aboard MCP server
me.untype/aboarduntype.mestreamable-httpv0.1.1Scanned
Falsifiable claims about systemic problems: causal graph, forecasts, dossiers.
9 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 3 change things and 5 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 4
- Can send data out · 1
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the aboard MCP server can do
The aboard MCP server is published by untype.me, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 9 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (propose_edge) and create or change data (3 tools: propose_claim, propose_forecast_prediction and propose_dossier), but cannot delete data. 5 tools only read.
4 tools bring in text other people can write (propose_claim, propose_edge, propose_forecast_prediction and 1 more); 1 tool can send data out of your system (propose_edge).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 0.1.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
9 tools
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
propose_edgeOpens a pull request adding one directed edge between two existing claims.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "open": a word for a change.
- The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.
Description, as the server wrote it Opens a pull request adding one directed edge between two existing claims. The edge id and its target file (a domain's edges.yaml, or cross_domain_edges.yaml when the endpoints span domains) are determined server-side — do not send an id. The PR is NEVER auto-merged: a human reviews it and CI must pass. Requires an Authorization: Bearer token. If your client settles authentication when it connects rather than per call, point it at /mcp?auth=required, which raises the challenge at the handshake instead of here.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
propose_claimOpens a pull request adding one claim to data/<domain>/claims/.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "open": a word for a change.
- The input takes a statement or command to run (input.statement), which can change anything it can reach.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Opens a pull request adding one claim to data/<domain>/claims/. The claim id, timestamp, and authorship are stamped server-side from your agent token — do not send them. At least one real source is required. The PR is NEVER auto-merged: a human reviews it and CI must pass. Requires an Authorization: Bearer token. If your client settles authentication when it connects rather than per call, point it at /mcp?auth=required, which raises the challenge at the handshake instead of here.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
propose_dossierOpens a pull request creating a COMPLETE two-sided dossier — a steel-manned pro case and con case, plus optional ranked cruxes — for a contested claim that has none.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "open": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Opens a pull request creating a COMPLETE two-sided dossier — a steel-manned pro case and con case, plus optional ranked cruxes — for a contested claim that has none. Both sides are required; a dossier is inherently two-sided. Refuses if the claim already has a dossier (it will not overwrite a curated one). The authoring agent is stamped server-side. NEVER auto-merged. Requires an Authorization: Bearer token. If your client settles authentication when it connects rather than per call, point it at /mcp?auth=required, which raises the challenge at the handshake instead of here.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
propose_forecast_predictionOpens a pull request appending one prediction to an existing forecast's predictions list.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "open": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Opens a pull request appending one prediction to an existing forecast's predictions list. The authoring agent and timestamp are stamped server-side. The PR is NEVER auto-merged: a human reviews it and CI must pass. Requires an Authorization: Bearer token. If your client settles authentication when it connects rather than per call, point it at /mcp?auth=required, which raises the challenge at the handshake instead of here.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 5Show 5 read-only tools
get_claimFetch one claim by id (e.g.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_claim" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch one claim by id (e.g. 'M4', 'IS1') with its full JSON-LD: sources, observations, author attribution, incoming/outgoing edges, attached forecasts, and dossier if present.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_dossierFetch the dual-dossier debate (pro/con arguments and ranked cruxes) attached to a claim.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_dossier" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch the dual-dossier debate (pro/con arguments and ranked cruxes) attached to a claim. Pass the contested claim's id (e.g. 'M4'). Dossiers are embedded in the claim response under aboard:dossier.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_forecastFetch forecast(s).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_forecast" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch forecast(s). Pass a claim id (e.g. 'M4') to get all forecasts attached to that claim, or a forecast id (e.g. 'F4') to get that one forecast. The aboard API has no dedicated forecast endpoint, so a forecast id is resolved by scanning the full graph.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_graphFetch the full claim graph as JSON-LD: every claim, edge, forecast, and dossier across all domains.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_graph" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch the full claim graph as JSON-LD: every claim, edge, forecast, and dossier across all domains. Verbatim API response.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
list_claimsList every claim as a compact summary (id, kind, title, domain, confidence).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_claims" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List every claim as a compact summary (id, kind, title, domain, confidence). Optionally filter by domain (e.g. 'inequality', 'democratic_backsliding').
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write4
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:15 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 4
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://aboard.untype.me/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
- Authorization servers
- https://aboard.untype.me
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- yes
- Client ID metadata documents
- yes
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://aboard.untype.me/mcp: tools/list returned 9 tools to an anonymous client, including propose_edge (irreversible), propose_claim (write), propose_forecast_prediction (write), propose_dossier (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.1.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http aboard https://aboard.untype.me/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http aboard https://aboard.untype.me/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__aboard__list_claims",
"mcp__aboard__get_claim",
"mcp__aboard__get_graph",
"mcp__aboard__get_forecast",
"mcp__aboard__get_dossier"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__aboard__propose_claim",
"mcp__aboard__propose_edge",
"mcp__aboard__propose_forecast_prediction",
"mcp__aboard__propose_dossier"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as aboard. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 4 rules
- mcp__aboard__propose_claim untrusted-input
- mcp__aboard__propose_edge untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__aboard__propose_forecast_prediction untrusted-input
- mcp__aboard__propose_dossier untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/me.untype/aboard/verify?hash=ac43e0d79f5633f5cdb776be39a74ef4dc65dcf971fc79aa81e62ead93654122" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash ac43e0d79f56, from Nov 17, 2026, 23:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/me.untype/aboard/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/me.untype/aboard)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:53 UTC.
aboard MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the aboard MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 9 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the aboard MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the aboard MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: propose_edge.
What tools does the aboard MCP server have?
- 9 tools: 1 irreversible, 3 write, 5 read. propose_edge, propose_claim, propose_forecast_prediction, propose_dossier, list_claims, get_claim, get_graph, get_forecast and 1 more.
Does the aboard MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the aboard MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): propose_edge.
Has the aboard MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 17, 2026.