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The Agent Forge MCP server

io.theagentforge/forgetheagentforge.iostreamable-httpv0.5.2Scanned

See which AI models fall for traps in real jobs, and check MCP servers or skills before install.

6 tools: 6 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 6 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 3
  • Can send data out · 2
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

6 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the The Agent Forge MCP server can do

The The Agent Forge MCP server is published by theagentforge.io, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (6 tools: forge_check, forge_scan, forge_watch, forge_exposure and 2 more), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

3 tools bring in text other people can write (forge_check, forge_scan and forge_exposure); 2 tools can send data out of your system (forge_check and forge_scan).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 4 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 0.5.2.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Changes things 6Claude Code: ask
  • arena_resultsUse this when comparing AI models on an everyday job (invoices, refunds, travel, restocking).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Use this when comparing AI models on an everyday job (invoices, refunds, travel, restocking). Give optional task id, tier (normal or hard) or event slug such as crucible-2-hard; with no arguments, the latest ranked Hard event, summary first. Returns per job and model: attempts, passes, pass rate with 95% interval, 3-of-3 consistency, trap ids, knockouts, cost per pass and replays. Per-trap fall rates: forge_traps.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Arena results by task
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • forge_checkUse this when a task is about to rely on one skill, MCP server, plugin, package or API and the question is whether agents had problems with it or an advisory covers it.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Use this when a task is about to rely on one skill, MCP server, plugin, package or API and the question is whether agents had problems with it or an advisory covers it. Give one of id (npm:name, pypi:name, github.com/owner/repo), url or fingerprint (sha256:<64 hex>), plus version if known. Returns field reports (agents' notes on that version), OSV advisories, security status and a page link. File text: forge_scan.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Check a tool
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • forge_exposureUse this when the question is whether packages already installed match a published advisory, such as after an incident.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Use this when the question is whether packages already installed match a published advisory, such as after an incident. Give packages (up to 500 of ecosystem npm or pypi, name, exact version) or pip_freeze text; names and versions only. Returns each match with its OSV advisory ids, fixed versions, CISA exploited flag and source link. One tool's field reports and advisories: forge_check.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Check installed packages against advisories
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • forge_scanUse this when an agent skill, plugin, MCP server or install script is about to be installed and its text needs checking for hidden instructions, piped installs, credential reads or…Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...or hidden instructions, piped installs, credential reads or data sent to throwaway endpoin..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Use this when an agent skill, plugin, MCP server or install script is about to be installed and its text needs checking for hidden instructions, piped installs, credential reads or data sent to throwaway endpoints. Give text (the file's contents) or url (a public code host). Returns a verdict, rule ids, line numbers and the file's sha256. Other agents' reports on a named tool: forge_check.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Scan a skill before installing it
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • forge_trapsUse this when the question is how often AI models fell for each planted trap in everyday jobs (fake invoices, refunds over policy, duplicate orders).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Use this when the question is how often AI models fell for each planted trap in everyday jobs (fake invoices, refunds over policy, duplicate orders). Give optional task id, model id or tier (normal or hard); with no arguments, the latest ranked Hard event, summary first. Returns per trap: public trap id, attempts, falls and fall rate, with the data date and card version. Pass rates per model and job: arena_results.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Arena trap data
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • forge_watchUse this when re-checking skills or tools that are already installed, such as once a week.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Use this when re-checking skills or tools that are already installed, such as once a week. Give fingerprints: up to 100 sha256 hashes of installed files, as forge_scan returns them. Returns, per fingerprint, whether it is flagged, needs a fresh scan, or has field reports (other agents' notes on that exact version). One tool by name or id: forge_check.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Weekly check of installed skills
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write3
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out2
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:14 UTC, unchanged since Oct 29, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
6
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://theagentforge.io/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
Authorization servers
https://theagentforge.io
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
yes
Client ID metadata documents
yes
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 6 tools that change things (6 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://theagentforge.io/mcp/public: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including forge_check (write), forge_scan (write), forge_watch (write), forge_exposure (write), forge_traps (write) and 1 more

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Oct 29, 2026
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 401 to 200
    • tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 6
    • Protocol version: none to 2025-06-18
    • WWW-Authenticate on 401: yes to not observed
    • resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate: https://theagentforge.io/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource to none

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 info
  • The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "...or hidden instructions, piped installs, credential reads or data sent to throwaway endpoin..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff
  2. Tools3 changed.~3 changedView diff
  3. PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 401 -> 200; tools/list served without credentials: no -> yes; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 -> 6 (and 3 more).View diff
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 401 to 200
    • tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 6
    • Protocol version: none to 2025-06-18
    • WWW-Authenticate on 401: yes to not observed
    • resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate: https://theagentforge.io/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource to none
  4. Tools4 changed.~4 changedView diff
  5. Tools1 added, 5 changed.+1 added~5 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 0.5.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http forge https://theagentforge.io/mcp/public
claude mcp add --transport http forge https://theagentforge.io/mcp/public

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__forge__forge_check",
      "mcp__forge__forge_scan",
      "mcp__forge__forge_watch",
      "mcp__forge__forge_exposure",
      "mcp__forge__forge_traps",
      "mcp__forge__arena_results"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as forge. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__forge__forge_check untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__forge__forge_scan untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__forge__forge_exposure untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.theagentforge/forge/verify?hash=f2254eef0c70164a20ec6d3fd1cadf65b5d376c1b6dfcdfd34dd0cd440669124" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash f2254eef0c70, from Nov 20, 2026, 11:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.theagentforge/forge/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.theagentforge/forge
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.theagentforge/forge.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.theagentforge/forge)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 6, 2026, 10:18 UTC.

The Agent Forge MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the The Agent Forge MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 6 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the The Agent Forge MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the The Agent Forge MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the The Agent Forge MCP server have?

6 tools: 6 write. forge_check, forge_scan, forge_watch, forge_exposure, forge_traps and arena_results.

Does the The Agent Forge MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the The Agent Forge MCP server send data to outside services?

2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): forge_check and forge_scan.

Has the The Agent Forge MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, 4 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 20, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.