Syl Guardian MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Syl Guardian MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Syl Guardian MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Syl Guardian MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Syl Guardian MCP server have?

2 tools: 2 write. guardian_review and guardian_request_upload.

Does the Syl Guardian MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Syl Guardian MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Syl Guardian MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Oct 28, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.