Chain.Love MCP server
love.chain.app/chainlove-mcpapp.chain.lovestreamable-httpv0.1.1Scanned
Hosted MCP gateway for Web3 infra discovery across 20+ networks via one endpoint.
5 tools: 3 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- 3 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
3 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Chain.Love MCP server can do
The Chain.Love MCP server is published by app.chain.love, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: discover_categories, bind_credentials_bag and execute), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
The fixed checks matched 3 findings (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 18, 2026, version 0.1.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
bind_credentials_bagOptionally bind session-scoped downstream credentials immediately after initialize.3 findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Findings
- Info
The title mentions "Credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
title: "Bind Credentials Bag"
- Info
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...tionally bind session-scoped downstream credentials immediately after initialize. Safe to c..."
- Info
The input schema at properties.credentials_bag.description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.credentials_bag.description: "Optional session-scoped credentials map. When omitted, the server will atte..."
Description, as the server wrote it Optionally bind session-scoped downstream credentials immediately after initialize. Safe to call even when no credentials are available.
discover_categoriesFor a chosen chain, list its dynamic categories and compact category summaries.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it For a chosen chain, list its dynamic categories and compact category summaries. Call this after discover_networks and before search when you want deterministic retrieval.
executeUnified execution entrypoint for registry actions, saved connection management, downstream MCP connection validation, and downstream MCP runtime actionsNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "execute" says "execute": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Unified execution entrypoint for registry actions, saved connection management, downstream MCP connection validation, and downstream MCP runtime actions
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
discover_networksList authoritative chain/network keys available in the current release.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List authoritative chain/network keys available in the current release. Call this first to choose a valid chain before discover_categories or search.
searchSearch Chain.Love registry services.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search" says "search": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Search Chain.Love registry services. Prefer passing explicit chain/category from discover_networks and discover_categories, but standalone search still works without prior discovery.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:15 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://app.chain.love/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including discover_categories (write), bind_credentials_bag (write), execute (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The title mentions "Credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
title: "Bind Credentials Bag"
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...tionally bind session-scoped downstream credentials immediately after initialize. Safe to c..."
The input schema at properties.credentials_bag.description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.credentials_bag.description: "Optional session-scoped credentials map. When omitted, the server will atte..."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.1.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http chainlove https://app.chain.love/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http chainlove https://app.chain.love/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__chainlove__discover_networks",
"mcp__chainlove__search"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__chainlove__discover_categories",
"mcp__chainlove__bind_credentials_bag",
"mcp__chainlove__execute"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as chainlove. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/love.chain.app/chainlove-mcp/verify?hash=411c07727a8702e95acb36e946781f017b2271af45b6510b52e3747cc6d80494" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 411c07727a87, from Nov 18, 2026, 18:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/love.chain.app/chainlove-mcp/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/love.chain.app/chainlove-mcp)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:53 UTC.
Chain.Love MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Chain.Love MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 3 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Chain.Love MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Chain.Love MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Chain.Love MCP server have?
- 5 tools: 3 write, 2 read. discover_categories, bind_credentials_bag, execute, discover_networks and search.
Does the Chain.Love MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Chain.Love MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Chain.Love MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 18, 2026.