Stabledrop escrow payments MCP server
me.stabledrop/escrow-paymentsstabledrop.mestreamable-httpv14.1.1Scanned
Stablecoin escrow payments the buyer can dispute, with a signed receipt. Pay a wallet or an email.
6 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 3 do something that can't be undone, 1 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 5
- Can send data out · 0
- 4 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here can delete or cancel things and 3 do something that can't be undone. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Stabledrop escrow payments MCP server can do
The Stabledrop escrow payments MCP server is published by stabledrop.me, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: settle_escrow_payment), do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (prepare_escrow_payment, payment_qr and check_escrow_payment) and create or change data (1 tool: verify_escrow_receipt). 1 tool only reads.
5 tools bring in text other people can write (read_published_page, prepare_escrow_payment, settle_escrow_payment and 2 more).
The fixed checks matched 4 findings (long-description and annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 14.1.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
6 tools
Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
settle_escrow_paymentCreate the payment contract around the money and return a signed receipt.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "settle_escrow_payment" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The description is 2,183 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...: it is a term, and leaving it out derives the default arbiter's address instead."
Description, as the server wrote itContains invisible characters, shown as [U+…] Create the payment contract around the money and return a signed receipt. `seller` and `nominal_buyer` may be wallet addresses OR EMAIL ADDRESSES, exactly as in `prepare_escrow_payment`; an email converts to the same wallet it did there. Works both ways, and which one runs is decided by whether you pass a signature: **Already transferred it yourself** — omit `authorization` and `signature`. We check the address holds the amount and build the payment contract around what is there. If the transfer has not arrived it says so, and nothing is spent finding out. **Want us to relay it** — pass the payer's `authorization` and `signature`. We broadcast it and pay the gas, so the payer needs none. This process holds no key and signs nothing; it is handed a signature and carries it. Pass the terms exactly as they were prepared. They ARE the payment contract's address, so a single altered figure moves it — and with a signature, stops matching what the payer signed. `seller` and `nominal_buyer` may be wallet addresses or email addresses, as in `prepare_escrow_payment`; an email resolves to the same wallet it did there. ⚠[U+FE0F] `external_id` MUST BE THE ONE `prepare_escrow_payment` RETURNED. It generates one when you leave it out, and that generated value is only knowable from its result — send a different one and this derives a different address, while the money is at the first. ⚠[U+FE0F] `error: sanctioned_party` IS FINAL. A party scored above 0 on the sanctions check when the money arrived (or the payment contract was refused before): the money is frozen at its address, and nothing more may be paid into it. Do not retry and do not offer to pay again. ⚠[U+FE0F] The receipt reports what the seller will actually RECEIVE in `token_amount`, with the platform fee named beside it. That is less than the amount authorised, and the two reconcile: token_amount + creator_fee = amount. `brand` is the white-label partner, as in `prepare_escrow_payment`: attribution only, and ignored when malformed. `arbiter`, when one was passed to `prepare_escrow_payment`, must be passed here too: it is a term, and leaving it out derives the default arbiter's address instead.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
Can't be undone 3Claude Code: ask
check_escrow_paymentWhat has happened to a settled payment, from the `status_url` on its receipt.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "check_escrow_payment" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "check_escrow_payment" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "check_escrow_payment" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
Description, as the server wrote it What has happened to a settled payment, from the `status_url` on its receipt.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
payment_qrA scannable code for a payment request, so nobody retypes an address.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "payment_qr" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "payment_qr" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "payment_qr" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
Description, as the server wrote itContains invisible characters, shown as [U+…] A scannable code for a payment request, so nobody retypes an address. Pass the `payment_uri` from `prepare_escrow_payment`. Returns a QR a phone wallet can scan, with the token, network, destination and amount already in it. Or pass its `share_with_payer.pay_link`, for a code that opens the payment on the site instead — what to hand someone who is being asked to pay, as the site's own requests do. ⚠[U+FE0F] A SEPARATE TOOL RATHER THAN PART OF `prepare`, because the two have different audiences. `prepare` answers a machine and has to stay parseable; an image in its result would make the structured fields something a client has to dig for. A person who needs the code asks for it. ⚠[U+FE0F] AND IT ENCODES THE URI, NOT THE BARE ADDRESS. A QR holding only an address leaves the amount and the token to be entered by hand, which is the part worth removing — a payment contract funded with the wrong figure is not the payment contract these terms derive to, and the money sits at an address nothing can deploy to.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: true
prepare_escrow_paymentWork out where a payment must go, before anybody signs or sends anything.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "prepare_escrow_payment" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The description is 4,991 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...erms the address derives from, so pass the same value to `settle_escrow_payment`."
Description, as the server wrote itContains invisible characters, shown as [U+…] Work out where a payment must go, before anybody signs or sends anything. `seller` and `nominal_buyer` may each be a wallet address OR AN EMAIL ADDRESS — an email is converted to the wallet that person owns, so you never need to know a wallet to use this. The parties are checked against the sanctions lists before an address is given. If any of them is listed the answer is `error: sanctioned_party` with no address, and the payment cannot be made through this service. The same answer comes back for terms whose payment contract was already refused on sanctions grounds when its money arrived: its address is not handed out again. If the check cannot be done right now the answer is `error: service_unavailable` with `retryable: true` and no address; try again shortly. Returns the payment address these terms produce, and TWO ways to fund it. Both end at the same address holding the same money; they differ only in who sends the transaction. **Transfer it yourself.** Send the tokens to the address from any wallet — a browser wallet, a hardware wallet, an exchange withdrawal. Nothing to sign for us, and no `payer` needed, because the payment contract never asks who paid: it reads its own balance. Then call `settle_escrow_payment` with no signature and we create the payment contract around what is there. **Or let us relay it.** Pass `payer` and this returns an EIP-3009 authorization for them to sign. We broadcast it and pay the gas, so **the payer needs no gas at all**. This is the only one an agent can complete unattended, and the only one that needs a key anywhere. Either way the address is the same, because it is a pure function of the terms. That is also what makes the relayed form safe: the payer signs `to` as part of the authorization, committing to every term at once — alter any of them afterwards and the address moves and the signature stops matching. `amount` is in the TOKEN's base units (1 USDC = 1000000), because that exact figure is one of the terms the address derives from. `expiry_timestamp` is an absolute Unix time — when the dispute window closes. `0` settles instantly with no recourse. There is no default: "instant, deliberately" and "nobody said" are different, and a caller must not discover afterwards which one they got. `nominal_buyer` is who may dispute and receives a refund. For an agentic payment this should be the PERSON, not the agent — they are the one who will later read a report and decide whether to object. **`seller` and `nominal_buyer` may each be a wallet address OR an email address.** An email resolves to the wallet Privy holds for that person — made for them if they have never logged in — and the same email always resolves to the same wallet, so the address derived here is the one `settle_escrow_payment` derives too. The resolved wallets come back under `parties`. A seller given by email is paid into that wallet; they sign in with the email to reach it. `external_id` keeps two otherwise-identical payments apart, and is one of the terms the address derives from. **Leave it out and a unique one is generated.** That is the right default: two payments matching in seller, amount, maturity and buyer would otherwise derive to the SAME address, and funding the second sends money into the first payment contract — recoverable only after that one is claimed, and only to ITS buyer. ⚠[U+FE0F] PASS BACK THE `external_id` THIS RETURNS, not the one you sent. A generated one is only knowable from the result, and settle derives the address again from whatever it is given: a different id is a different address, and the money is at this one. Supply your own for the opposite behaviour — a checkout hash gives "one checkout, one payment contract", so re-presenting the same purchase returns the same address rather than a second. `description` is what the payment is FOR, in the buyer's own words — ask them for it rather than defaulting. It is what they will be looking at in the dashboard weeks later deciding whether to dispute, and "Protected payment" tells them nothing about which one this was. It does not affect the address, so it can be set freely here. `brand` is the white-label partner the payment is being made under, if any (the `?b=` id, e.g. `escrow-me`). It is recorded on the contract for attribution only: it does not affect the address, and a malformed one is ignored rather than refused. `product_name` is what is being bought, shown on both parties' dashboards. Display only, like `brand`. A seller or nominal buyer given by email is recorded with that email as well, so the payment contract shows to them the way a request made on the site does. ⚠[U+FE0F] 1 to 160 characters. Longer is refused HERE rather than at the chain, where the check happens after the money has already moved. `arbiter` is who decides a dispute. Leave it out for the default arbiter, which is almost always right. It is one of the terms the address derives from, so pass the same value to `settle_escrow_payment`.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
verify_escrow_receiptCheck a receipt's signature against the key its issuer publishes.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote itContains invisible characters, shown as [U+…] Check a receipt's signature against the key its issuer publishes. ⚠[U+FE0F] THE KEY IS FETCHED FROM THE RECEIPT'S OWN `iss`, NOT FROM WHOEVER HANDED IT OVER. Otherwise anything that can serve a receipt can also serve the key that vouches for it, and the signature stops meaning anything. Use this on receipts from anywhere, including ones this server did not produce.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
read_published_pageRead one of the published pages, for answering questions about how any of this works.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "read_published_page" says "read": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Read one of the published pages, for answering questions about how any of this works. Use it rather than guessing. What the fees are, how a dispute is decided and who decides it, what a buyer is agreeing to — all of it is written down, and none of it is safe to invent. how-it-works How an protected payment works, start to finish faq Common questions about protected payments, fees, disputes and timing arbitration-policy How a dispute is decided, by whom, and on what evidence terms-of-service The terms a buyer and seller are agreeing to privacy-policy What is collected and why plugins The WordPress and Shopify integrations home What the product is and who it is for
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write5
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:15 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 5
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (1 destructive, 3 irreversible, 1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://api.stabledrop.me/api/ap2/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including settle_escrow_payment (destructive), prepare_escrow_payment (irreversible), payment_qr (irreversible), check_escrow_payment (irreversible), verify_escrow_receipt (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warnpayment_qr
The server marks "payment_qr" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "payment_qr" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
The server marks "check_escrow_payment" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "check_escrow_payment" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
The description is 4,991 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...erms the address derives from, so pass the same value to `settle_escrow_payment`."
The description is 2,183 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...: it is a term, and leaving it out derives the default arbiter's address instead."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools6 changed.~6 changedView diff
- Changed:check_escrow_paymentCan't be undoneinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:payment_qrCan't be undoneinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:prepare_escrow_paymentCan't be undoneinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:read_published_pageOnly readsinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:settle_escrow_paymentDeletes or cancelsinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:verify_escrow_receiptChanges thingsinputSchemaannotations
Install
Pinned to version 14.1.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http escrow-payments https://api.stabledrop.me/api/ap2/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http escrow-payments https://api.stabledrop.me/api/ap2/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__escrow-payments__read_published_page"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__escrow-payments__prepare_escrow_payment",
"mcp__escrow-payments__payment_qr",
"mcp__escrow-payments__check_escrow_payment",
"mcp__escrow-payments__verify_escrow_receipt"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__escrow-payments__settle_escrow_payment"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as escrow-payments. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 5 rules
- mcp__escrow-payments__read_published_page untrusted-input
- mcp__escrow-payments__prepare_escrow_payment untrusted-input
- mcp__escrow-payments__settle_escrow_payment untrusted-input
- mcp__escrow-payments__check_escrow_payment untrusted-input
- mcp__escrow-payments__verify_escrow_receipt untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/me.stabledrop/escrow-payments/verify?hash=7b8805b3d910ed93be3d0bf4c18a11e33effbe9254ce9c2a3ecdaf34452e54c8" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 7b8805b3d910, from Nov 17, 2026, 11:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/me.stabledrop/escrow-payments/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/me.stabledrop/escrow-payments)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 17, 2026, 11:18 UTC.
Stabledrop escrow payments MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Stabledrop escrow payments MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 4 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Stabledrop escrow payments MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: settle_escrow_payment.
Can the Stabledrop escrow payments MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 3 tools can send, pay, publish or merge: prepare_escrow_payment, payment_qr and check_escrow_payment.
What tools does the Stabledrop escrow payments MCP server have?
- 6 tools: 1 destructive, 3 irreversible, 1 write, 1 read. settle_escrow_payment, prepare_escrow_payment, payment_qr, check_escrow_payment, verify_escrow_receipt and read_published_page.
Does the Stabledrop escrow payments MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Stabledrop escrow payments MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Stabledrop escrow payments MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Oct 29, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.