Tailscale MCP by usefulapi
io.usefulapi/tailscaleusefulapi.iostreamable-httpv1.40.5Scanned
Read devices, users, keys, ACLs and DNS for a tailnet; manage devices, routes and auth keys.
22 tools: 8 can delete or cancel things and 14 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
The remote endpoint did not answer the last look. Remote posture
Anlyon alternative
8 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →What the Tailscale MCP by usefulapi can do
The Tailscale MCP by usefulapi is published by usefulapi.io, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 22 tools. It can delete or cancel things (8 tools: tailscale_authorize_device, tailscale_set_device_name, tailscale_set_device_tags, tailscale_expire_device_key and 4 more). 14 tools only read.
1 tool reads private data (tailscale_get_policy_file).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Last scanned Oct 25, 2026, version 1.40.5.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
22 tools
Deletes or cancels 8Claude Code: deny
tailscale_authorize_deviceAuthorize or de-authorize a device (only relevant when device approval is enabled for the tailnet).No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
Description, as the server wrote it Authorize or de-authorize a device (only relevant when device approval is enabled for the tailnet). Tailscale REST: POST /device/{deviceId}/authorized.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Authorize device
- destructiveHint: true
tailscale_create_auth_keyCreate a new auth key for the tailnet (used to register new devices).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "tailscale_create_auth_key" says "create": a word for a change.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
Description, as the server wrote it Create a new auth key for the tailnet (used to register new devices). Tailscale REST: POST /tailnet/{tailnet}/keys.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Create auth key
- destructiveHint: true
tailscale_delete_deviceDelete a device, removing it from the tailnet.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "tailscale_delete_device" says "delete": a word for removing or ending something.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
Description, as the server wrote it Delete a device, removing it from the tailnet. Tailscale REST: DELETE /device/{deviceId}.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Delete device
- destructiveHint: true
tailscale_delete_keyDelete (revoke) an auth key or API access token by id — a security response.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "tailscale_delete_key" says "delete": a word for removing or ending something.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
Description, as the server wrote it Delete (revoke) an auth key or API access token by id — a security response. Tailscale REST: DELETE /tailnet/{tailnet}/keys/{keyId}.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Delete key
- destructiveHint: true
tailscale_expire_device_keyExpire a device's node key, forcing it to re-authenticate — a security response to a compromised or lost device.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
Description, as the server wrote it Expire a device's node key, forcing it to re-authenticate — a security response to a compromised or lost device. Tailscale REST: POST /device/{deviceId}/expire.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Expire device key
- destructiveHint: true
tailscale_set_device_nameSet (rename) a device's name.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "tailscale_set_device_name" says "set": a word for a change.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
Description, as the server wrote it Set (rename) a device's name. Tailscale REST: POST /device/{deviceId}/name.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Set device name
- destructiveHint: true
tailscale_set_device_routesSet the subnet routes ENABLED for a device (from the routes it advertises).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "tailscale_set_device_routes" says "set": a word for a change.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
Description, as the server wrote it Set the subnet routes ENABLED for a device (from the routes it advertises). REPLACES the enabled set. Tailscale REST: POST /device/{deviceId}/routes.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Set device routes
- destructiveHint: true
tailscale_set_device_tagsSet a device's ACL tags.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "tailscale_set_device_tags" says "set": a word for a change.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
Description, as the server wrote it Set a device's ACL tags. REPLACES the device's existing tags. Tailscale REST: POST /device/{deviceId}/tags.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Set device tags
- destructiveHint: true
Only reads 14Show 14 read-only tools
tailscale_get_deviceGet a single device by id.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "tailscale_get_device" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Get a single device by id. Tailscale REST: GET /device/{deviceId}.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get device
- readOnlyHint: true
tailscale_get_dns_preferencesGet the tailnet's DNS preferences (e.g.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "tailscale_get_dns_preferences" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Get the tailnet's DNS preferences (e.g. whether MagicDNS is enabled). Tailscale REST: GET /tailnet/{tailnet}/dns/preferences.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get DNS preferences
- readOnlyHint: true
tailscale_get_keyGet details of a single auth key / API access token by id (capabilities, expiry, usage).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "tailscale_get_key" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Get details of a single auth key / API access token by id (capabilities, expiry, usage). Tailscale REST: GET /tailnet/{tailnet}/keys/{keyId}.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get key
- readOnlyHint: true
tailscale_get_policy_fileGet the tailnet's ACL / policy file (returned as JSON via the Accept header, not HuJSON).Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "tailscale_get_policy_file" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "tailscale_get_policy_file" says "get" and "file": it reads files.
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "get" and "file": it reads files.
Description, as the server wrote it Get the tailnet's ACL / policy file (returned as JSON via the Accept header, not HuJSON). Tailscale REST: GET /tailnet/{tailnet}/acl.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get policy file
- readOnlyHint: true
tailscale_get_split_dnsGet the tailnet's split-DNS configuration — a map of domain → nameservers.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "tailscale_get_split_dns" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Get the tailnet's split-DNS configuration — a map of domain → nameservers. Tailscale REST: GET /tailnet/{tailnet}/dns/split-dns.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get split DNS
- readOnlyHint: true
tailscale_get_tailnet_settingsGet the tailnet's settings (device approval, key expiry, posture, etc.).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "tailscale_get_tailnet_settings" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Get the tailnet's settings (device approval, key expiry, posture, etc.). Tailscale REST: GET /tailnet/{tailnet}/settings.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get tailnet settings
- readOnlyHint: true
tailscale_get_userGet a single user by id.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "tailscale_get_user" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Get a single user by id. Tailscale REST: GET /users/{userId}.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get user
- readOnlyHint: true
tailscale_list_device_routesList the subnet routes a device advertises and which are enabled.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "tailscale_list_device_routes" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List the subnet routes a device advertises and which are enabled. Tailscale REST: GET /device/{deviceId}/routes.
Annotations the server declares
- title: List device routes
- readOnlyHint: true
tailscale_list_devicesList all devices in the tailnet (name, addresses, OS, last seen, tags, etc.).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "tailscale_list_devices" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List all devices in the tailnet (name, addresses, OS, last seen, tags, etc.). Tailscale REST: GET /tailnet/{tailnet}/devices.
Annotations the server declares
- title: List devices
- readOnlyHint: true
tailscale_list_dns_nameserversList the global DNS nameservers configured for the tailnet.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "tailscale_list_dns_nameservers" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List the global DNS nameservers configured for the tailnet. Tailscale REST: GET /tailnet/{tailnet}/dns/nameservers.
Annotations the server declares
- title: List DNS nameservers
- readOnlyHint: true
tailscale_list_dns_searchpathsList the DNS search paths (search domains) configured for the tailnet.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "tailscale_list_dns_searchpaths" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List the DNS search paths (search domains) configured for the tailnet. Tailscale REST: GET /tailnet/{tailnet}/dns/searchpaths.
Annotations the server declares
- title: List DNS search paths
- readOnlyHint: true
tailscale_list_keysList auth keys and API access tokens for the tailnet.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "tailscale_list_keys" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List auth keys and API access tokens for the tailnet. Tailscale REST: GET /tailnet/{tailnet}/keys.
Annotations the server declares
- title: List keys
- readOnlyHint: true
tailscale_list_usersList users of the tailnet, optionally filtered by type, role or status.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "tailscale_list_users" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List users of the tailnet, optionally filtered by type, role or status. Tailscale REST: GET /tailnet/{tailnet}/users.
Annotations the server declares
- title: List users
- readOnlyHint: true
tailscale_list_webhooksList the webhook endpoints configured for the tailnet.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "tailscale_list_webhooks" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List the webhook endpoints configured for the tailnet. Tailscale REST: GET /tailnet/{tailnet}/webhooks.
Annotations the server declares
- title: List webhooks
- readOnlyHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:38 UTC, unchanged since Oct 29, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- no
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- not observed
- tools/list served without credentials
- no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- not observed
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
The probe stopped: The server redirected a POST to a different request.
Posture changes
- Oct 29, 2026
- Reachable: yes to no
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to none
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 8 to 0
- Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: https://tailscale.usefulapi.io/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp to none
- Authorization servers: https://tailscale.usefulapi.io to none
- Dynamic client registration: yes to not observed
- Client ID metadata documents: no to not observed
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. Reachable: yes -> no; HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> none; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no (and 6 more).View diff
- Reachable: yes to no
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to none
- tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 8 to 0
- Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata: https://tailscale.usefulapi.io/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp to none
- Authorization servers: https://tailscale.usefulapi.io to none
- Dynamic client registration: yes to not observed
- Client ID metadata documents: no to not observed
Install
Pinned to version 1.40.5. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http tailscale https://tailscale.usefulapi.io/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http tailscale https://tailscale.usefulapi.io/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__tailscale__tailscale_list_devices",
"mcp__tailscale__tailscale_get_device",
"mcp__tailscale__tailscale_list_device_routes",
"mcp__tailscale__tailscale_list_keys",
"mcp__tailscale__tailscale_get_key",
"mcp__tailscale__tailscale_get_policy_file",
"mcp__tailscale__tailscale_list_dns_nameservers",
"mcp__tailscale__tailscale_get_dns_preferences",
"mcp__tailscale__tailscale_list_dns_searchpaths",
"mcp__tailscale__tailscale_get_split_dns",
"mcp__tailscale__tailscale_list_users",
"mcp__tailscale__tailscale_get_user",
"mcp__tailscale__tailscale_list_webhooks",
"mcp__tailscale__tailscale_get_tailnet_settings"
],
"ask": [],
"deny": [
"mcp__tailscale__tailscale_authorize_device",
"mcp__tailscale__tailscale_set_device_name",
"mcp__tailscale__tailscale_set_device_tags",
"mcp__tailscale__tailscale_expire_device_key",
"mcp__tailscale__tailscale_set_device_routes",
"mcp__tailscale__tailscale_create_auth_key",
"mcp__tailscale__tailscale_delete_key",
"mcp__tailscale__tailscale_delete_device"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as tailscale. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__tailscale__tailscale_get_policy_file private-data
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.usefulapi/tailscale/verify?hash=608ee481e916c33608c8e49f660053b3e8dc3faf267daf36a6dfa398bccbb66c" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 608ee481e916, from Oct 25, 2026, 23:19 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.usefulapi/tailscale/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.usefulapi/tailscale)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 20, 2026, 20:18 UTC.
Tailscale MCP by usefulapi: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Tailscale MCP by usefulapi safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 22 tools, 8 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Tailscale MCP by usefulapi delete data?
- Yes. 8 tools can delete, cancel or revoke something: tailscale_authorize_device, tailscale_set_device_name, tailscale_set_device_tags, tailscale_expire_device_key, tailscale_set_device_routes, tailscale_create_auth_key and 2 more.
Can the Tailscale MCP by usefulapi do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Tailscale MCP by usefulapi have?
- 22 tools: 8 destructive, 14 read. tailscale_authorize_device, tailscale_set_device_name, tailscale_set_device_tags, tailscale_expire_device_key, tailscale_set_device_routes, tailscale_create_auth_key, tailscale_delete_key, tailscale_delete_device and 14 more.
Does the Tailscale MCP by usefulapi need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.
Does the Tailscale MCP by usefulapi send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Tailscale MCP by usefulapi changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Oct 25, 2026.