Threatist MCP server
io.threatist/threatistthreatist.iostreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Vulnerability records: CVE, GHSA, CISA KEV, EPSS and vendor fixes in one place. No key needed.
5 tools: 5 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
Decide which of this server's tools your agent can use.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Threatist MCP server can do
The Threatist MCP server is published by threatist.io, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 22, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Only reads 5Show 5 read-only tools
get_advisoryA Red Hat RHSA or Microsoft KB or ADV with its CVEs and records.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_advisory" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it A Red Hat RHSA or Microsoft KB or ADV with its CVEs and records.
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
get_vendorA vendor's records, highest priority first.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_vendor" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it A vendor's records, highest priority first. Takes the same filters as search_vulnerabilities.
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
get_vulnerabilityA record for a TI id or an alias such as a CVE or GHSA id.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_vulnerability" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it A record for a TI id or an alias such as a CVE or GHSA id. Merged ids give the surviving record. By default the record is shortened: no CPE matches, at most 20 references (exploits and patches first) and the 10 newest advisories; trimmed says what was cut.
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
list_exploitedRecent additions to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_exploited" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Recent additions to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue. Newest first, each with its Threatist record.
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
search_vulnerabilitiesRecords matching a text and filters, a page at a time.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_vulnerabilities" says "search": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Records matching a text and filters, a page at a time. Pass next as cursor for the next page.
Annotations the server declares
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 15, 2026, 13:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 8, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools3 changed.~3 changedView diff
- Changed:get_vendorOnly readsinputSchema
- Changed:get_vulnerabilityOnly readsinputSchema
- Changed:search_vulnerabilitiesOnly readsinputSchema
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http threatist https://threatist.io/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http threatist https://threatist.io/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__threatist__get_advisory",
"mcp__threatist__get_vendor",
"mcp__threatist__get_vulnerability",
"mcp__threatist__list_exploited",
"mcp__threatist__search_vulnerabilities"
],
"ask": [],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as threatist. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.threatist/threatist/verify?hash=54610a3255f6bece517a89d49a23056188fb6e42d7eccaf0b7f7824c58379c9c" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 54610a3255f6, from Nov 22, 2026, 06:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.threatist/threatist/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.threatist/threatist)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 7, 2026, 23:18 UTC.
Threatist MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Threatist MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.
Can the Threatist MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Threatist MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Threatist MCP server have?
- 5 tools: 5 read. get_advisory, get_vendor, get_vulnerability, list_exploited and search_vulnerabilities.
Does the Threatist MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Threatist MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Threatist MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 22, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.