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DID.is evidence MCP server

is.did/mcpdid.isstreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned

Read-only checks for DIDs, credentials, MCP servers, A2A cards and agent delegation.

7 tools: 3 change things and 4 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 4 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 7
  • Can send data out · 2
  • 9 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

3 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the DID.is evidence MCP server can do

The DID.is evidence MCP server is published by did.is, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 7 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: verify_credential, authorize_tool_call and evaluate_policy), but cannot delete data. 4 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (search_directory); 7 tools bring in text other people can write (resolve_did, verify_credential, inspect_mcp_server and 4 more); 2 tools can send data out of your system (inspect_mcp_server and inspect_a2a_agent). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

The fixed checks matched 9 findings (credentials-mention and annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 18, 2026, version 0.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

7 tools

Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • authorize_tool_callCheck whether a DID.is delegation chain (compact JWTs, root first) allows an agent to call a given tool.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "authorize_tool_call" says "call": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "authorize_tool_call" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "authorize_tool_call" says "call": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check whether a DID.is delegation chain (compact JWTs, root first) allows an agent to call a given tool. Returns ALLOW or DENY with the verified chain. Read-only; nothing is stored.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Check a delegation chain for a tool call
  • evaluate_policyEvaluate a DID against inline declarative rules or a saved team policyRef (allowed methods, curves, domain binding, TLS, linked accounts, verifiable history, credential status).Reads text others write3 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "evaluate_policy" says "evaluate": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...S, linked accounts, verifiable history, credential status). Returns PASS, FAIL or INDETERM..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The input schema at properties.credential.description mentions "Credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.credential.description: "Credential as a JSON object (W3C VC with Data Inte..."

      What this check looks for
    • Warn

      The server marks "evaluate_policy" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "evaluate_policy" says "evaluate": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Evaluate a DID against inline declarative rules or a saved team policyRef (allowed methods, curves, domain binding, TLS, linked accounts, verifiable history, credential status). Returns PASS, FAIL or INDETERMINATE (not a pass). Read-only.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Evaluate a DID against rules
  • verify_credentialVerify a W3C Verifiable Credential or SD-JWT VC (JSON object or compact string): signature, validity period and status list.Reads text others write5 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The title mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      title: "Verify a credential"

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The annotations title mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      annotations.title: "Verify a credential"

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The description mentions "Credential".

      Matched text

      description: "Verify a W3C Verifiable Credential or SD-JWT VC (JSON object or compact st..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The input schema at properties.credential.description mentions "Credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.credential.description: "Credential as a JSON object (W3C VC with Data Inte..."

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The input schema at required[0] mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.required[0]: "credential"

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Verify a W3C Verifiable Credential or SD-JWT VC (JSON object or compact string): signature, validity period and status list. Optional requiredClaims checks issuer-signed claim values. Read-only.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Verify a credential
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
  • inspect_a2a_agentFetch an A2A agent card (agent URL or card URL) and report its signature status, interfaces and skills.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "inspect_a2a_agent" says "inspect": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "fetch" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fetch an A2A agent card (agent URL or card URL) and report its signature status, interfaces and skills. Read-only.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Inspect an A2A agent card
  • inspect_mcp_serverInspect a remote MCP server over Streamable HTTP: protocol version, tool inventory fingerprints, declared annotations versus DID.is side-effect heuristics, and changes since the la…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "inspect_mcp_server" says "inspect": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "inspect" and "http": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.endpoint), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.endpoint): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Inspect a remote MCP server over Streamable HTTP: protocol version, tool inventory fingerprints, declared annotations versus DID.is side-effect heuristics, and changes since the last observation. Read-only; never authenticates to the server.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Inspect an MCP server
  • resolve_didResolve a DID (did:key, did:jwk, did:web, did:webvh) and report which evidence dimensions are established and which are not.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "resolve_did" says "resolve": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "resolve" and "web": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Resolve a DID (did:key, did:jwk, did:web, did:webvh) and report which evidence dimensions are established and which are not. Read-only; fetches the DID document from its origin.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Resolve a DID
  • search_directorySearch the public DID.is directory of DIDs whose controllers proved control and chose to be listed.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_directory" says "search": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "search_directory" says "search" and "directory": it reads files.
    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "search" and "directory": it reads files.
    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search the public DID.is directory of DIDs whose controllers proved control and chose to be listed. Matches names and domains. Read-only.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Search the DID.is directory

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

14 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 private-data tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write7
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out2
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__did__search_directory"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:14 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://did.is/mcp: tools/list returned 7 tools to an anonymous client, including verify_credential (write), authorize_tool_call (write), evaluate_policy (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 warn7 info
  • The server marks "authorize_tool_call" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "authorize_tool_call" says "call": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "evaluate_policy" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "evaluate_policy" says "evaluate": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The title mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    title: "Verify a credential"

    What this check looks for
  • The annotations title mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    annotations.title: "Verify a credential"

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "Credential".

    Matched text

    description: "Verify a W3C Verifiable Credential or SD-JWT VC (JSON object or compact st..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.credential.description mentions "Credential".

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.credential.description: "Credential as a JSON object (W3C VC with Data Inte..."

    What this check looks for
Show 3 more findings

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http did https://did.is/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http did https://did.is/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__did__resolve_did",
      "mcp__did__search_directory"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__did__verify_credential",
      "mcp__did__inspect_mcp_server",
      "mcp__did__inspect_a2a_agent",
      "mcp__did__authorize_tool_call",
      "mcp__did__evaluate_policy"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as did. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 7 rules
  • mcp__did__resolve_did untrusted-input
  • mcp__did__verify_credential untrusted-input
  • mcp__did__inspect_mcp_server untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__did__inspect_a2a_agent untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__did__authorize_tool_call untrusted-input
  • mcp__did__evaluate_policy untrusted-input
  • mcp__did__search_directory private-data, untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/is.did/mcp/verify?hash=23f25de7dabec6ec58039928f9e569bced2f66fbdfd29b2675035c675e6fb544" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 23f25de7dabe, from Nov 18, 2026, 15:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/is.did/mcp/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for is.did/mcp
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/is.did/mcp.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/is.did/mcp)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:53 UTC.

DID.is evidence MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the DID.is evidence MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 7 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 9 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the DID.is evidence MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the DID.is evidence MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the DID.is evidence MCP server have?

7 tools: 3 write, 4 read. verify_credential, authorize_tool_call, evaluate_policy, resolve_did, inspect_mcp_server, inspect_a2a_agent and search_directory.

Does the DID.is evidence MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the DID.is evidence MCP server send data to outside services?

2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): inspect_mcp_server and inspect_a2a_agent.

Has the DID.is evidence MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 18, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.