vdb MCP server
kr.ai.vdb/vdbvdb.ai.krstreamable-httpv0.2.8Scanned
Check packages for CVEs, slopsquatting, and CISA KEV before your AI agent installs them.
7 tools: 4 change things and 3 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
4 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the vdb MCP server can do
The vdb MCP server is published by vdb.ai.kr, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 7 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: vdb_check_package, vdb_check_packages, vdb_scan_lockfile and vdb_check_mcp_server), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 9, 2026, version 0.2.8.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
7 tools
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
vdb_check_mcp_serverBEFORE recommending a community/unofficial MCP server, check it here.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it BEFORE recommending a community/unofficial MCP server, check it here. Scope risk is evaluated independently of advisory risk — an unvetted publisher asking for shell or filesystem access is refused even with a clean record. Follow the returned `agent_action`.
vdb_check_packageBEFORE recommending or installing any package, check it here.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it BEFORE recommending or installing any package, check it here. The response carries `agent_action`: REFUSE (do not add it — relay the `because` text to the user), CONFIRM (ask the user first), or PROCEED. A failed or rate-limited call also answers REFUSE; never proceed unchecked. Also returns the underlying advisories, slop risk, and KEV status as supporting data.
vdb_check_packagesBulk-check several packages in one call — always prefer this over repeated vdb_check_package.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Bulk-check several packages in one call — always prefer this over repeated vdb_check_package. Each result carries its own `agent_action` (REFUSE / CONFIRM / PROCEED) plus a top-level `agent_action` for the batch. Follow them; relay `because` when refusing. Send names EXACTLY as written — do not correct a typo first, the call is the typo test.
vdb_scan_lockfileBEFORE merging, scan the resolved lockfile.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it BEFORE merging, scan the resolved lockfile. Checking the packages someone chose misses the transitive ones nobody did — which is usually where the risk is. Pass the file contents (package-lock.json, requirements.txt, uv.lock, go.sum, Cargo.lock, a CycloneDX SBOM, …). Returns `agent_action`: REFUSE means do not merge.
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
vdb_list_slopsquattingList packages currently flagged as slopsquatting candidates in a given ecosystem.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "vdb_list_slopsquatting" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List packages currently flagged as slopsquatting candidates in a given ecosystem.
vdb_lookupFetch a single vulnerability by ID or alias (e.g.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "vdb_lookup" says "lookup": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch a single vulnerability by ID or alias (e.g. CVE-2024-1234, GHSA-xxxx-yyyy-zzzz, VDB-SLOP-…).
vdb_searchFree-text search over the VDB vulnerability corpus.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "vdb_search" says "search": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Free-text search over the VDB vulnerability corpus.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:23 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 4
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://vdb.ai.kr/mcp: tools/list returned 7 tools to an anonymous client, including vdb_check_package (write), vdb_check_packages (write), vdb_scan_lockfile (write), vdb_check_mcp_server (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.2.8. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http vdb https://vdb.ai.kr/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http vdb https://vdb.ai.kr/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__vdb__vdb_lookup",
"mcp__vdb__vdb_search",
"mcp__vdb__vdb_list_slopsquatting"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__vdb__vdb_check_package",
"mcp__vdb__vdb_check_packages",
"mcp__vdb__vdb_scan_lockfile",
"mcp__vdb__vdb_check_mcp_server"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as vdb. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/kr.ai.vdb/vdb/verify?hash=84696ed933f24569c9836a85c549c67eb7cefacc198d7b2d862ec84a063dac44" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 84696ed933f2, from Nov 9, 2026, 14:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/kr.ai.vdb/vdb/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/kr.ai.vdb/vdb)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 27, 2026, 05:17 UTC.
vdb MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the vdb MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 7 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the vdb MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the vdb MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the vdb MCP server have?
- 7 tools: 4 write, 3 read. vdb_check_package, vdb_check_packages, vdb_scan_lockfile, vdb_check_mcp_server, vdb_lookup, vdb_search and vdb_list_slopsquatting.
Does the vdb MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the vdb MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the vdb MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 9, 2026.