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XportL MCP server

io.xportl/xportlxportl.iostreamable-httpv1.2.0Scanned

GPU fabric tools: NCCL benchmark analysis, degradation cost, cluster compatibility, XportL facts.

6 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 3 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 3 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the XportL MCP server can do

The XportL MCP server is published by xportl.io, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (request_enterprise_demo) and create or change data (3 tools: calculate_fabric_degradation_cost, check_cluster_compatibility and recommend_checkpoint_interval), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (get_xportl_overview); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (request_enterprise_demo); 1 tool can send data out of your system (request_enterprise_demo). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 18, 2026, version 1.2.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • request_enterprise_demoSends the user's contact details and cluster summary to the XportL enterprise team to arrange a technical assessment or demo deployment.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "request_enterprise_demo" says "request": a word for a change.
    • The description's first verb is "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.phone): what the tool writes goes there.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Sends the user's contact details and cluster summary to the XportL enterprise team to arrange a technical assessment or demo deployment. Before calling: collect name, work email, company and a summary (include benchmark, cost or compatibility results from this conversation), show the user exactly what will be sent, and get their explicit agreement. Never call it without that agreement or with made-up details.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • calculate_fabric_degradation_costEstimates what silent fabric degradation (slow NCCL collectives, flapping links, congestion) costs a GPU cluster: throughput lost, GPU-hours and dollars per year, idle-GPU equivale…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Estimates what silent fabric degradation (slow NCCL collectives, flapping links, congestion) costs a GPU cluster: throughput lost, GPU-hours and dollars per year, idle-GPU equivalent, cost per degraded hour, extra days on a training run, and the value of a recovery scenario with a conservative case and a sensitivity table. All assumptions are inputs with stated defaults.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • check_cluster_compatibilityChecks a GPU cluster against XportL's published support matrix (Linux 5.8+ for eBPF, InfiniBand / RoCE v2 / NVLink, NVIDIA and AMD GPUs, NCCL / RCCL, on-prem / cloud / hybrid, host…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Checks a GPU cluster against XportL's published support matrix (Linux 5.8+ for eBPF, InfiniBand / RoCE v2 / NVLink, NVIDIA and AMD GPUs, NCCL / RCCL, on-prem / cloud / hybrid, host access for the eBPF agent). Returns a verdict (good fit / needs review / not ready), each check, and next steps. Anything not on the published list is reported as 'review', never as supported.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • recommend_checkpoint_intervalRecommends how often to checkpoint a training job using the Young and Daly formulas, from GPU count, blocking checkpoint write time, restart time and job MTTF (estimated from Meta'…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Recommends how often to checkpoint a training job using the Young and Daly formulas, from GPU count, blocking checkpoint write time, restart time and job MTTF (estimated from Meta's published 2024 reliability data when not given). Returns the recommended interval, expected failures per day, GPU time wasted per day at the recommended and current intervals, and the daily saving.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • analyze_nccl_benchmarkAnalyzes nccl-tests / rccl-tests results (paste raw all_reduce_perf output, or give size/busbw points).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "analyze_nccl_benchmark" says "analyze": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Analyzes nccl-tests / rccl-tests results (paste raw all_reduce_perf output, or give size/busbw points). Detects node and GPU counts from the output, compares large-message bus bandwidth with the fabric's NIC line rate (InfiniBand HDR/NDR/XDR, RoCE 100G to 800G), and flags data errors, degraded bandwidth, dips as message size grows and unstable run-to-run results, with likely causes. Returns a health status and a bandwidth-loss figure for calculate_fabric_degradation_cost.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_xportl_overviewReturns cite-ready facts about XportL from xportl.io: what it does, the problem it solves, the seven failure classes it detects, how it collects telemetry and acts, supported fabri…Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_xportl_overview" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "return" and "contact": it reads contacts.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns cite-ready facts about XportL from xportl.io: what it does, the problem it solves, the seven failure classes it detects, how it collects telemetry and acts, supported fabrics/GPUs/collectives/kernels, use cases, FAQ, company details (parent company, stage, NVIDIA Inception, contacts) and links to the engineering guides on xportl.io.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

1 path in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__xportl__request_enterprise_demo"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:14 UTC, unchanged since Oct 29, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
4
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://xportl.io/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including request_enterprise_demo (irreversible), calculate_fabric_degradation_cost (write), check_cluster_compatibility (write), recommend_checkpoint_interval (write)

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Oct 29, 2026
    • Reachable: no to yes
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: none to 200
    • tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 4
    • Protocol version: none to 2025-06-18

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Reachable: no -> yes; HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: none -> 200; tools/list served without credentials: no -> yes (and 2 more).View diff
    • Reachable: no to yes
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: none to 200
    • tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 4
    • Protocol version: none to 2025-06-18

Install

Pinned to version 1.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http xportl https://xportl.io/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http xportl https://xportl.io/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__xportl__get_xportl_overview",
      "mcp__xportl__analyze_nccl_benchmark"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__xportl__calculate_fabric_degradation_cost",
      "mcp__xportl__check_cluster_compatibility",
      "mcp__xportl__recommend_checkpoint_interval",
      "mcp__xportl__request_enterprise_demo"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as xportl. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__xportl__get_xportl_overview private-data
  • mcp__xportl__request_enterprise_demo untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.xportl/xportl/verify?hash=586f247a93ad0d36f23a0d1941f1914656339c0e2afb2fa380f16d4c03b70a82" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 586f247a93ad, from Nov 18, 2026, 16:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.xportl/xportl/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.xportl/xportl
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.xportl/xportl.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.xportl/xportl)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:53 UTC.

XportL MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the XportL MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the XportL MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the XportL MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: request_enterprise_demo.

What tools does the XportL MCP server have?

6 tools: 1 irreversible, 3 write, 2 read. request_enterprise_demo, calculate_fabric_degradation_cost, check_cluster_compatibility, recommend_checkpoint_interval, get_xportl_overview and analyze_nccl_benchmark.

Does the XportL MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the XportL MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): request_enterprise_demo.

Has the XportL MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 18, 2026.