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Contencial MCP server

jp.co.contencial/mcpcontencial.co.jpstreamable-httpv0.2.0Scanned

株式会社コンテンシャルの公開情報を検索・取得できる読み取り専用サーバー。出典は canonical URL に固定。

6 tools: 1 change things and 5 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 5 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 3
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Contencial MCP server can do

The Contencial MCP server is published by contencial.co.jp, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: research_contencial_viewpoint), but cannot delete data. 5 tools only read.

3 tools bring in text other people can write (search_contencial_content, read_contencial_content and get_contencial_services); 1 tool can send data out of your system (read_contencial_content).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 18, 2026, version 0.2.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • research_contencial_viewpoint特定テーマに対するコンテンシャルの考え方を調べます。根拠を公式方針/サービス説明/専門記事/代表者見解に分類し、確信度を添えて返します。根拠がない場合は confidence="none" を返します。No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    特定テーマに対するコンテンシャルの考え方を調べます。根拠を公式方針/サービス説明/専門記事/代表者見解に分類し、確信度を添えて返します。根拠がない場合は confidence="none" を返します。
Only reads 5Show 5 read-only tools
  • get_contencial_profile会社概要・経営方針・代表挨拶・代表者プロフィール・運営ポリシー・アクセス・採用情報と、メンバー一覧・取り組み事例一覧を返します。No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_contencial_profile" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    会社概要・経営方針・代表挨拶・代表者プロフィール・運営ポリシー・アクセス・採用情報と、メンバー一覧・取り組み事例一覧を返します。
  • get_contencial_services提供サービスの一覧と各サービスの公式説明・canonical URL を返します。本文に料金やプランの記載があればそのまま含まれます。Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_contencial_services" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    提供サービスの一覧と各サービスの公式説明・canonical URL を返します。本文に料金やプランの記載があればそのまま含まれます。
  • list_recent_contencial_content更新日の新しい順に公式コンテンツを一覧します。「最近どんな発信をしているか」を検索語なしで確認する用途です。No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_recent_contencial_content" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    更新日の新しい順に公式コンテンツを一覧します。「最近どんな発信をしているか」を検索語なしで確認する用途です。
  • read_contencial_content公開コンテンツ1件の全文とメタデータを返します。content_id か canonical URL で指定します。Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "read_contencial_content" says "read": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    公開コンテンツ1件の全文とメタデータを返します。content_id か canonical URL で指定します。
  • search_contencial_content株式会社コンテンシャルの公開情報(会社概要・経営方針・メンバー・サービス・SEOブログ・SEOレポート・取り組み事例・お知らせ)を横断検索します。結果には canonical URL・種別・公式性の分類・更新日・該当箇所が含まれます。Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_contencial_content" says "search": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    株式会社コンテンシャルの公開情報(会社概要・経営方針・メンバー・サービス・SEOブログ・SEOレポート・取り組み事例・お知らせ)を横断検索します。結果には canonical URL・種別・公式性の分類・更新日・該当箇所が含まれます。

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write3
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:15 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.contencial.co.jp/: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including research_contencial_viewpoint (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http contencial https://mcp.contencial.co.jp/
claude mcp add --transport http contencial https://mcp.contencial.co.jp/

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__contencial__search_contencial_content",
      "mcp__contencial__get_contencial_profile",
      "mcp__contencial__get_contencial_services",
      "mcp__contencial__list_recent_contencial_content"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__contencial__read_contencial_content",
      "mcp__contencial__research_contencial_viewpoint"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as contencial. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__contencial__search_contencial_content untrusted-input
  • mcp__contencial__read_contencial_content untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__contencial__get_contencial_services untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/jp.co.contencial/mcp/verify?hash=aa40a27b7a184fedec5afdad29c64b0e641524928b5c0a814da1559ad0cc39e8" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash aa40a27b7a18, from Nov 18, 2026, 16:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/jp.co.contencial/mcp/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for jp.co.contencial/mcp
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/jp.co.contencial/mcp.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/jp.co.contencial/mcp)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:53 UTC.

Contencial MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Contencial MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Contencial MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Contencial MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Contencial MCP server have?

6 tools: 1 write, 5 read. research_contencial_viewpoint, search_contencial_content, read_contencial_content, get_contencial_profile, get_contencial_services and list_recent_contencial_content.

Does the Contencial MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Contencial MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): read_contencial_content.

Has the Contencial MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 18, 2026.