mtok.market MCP server
market.mtok/mcpmtok.marketstreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned
Spot market for AI inference tokens. Buyers pay per draw in USDC on Base; sellers host delivery.
13 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 6 change things and 6 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- 3 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here can delete or cancel things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the mtok.market MCP server can do
The mtok.market MCP server is published by mtok.market, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 13 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: cancel_order) and create or change data (6 tools: selling_guide, buying_guide, get_book, register and 2 more). 6 tools only read.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
The fixed checks matched 3 findings (annotation-conflict and credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 1.0.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
13 tools
Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
cancel_orderCancel one of your open orders.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "cancel_order" says "cancel": a word for removing or ending something.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
Description, as the server wrote it Cancel one of your open orders. side: offer|bid.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Changes things 6Claude Code: ask
buying_guideTurnkey, executable steps to get a human cheap AI tokens and run their prompts on mtok.market: bid (read routes[]) or read the book for a tier:direct offer, then draw paid chunks f…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Turnkey, executable steps to get a human cheap AI tokens and run their prompts on mtok.market: bid (read routes[]) or read the book for a tier:direct offer, then draw paid chunks from the seller's relay (pay each draw on-chain through MtokDripLedger, POST <relayEndpoint>/chunk, the relay verifies DrawPaid and serves). You need a funded wallet on Base.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_bookOpen offers (asks) and bids for a model.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_book" says "get": a word for reading.
- The description's first verb is "open": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "get_book" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "get_book" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Open offers (asks) and bids for a model. sort=input|output ranks by that dimension.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
place_bidBid for a block.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Bid for a block. The bid response returns routes[] — the crossing SELLER-HOSTED offers (lowest price first), each {offerId, sellerId, relayEndpoint, settlementPubkey, requestHashScheme?, inputPricePerMTok, outputPricePerMTok, availableInputTokens, availableOutputTokens}. Pick a route and DRAW paid chunks from its relayEndpoint (pay each draw on-chain through MtokDripLedger using /api/config, POST <relayEndpoint>/chunk, then affirmDraw/disputeDraw on-chain — see buying_guide / drawFromSeller). priceOn=input|output ranks matches by one dimension. You ALWAYS need a funded wallet on Base (there is no no-wallet path). SIGNING: a non-custodial market requires a client-signed Ed25519 intent — the MCP server CANNOT sign (it does not hold your key). Use the mtok SDK's bid() (it signs for you), or sign the intent yourself and pass {intent, sig}.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
place_offerList capacity for sale via SELLER-HOSTED delivery (tier:"direct" — the only advertised path).1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.
- The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "place_offer" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List capacity for sale via SELLER-HOSTED delivery (tier:"direct" — the only advertised path). Set tier:"direct" + relayEndpoint (your relay's PUBLIC HTTPS url — a cloudflared tunnel gives one free) + settlementPubkey (your seller payout EVM address on Base) and NO credentialId: you run your own relay (mtok-relay or any conforming passthrough) pointed at an upstream you control, and buyers pay each draw on-chain through MtokDripLedger (canonical relay protocol: GET /api/guides/selling, notes.directTierProtocol). After every instance behind relayEndpoint is dual-stack, add requestHashScheme:"nonce-v1"; omit it during a mixed-fleet rollout. Set a positive price; each on-chain draw pays seller plus configured platform fee, and the platform holds nothing. Your relay is REPORT-FREE: it verifies the DrawPaid event before delivery and reports nothing (the platform indexes the draw from MtokDripLedger events; the canonical tape is GET /api/chain/draws). GET /api/models/licenses is best-effort guidance, not a gate: you are responsible for the right to sell what you list. usableForSeconds is required. SIGNING: a non-custodial market requires a client-signed Ed25519 intent — the MCP server CANNOT sign (it does not hold your key); sign tier/relayEndpoint/settlementPubkey/requestHashScheme INTO the intent params. Use the mtok SDK's offer() (it signs for you), or sign the intent yourself and pass {intent, sig}.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
registerCreate an agent identity.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "create": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Create an agent identity. Returns {agentId, apiKey}; send the apiKey as the x-api-key (or Authorization: Bearer) header on EVERY subsequent request to act as that agent — this transport is stateless, so it is not remembered between calls. Pass pubkey (Ed25519 SPKI PEM) if you will place signed non-custodial orders.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
selling_guideTurnkey, executable steps to put a human's spare AI capacity on mtok.market via SELLER-HOSTED delivery — run YOUR OWN relay pointed at an upstream you control (a local Ollama/vLLM …No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Turnkey, executable steps to put a human's spare AI capacity on mtok.market via SELLER-HOSTED delivery — run YOUR OWN relay pointed at an upstream you control (a local Ollama/vLLM model, a subscription via a CLI bridge, or a provider key) and list a tier:direct offer; buyers pay you per chunk on-chain. Gotchas baked in. supply_type filters to one path.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 6Show 6 read-only tools
get_configChain config a SELLER-HOSTED buyer needs to build the on-chain draw payment: { feeAddress, feeBps, dustThresholdUsd, chainId, usdcAddress, dripContractAddress }.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_config" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Chain config a SELLER-HOSTED buyer needs to build the on-chain draw payment: { feeAddress, feeBps, dustThresholdUsd, chainId, usdcAddress, dripContractAddress }. Pay each draw through the MtokDripLedger contract at dripContractAddress (payDraw), then affirmDraw/disputeDraw on-chain; the seller relay verifies the DrawPaid event before delivery.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_drawsThe chain-derived draw tape: contract-paid draws indexed from MtokDripLedger events on Base.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_draws" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it The chain-derived draw tape: contract-paid draws indexed from MtokDripLedger events on Base. status=inProcess (DrawPaid with no terminal yet) | settled (closed by DrawAffirmed or DrawDisputed). This is the canonical delivered/receipt surface; the platform records nothing off-chain.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_meYour agent state: open orders (offers + bids).1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_me" says "get": a word for reading.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...there is no platform wallet, grant, or credential vault in /me; money moves peer-to-peer..."
Description, as the server wrote it Your agent state: open orders (offers + bids). Non-custodial — there is no platform wallet, grant, or credential vault in /me; money moves peer-to-peer on-chain, and your delivered draws are the on-chain tape (get_draws).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_reputationA seller's reputation: score, tier, recommendedMaxChunkUsd (the per-draw size a buyer should risk in the direct tier), plus a chain object {affirmed, disputed, deliveredUsd} folded…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_reputation" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it A seller's reputation: score, tier, recommendedMaxChunkUsd (the per-draw size a buyer should risk in the direct tier), plus a chain object {affirmed, disputed, deliveredUsd} folded from MtokDripLedger events (source:"chain").
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_spotSpot prices per model: the delivered OUTPUT-token rate (USD/MTok) from affirmed on-chain draws (last price, median, draw count).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_spot" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Spot prices per model: the delivered OUTPUT-token rate (USD/MTok) from affirmed on-chain draws (last price, median, draw count).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_statsExchange fee model plus chain-derived volume: delivered volume + affirmed/disputed counts, all recomputable from MtokDripLedger events on Base (source:"chain").No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_stats" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Exchange fee model plus chain-derived volume: delivered volume + affirmed/disputed counts, all recomputable from MtokDripLedger events on Base (source:"chain").
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:15 UTC, unchanged since Nov 6, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 7
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 7 tools that change things (1 destructive, 6 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://mtok.market/mcp: tools/list returned 13 tools to an anonymous client, including cancel_order (destructive), selling_guide (write), buying_guide (write), get_book (write), register (write) and 2 more
Posture changes
- Nov 6, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 to 7
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warnget_book
The server marks "get_book" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "get_book" says "get": a word for reading.
- Warnplace_offer
The server marks "place_offer" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.
- Infoget_me
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...there is no platform wallet, grant, or credential vault in /me; money moves peer-to-peer..."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 -> 7.View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 to 7
Tools13 changed.~13 changedView diff
- Changed:buying_guideChanges thingsannotations
- Changed:cancel_orderDeletes or cancelsinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:get_bookChanges thingsinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:get_configOnly readsannotations
- Changed:get_drawsOnly readsinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:get_meOnly readsannotations
- Changed:get_reputationOnly readsinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:get_spotOnly readsannotations
- Changed:get_statsOnly readsannotations
- Changed:place_bidChanges thingsinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:place_offerChanges thingsinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:registerChanges thingsinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:selling_guideChanges thingsinputSchemaannotations
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http mtok https://mtok.market/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http mtok https://mtok.market/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__mtok__get_spot",
"mcp__mtok__get_draws",
"mcp__mtok__get_stats",
"mcp__mtok__get_me",
"mcp__mtok__get_reputation",
"mcp__mtok__get_config"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__mtok__selling_guide",
"mcp__mtok__buying_guide",
"mcp__mtok__get_book",
"mcp__mtok__register",
"mcp__mtok__place_offer",
"mcp__mtok__place_bid"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__mtok__cancel_order"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as mtok. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/market.mtok/mcp/verify?hash=99f96989fd960ec927699b0bcb0c4b9c16931ccaf8fc6121c6eb14fbb52b4920" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 99f96989fd96, from Nov 17, 2026, 22:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/market.mtok/mcp/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/market.mtok/mcp)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:53 UTC.
mtok.market MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the mtok.market MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 13 tools, 7 of which can change, send or delete something, and 3 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the mtok.market MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: cancel_order.
Can the mtok.market MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the mtok.market MCP server have?
- 13 tools: 1 destructive, 6 write, 6 read. cancel_order, selling_guide, buying_guide, get_book, register, place_offer, place_bid, get_spot and 5 more.
Does the mtok.market MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the mtok.market MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the mtok.market MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 4, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.