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alice MCP server

io.tranx/alicetranx.iostreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned

Audit any site's AI visibility from your assistant: crawler access, rendering, and schema.

2 tools: 1 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 2
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the alice MCP server can do

The alice MCP server is published by tranx.io, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: check_ai_visibility), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

2 tools bring in text other people can write (check_ai_visibility and compare_ai_visibility); 2 tools can send data out of your system (check_ai_visibility and compare_ai_visibility).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 18, 2026, version 0.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

2 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • check_ai_visibilityCheck whether AI names a website when buyers ask, and whether AI can read it.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check whether AI names a website when buyers ask, and whether AI can read it. Starts a live check of one brand-name question and one buyer question on Google AI Overviews, ChatGPT, Claude and Gemini (results fill in on the report link within about a minute), and returns a 0-100 AI readability score: which AI crawlers the site allows or blocks, whether content is server-rendered, structured-data coverage, and the highest-impact fixes. Use when someone asks whether ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini or Google AI mention or cite their site, how their site appears to AI, whether AI can read or find it, or asks for an SEO or AI visibility audit of a URL.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • compare_ai_visibilityCompare how visible several websites are to AI answer engines, side by side.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "compare_ai_visibility" says "compare": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "compare" and "website": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.urls), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.urls): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Compare how visible several websites are to AI answer engines, side by side. Scans 2-4 URLs and ranks them by AI visibility score, showing which blocks AI crawlers, which is server-rendered, and which has answer-ready structured data. Use when someone wants to benchmark their site against competitors, or asks why a competitor gets recommended by AI assistants and they do not. This compares technical readability only; it does not test live AI mentions.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out2
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:14 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://tranx.io/api/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including check_ai_visibility (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
  2. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http alice https://tranx.io/api/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http alice https://tranx.io/api/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__alice__check_ai_visibility",
      "mcp__alice__compare_ai_visibility"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as alice. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__alice__check_ai_visibility untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__alice__compare_ai_visibility untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.tranx/alice/verify?hash=0fbff3d6d6cfa4480106fc1741c9e3d8a7313a40601e70b3b6c9d689329ebeb6" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 0fbff3d6d6cf, from Nov 18, 2026, 15:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.tranx/alice/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.tranx/alice
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.tranx/alice.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.tranx/alice)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:52 UTC.

alice MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the alice MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the alice MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the alice MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the alice MCP server have?

2 tools: 1 write, 1 read. check_ai_visibility and compare_ai_visibility.

Does the alice MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the alice MCP server send data to outside services?

2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): check_ai_visibility and compare_ai_visibility.

Has the alice MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 18, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.