Brandize MCP server
me.brandize/brandizebrandize.mestreamable-httpv1.2.0Scanned
AI logo generation, brand color palettes, SEO meta tags, JSON-LD schema markup, and blog search.
10 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 6 change things and 3 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 0
- 3 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Brandize MCP server can do
The Brandize MCP server is published by brandize.me, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 10 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (buy_logo_variation) and create or change data (6 tools: echo, generate_color_palette, generate_meta_tags, generate_schema_markup and 2 more), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.
1 tool brings in text other people can write (search_blog).
The fixed checks matched 3 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 1.2.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
10 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
buy_logo_variationPurchase one of the alternate designs from generate_logo_variations instead of the original logo.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "purchase": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
Description, as the server wrote it Purchase one of the alternate designs from generate_logo_variations instead of the original logo. Priced the same as the PREMIUM tier. Mints a short checkout link; once paid, the chosen variation becomes the job's deliverable — poll get_logo_result with the same jobToken to retrieve it. This is a paid purchase; the hosted checkout page collects the user's acceptance of the Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, so no separate consent step is needed here.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Buy logo variation
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
Changes things 6Claude Code: ask
echoHealth check that returns the provided message verbatim, confirming the Brandize MCP endpoint is reachable.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Health check that returns the provided message verbatim, confirming the Brandize MCP endpoint is reachable.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Echo (health check)
- readOnlyHint: true
generate_color_paletteGenerate a 5-color brand palette from a base hex color and a harmony rule.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "generate_color_palette" says "generate": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "generate_color_palette" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true}; The name "generate_color_palette" says "generate": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Generate a 5-color brand palette from a base hex color and a harmony rule. Returns CSS custom properties, a Tailwind config snippet, or a plain hex list.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Generate color palette
- readOnlyHint: true
generate_logoGenerate a brand logo.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "generate_logo" says "generate": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Generate a brand logo. Before calling, collect a short design brief from the user — do not assume defaults: (1) which package/tier they want to buy, (2) visual style, (3) color scheme (a primary brand color, and a secondary/accent if they want one), (4) layout (icon-only, wordmark, horizontal-lockup, or stacked), (5) the primary surface it must read well on, and (6) the industry. Ask for anything the user has not stated; if they have no preference on a field, propose an option and confirm it before generating. Returns a watermarked low-res preview plus a short checkout link priced at the Brandize service tiers, and an `upgrades` list of higher tiers (what each adds + its price) — offer these to the user before checkout and let them upgrade if they want, but never force it. The full-resolution, watermark-free deliverable (PNG + vector SVG + commercial license) unlocks only after payment — poll get_logo_result with the returned jobToken to retrieve it. This is a paid purchase; the hosted checkout page collects the user's acceptance of the Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, so no separate consent step is needed here.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Generate logo
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
generate_logo_variationsGenerate alternate style directions for an existing generate_logo job.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "generate_logo_variations" says "generate": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Generate alternate style directions for an existing generate_logo job. Free — no checkout — but limited to this job's free-preview credit (1 by default; a COMPLETE purchase grants 2 more, other tiers grant none). Returns the same kind of watermarked, low-res preview as generate_logo, plus how many free credits remain. Before any purchase, each result's variationId can be passed to buy_logo_variation to purchase that design instead of the original. On an already-purchased COMPLETE job, this instead adds more alternates to the deliverable itself (retrieve via get_logo_result as usual) — call it again there if the user wants more once revisionCredits allows. Any other purchased tier refuses outright — its deliverable is fixed.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Generate logo variations
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
generate_meta_tagsGenerate an HTML <head> meta-tag block (title, description, canonical, robots, Open Graph, Twitter Card) from page details.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "generate_meta_tags" says "generate": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "generate_meta_tags" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true}; The name "generate_meta_tags" says "generate": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Generate an HTML <head> meta-tag block (title, description, canonical, robots, Open Graph, Twitter Card) from page details. All fields optional.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Generate meta tags
- readOnlyHint: true
generate_schema_markupGenerate a JSON-LD <script> block for a schema.org type (LocalBusiness, Organization, WebSite, Article, FAQPage, or Product) from a flat data object.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "generate_schema_markup" says "generate": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "generate_schema_markup" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true}; The name "generate_schema_markup" says "generate": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Generate a JSON-LD <script> block for a schema.org type (LocalBusiness, Organization, WebSite, Article, FAQPage, or Product) from a flat data object. For FAQPage, pass data.items as [{ question, answer }].
Annotations the server declares
- title: Generate schema markup
- readOnlyHint: true
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
get_logo_resultPoll a logo job by its jobToken.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_logo_result" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Poll a logo job by its jobToken. Once payment has settled, returns a URL to download the full-resolution, watermark-free asset; otherwise a pending status. Read-only and safe to poll — after the user pays, keep polling every ~5 seconds for up to a few minutes (payment confirmation is not instant) until the status is paid.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get logo result
- readOnlyHint: true
get_pricing_tiersList Brandize service tiers with their price (USD) and included features.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_pricing_tiers" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List Brandize service tiers with their price (USD) and included features. Read-only; nothing is purchased.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get pricing tiers
- readOnlyHint: true
search_blogSearch Brandize blog posts (logo design and branding guides) by keyword.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_blog" says "search": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "search" and "post": it reads posts, which other people can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Search Brandize blog posts (logo design and branding guides) by keyword. Returns matching post titles, excerpts, and URLs.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Search blog
- readOnlyHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:15 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 7
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 7 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 6 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://brandize.me/api/mcp: tools/list returned 10 tools to an anonymous client, including buy_logo_variation (irreversible), echo (write), generate_color_palette (write), generate_meta_tags (write), generate_schema_markup (write) and 2 more
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The server marks "generate_color_palette" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true}; The name "generate_color_palette" says "generate": a word for a change.
The server marks "generate_meta_tags" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true}; The name "generate_meta_tags" says "generate": a word for a change.
The server marks "generate_schema_markup" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true}; The name "generate_schema_markup" says "generate": a word for a change.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http brandize https://brandize.me/api/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http brandize https://brandize.me/api/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__brandize__get_pricing_tiers",
"mcp__brandize__search_blog",
"mcp__brandize__get_logo_result"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__brandize__echo",
"mcp__brandize__generate_color_palette",
"mcp__brandize__generate_meta_tags",
"mcp__brandize__generate_schema_markup",
"mcp__brandize__generate_logo",
"mcp__brandize__generate_logo_variations",
"mcp__brandize__buy_logo_variation"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as brandize. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__brandize__search_blog untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/me.brandize/brandize/verify?hash=46e2441284284d83fdd1ff094adce66973054f47d4c9031a31e8734c50702bc7" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 46e244128428, from Nov 17, 2026, 22:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/me.brandize/brandize/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/me.brandize/brandize)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:53 UTC.
Brandize MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Brandize MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 10 tools, 7 of which can change, send or delete something, and 3 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Brandize MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Brandize MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: buy_logo_variation.
What tools does the Brandize MCP server have?
- 10 tools: 1 irreversible, 6 write, 3 read. buy_logo_variation, echo, generate_color_palette, generate_meta_tags, generate_schema_markup, generate_logo, generate_logo_variations, get_pricing_tiers and 2 more.
Does the Brandize MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Brandize MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Brandize MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 17, 2026.